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Market Design with Distributional Objectives

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arxiv 2301.00237 v2 pith:MQPJHVS3 submitted 2022-12-31 econ.TH

classification econ.TH
keywords distributionalmeritadditionapplicationschoicechoosingfamilyobjective
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We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. OpenAlex reports about 3 citations worldwide. Full citation record

  1. Matching with regional constraints: An equivalence

    econ.TH 2025-04 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    The FDA matching equals the DA matching when each hospital quota is its FDA fill count, which makes the DA outcome constrained efficient and weakly stable.

  2. Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals

    cs.GT 2024-12 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A school can enforce multiple diversity quotas while maximizing the minimum admission share of every type-combination group, and the paper gives a claimed-unique choice function and flow algorithms for it.

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