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Market Design with Distributional Objectives
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We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Matching with regional constraints: An equivalence
The FDA matching equals the DA matching when each hospital quota is its FDA fill count, which makes the DA outcome constrained efficient and weakly stable.
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Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals
A school can enforce multiple diversity quotas while maximizing the minimum admission share of every type-combination group, and the paper gives a claimed-unique choice function and flow algorithms for it.
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