Climb on the Bandwagon: Consensus and periodicity in a lifetime utility model with strategic interactions

What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper we study the collective behavior of a large population of agents being either Left or Right: the core idea is that agents benefit from being with the winner party, but, on the other hand, they suffer a cost in changing their status quo. At the microscopic level the model is formulated as a stochastic, symmetric dynamic game with $N$ players. In the macroscopic limit as $N \rightarrow +\infty$, we obtain a mean field game whose equilibria describe the "rational" collective behavior of the society. It is of particular interest to detect the emerging long-time attractors, e.g. consensus or oscillating behavior. Significantly, we discover that bandwagoning can be persistent at the macro level: endogenously generated periodicity is in fact detected.