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Now Let's Make It Physical: Enabling Physically Trusted Certificate Issuance for Keyless Security in CAs
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The signing key protection of Certificate Authorities (CAs) remains a critical challenge in PKI. Traditional approaches struggle to eliminate the risk of key exposure due to those (un)intentional human errors. This long-standing dilemma motivates us to propose Armored Core, a novel PKI security extension using the trusted binding of Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for CAs. PUFs leverage manufacturing variations to generate unique and random responses. Combining with XOR and hash, they can make key exposure impossible for CAs through keyless certificate issuance. In Armored Core, we design a set of PUF-based X.509v3 certificate functions for CAs to generate physically trusted "signatures" without using a digital key. Moreover, we introduce a novel PUF transparency mechanism to effectively monitor the PUF operations in CAs. We integrate Armored Core into real-world PKI systems including Let's Encrypt Pebble and Certbot. We also provide a PUF-embedded hardware prototype. The evaluation results show that Armored Core can achieve keyless certificate issuance while improving the computation performance by 4.9%~73.7%. It only incurs small communication and storage overhead (<4%).
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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RISecure-PUF: Multipurpose PUF-Driven Security Extensions with Lookaside Buffer in RISC-V
RISecure-PUF adds two RISC-V instructions that hash PUF responses with external challenges and adds a lookaside buffer, claiming provable security and up to 2.72x batch speedup on FPGA.
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