Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.608708Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets
As of 21 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 57 of 57 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2501.12591.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.660024Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: pith, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.927084Z
Reference resolution
57 of 57 outbound references displayed
- verified exact3
- verified fuzzy18
- unresolved36
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 8ba22b45-4efc-42c8-a4dd-0a08e633b0f9 · outbound
This paper cites and Stoikov, S.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Stoikov, S
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.505779Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation febc5f90-668f-45d8-9288-bbeaa3771c24 · outbound
This paper cites and Bergault, P.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Bergault, P
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.494511Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation e95c35ae-7155-4b13-b137-daf6f5758fbe · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 3
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.481970Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 3116f1e0-87a9-4f67-b074-0f3ec08ffde7 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 4
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.469416Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 5200e7c5-ca62-48d4-b4bf-e0d08147c4a9 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 5
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.456613Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 9e90f725-2487-4899-92f0-7d329d3b56d5 · outbound
This paper cites Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders
Reference 6
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.380939Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation dbda77a9-c2ba-4a53-b059-136631b3b6be · outbound
This paper cites An overview on deep learning-based approximation methods for partial differential equations.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets An overview on deep learning-based approximation methods for partial differential equations
Reference 7
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.386468Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation c4dcecec-e81d-4fd0-905b-31ed83ef19df · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 8
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.444398Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 88d9453d-735a-42db-93de-3f4e5184f9db · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 9
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.429806Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 15c23410-dbed-41a4-a0dc-67ea6ab7c8d6 · outbound
This paper cites S., and Shim, J.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets S., and Shim, J
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.417079Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation dea18622-49cb-4bda-9050-7fe0f645df84 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 11
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.404079Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c9dafe32-d2a1-42d3-805f-60fc5e0f698f · outbound
This paper cites A new approach to principal-agent problems with volatility control.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets A new approach to principal-agent problems with volatility control
Reference 12
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.409133Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation cbbef6ae-8e8f-41a8-9c05-8e6949524789 · outbound
This paper cites and Foucault, T.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Foucault, T
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.390473Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation d98d13ed-c953-499b-9ac5-49b4d37e8cc3 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 14
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.378472Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 1f536f08-f534-4a66-bf46-5d987458954f · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 15
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.365728Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 713a5147-c666-4a57-953a-46c6cdc6f231 · outbound
This paper cites and Xing, H.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Xing, H
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.351009Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation df42d155-e29c-449f-8cb4-fda67365ac56 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 17
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.338009Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 14b9a6ff-0e8f-4948-ab92-5c763ee6369c · outbound
This paper cites Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.800921Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 30b9db89-c4a6-4876-b1dc-8cbffba66aca · outbound
This paper cites and Zhu, H.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Zhu, H
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.325866Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c1e7f67b-4e97-4001-bba9-a891fe11e599 · outbound
This paper cites and Zhu, H.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Zhu, H
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.313164Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 565f2525-6773-46ec-8de7-e70754f7333c · outbound
This paper cites and Possama \" , D.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Possama \" , D
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.301119Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation de76921b-56ac-4acf-be15-81efd8d574db · outbound
This paper cites and Touzi, N.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Touzi, N
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.288926Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation cc66f794-ed5d-4625-b690-c59a3436e55f · outbound
This paper cites E., Mastrolia, T., Rosenbaum, M., and Touzi, N.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets E., Mastrolia, T., Rosenbaum, M., and Touzi, N
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.276194Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation fde61c75-e26f-4b31-b4ca-09a4a6bc80b5 · outbound
This paper cites and Skouras, S.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Skouras, S
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.264182Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 544a52ee-0bd2-4b8a-8916-ef3f41d216b7 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 25
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.250564Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 700b3a3c-a8c4-45bf-863f-7a408deb991e · outbound
This paper cites and Nadtochiy, S.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Nadtochiy, S
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.236322Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 0f3080bc-0685-42a2-ac58-8251271d70b2 · outbound
This paper cites H., Papapantoleon, A., and Smaragdakis, C.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets H., Papapantoleon, A., and Smaragdakis, C
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified exact
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.775398Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 7a8bfef9-d4eb-4524-9ae4-e516851af922 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 28
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.223087Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 26b0a856-7c96-4af6-9f05-a23b8c1dd0b3 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 29
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.210358Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 11977a60-abba-4669-b207-ced19f42151b · outbound
This paper cites and Long, J.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Long, J
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.196439Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation d9b5ce25-2f3b-417e-99de-5c6f9628fb29 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 31
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.184692Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c61cf63a-2dbc-4699-ab0e-45be409586ad · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 32
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.171560Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 9d90ff2c-a57a-4e14-b9c1-9bc82ca61d7a · outbound
This paper cites and Milgrom, P.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Milgrom, P
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.158152Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 6ea4851d-7f88-4505-8b10-a6dee0afa932 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 34
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.503469Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation b5eccdcd-8857-4525-9d17-bef6f9f08eaa · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 35
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.134635Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 4f5b9d94-c682-4fa4-9ac0-e01882ff3237 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 36
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.120132Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 9bb2ae4f-55b4-4dad-aa69-a5e6d9099eb4 · outbound
This paper cites A deep learning method for solving stochastic optimal control problems driven by fully-coupled FBSDEs.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets A deep learning method for solving stochastic optimal control problems driven by fully-coupled FBSDEs
Reference 37
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.518361Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 56f5a8e4-24dc-4175-8442-b3e4ecc7c310 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 38
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.107704Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation f700b815-65aa-4620-ba49-192c538bc5f7 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 39
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.095142Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 9946e70d-356e-4651-a070-393d304a8084 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 40
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.080782Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 3243df72-63d6-4a0c-a65b-87770b486d67 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 41
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.067653Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation cd011d2b-5f5b-4ef9-9192-d64b8b9fdcdf · outbound
This paper cites Multi-Agent Relative Investment Games in a Jump Diffusion Market with Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Multi-Agent Relative Investment Games in a Jump Diffusion Market with Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
Reference 42
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.663924Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c759b1cb-e7be-41b9-9976-d41ec80c91ec · outbound
This paper cites and Ren, Z.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Ren, Z
Reference 43
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.051251Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation e7338f64-94ad-4cb6-9cb3-eb5d43531bf0 · outbound
This paper cites Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design
Reference 44
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.547134Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 742b98b4-6003-4683-ac93-5aea6e4508e1 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 45
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.034968Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 8705c3ca-7009-49ae-a4a9-626afdbc8221 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 46
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.021059Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 7c5c2b79-ffa6-40b5-a4c3-fe3498c26e97 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 47
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:04.008004Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation ba13dbbc-9973-4454-ad82-e2eed05bb22a · outbound
This paper cites and Sulem, A.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Sulem, A
Reference 48
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.990609Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c2978bfc-189c-4da1-a898-125a485c4dcd · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 49
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.976203Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 2717ef7b-1656-4ab3-a922-32d3928422cd · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 50
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.963658Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 198fa7a0-c268-4af9-8b7f-b5874af1f0cb · outbound
This paper cites and Viswanathan, S.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Viswanathan, S
Reference 51
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.951324Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation af39a526-69f7-4278-b982-d9183b976229 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 52
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.938036Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 8bc084a6-61ea-4173-959c-1b35290b81e7 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 53
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.914041Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 876c99bf-80ed-4c4b-941e-3b7151fbb039 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 54
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.897690Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 6f6ac431-3531-4e3c-b42c-6a6d9ce6b85d · outbound
This paper cites and Wellman, M.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets and Wellman, M
Reference 55
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.883902Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation c1f5ab07-b1fa-4a53-891a-174548641d82 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 56
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.870301Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation efb4b79f-1ebd-412c-8492-c94fecb0d605 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets Unresolved cited work
Reference 57
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T17:08:03.857307Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Pith citing papers
Observation 5e0572d3-ce78-4106-8363-7357eebcd2cc · inbound
Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools cites this paper.
Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.999760Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-21T06:32:19.484+00:00.
Observation 852398c3-3bd7-40ba-a607-969082868059 · inbound
Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions cites this paper.
Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets
Reference 42
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T08:26:58.375626Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.