A Stackelberg Game Model for Overlay D2D Transmission with Heterogeneous Rate Requirements

This paper studies the performance of overlay device-to-device (D2D) communication links via carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) protocols. We assume that the D2D links have heterogeneous rate requirements and different willingness to pay, and each of them acts non-altruistically to achieve its target rate while maximizing its own payoff. Spatial reuse is allowed if the links are not interfering with each other. A non-cooperative game model is used to address the resource allocation among the D2D links, at the same time leveraging on the ideal CSMA network (ICN) model to address the physical channel access issue. We propose a Stackelberg game in which the base station in the cellular network acts as a Stackelberg leader to regulate the individual payoff by modifying the unit service price so that the total D2D throughput is maximized. The problem is shown to be quasi-convex and can be solved by a sequence of equivalent convex optimization problems. The pricing strategies are designed so that the network always operates within the feasible throughput region. The results are verified by simulations.