Powershare Mechanics

Ana Mikatadze; Beka Dalakishvili

arxiv: 1907.07975 · v1 · pith:RMM3AOPVnew · submitted 2019-07-18 · 💰 econ.GN · cs.DC· q-fin.EC

Powershare Mechanics

Beka Dalakishvili , Ana Mikatadze This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-24 19:38 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💰 econ.GN cs.DCq-fin.EC

keywords charity crowdfundinggamified social networkpublic computingFIRE consensus protocolscarce resource allocationincentivization structurevalue creationgovernance framework

0 comments

The pith

The multi-layer incentivization structure maximizes value creation in a gamified social network for charity crowdfunding through the optimal scarce resource allocation model and FIRE consensus protocol.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper proposes a governance framework for a gamified social network that supports charity crowdfunding fueled by public computing. It introduces an optimal scarce resource allocation model, the technological configuration of the FIRE consensus protocol, and a multi-layer incentivization structure. These components are presented as working together to maximize value creation across the network. A sympathetic reader would care because the approach suggests a structured way to align user participation, resource use, and charitable outcomes in a decentralized setting.

Core claim

The paper claims that the multi-layer incentivization structure maximizes value creation within the network through the combination of the optimal scarce resource allocation model and the FIRE consensus protocol.

What carries the argument

The multi-layer incentivization structure, which integrates the optimal scarce resource allocation model and the FIRE consensus protocol to direct participation and resources toward higher value outcomes.

If this is right

Value creation is maximized when scarce resources are allocated according to the optimal model.
The FIRE consensus protocol provides the technological foundation for reliable decentralized operation.
Multi-layer incentives encourage sustained user contributions to both computing tasks and charity activities.
The overall governance framework produces higher network efficiency than non-optimized alternatives.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

The same incentive layering could be tested in other public-computing or collaborative platforms beyond charity.
Pilot implementations would reveal whether user behavior aligns with the predicted value maximization.
Connections to existing public computing grids could reduce the technical barriers to initial rollout.

Load-bearing premise

The assumption that the proposed incentivization structure and consensus protocol will produce the claimed maximization of value creation when deployed in a real gamified social network, without major issues in adoption, technical failures, or misaligned user behavior.

What would settle it

A deployment of the gamified social network in which value creation metrics are measured and compared against a baseline version lacking the multi-layer incentivization structure and FIRE protocol configuration.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 1907.07975 by Ana Mikatadze, Beka Dalakishvili.

**Figure 1.** Figure 1: the provided code represents the logic of the non-linear reward allocation to the campaigns and backers, as well as the logic behind reduction of the circulating supply and accumulation of the surplus funds of the network to be allocated to campaigns through voting [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_1.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 2.** Figure 2: The provided code represents the logic of surplus allocation, where funds attributed to failed campaigns is distributed amongst the campaigns voted by the community Reduction of circulating supply As shown in the algorithm (surplus_allocation = circulation_reduction), which is linked to the decrease of total outstanding FIRE for the moment. For doing so, typically a burn mechanism is used. Despite its posi… view at source ↗

read the original abstract

This paper proposes the governance framework of a gamified social network for charity crowdfunding fueled by public computing. It introduces optimal scarce resource allocation model, technological configuration of the FIRE consensus protocol, and multi-layer incentivization structure that maximizes value creation within the network.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Desk Editor's Note private letter to a colleague

This is a high-level design proposal for a charity crowdfunding network using public computing and a custom FIRE consensus protocol, but it asserts value maximization with no models, derivations, or tests.

read the letter

The paper outlines a gamified social network for charity that runs on public computing, with an optimal scarce resource allocation model, a FIRE consensus protocol, and multi-layer incentives. The core claim is that this combination maximizes value creation inside the network. Nothing in the description shows any equations, optimization proof, simulation, or data to support that claim. The abstract simply names the pieces and states the outcome. That is the main thing to know: it is a framework sketch without the analysis that would make the claim testable. The integration of gamification, crowdfunding, and public computing for charity is the element that feels new, even if the separate ideas appear elsewhere. The paper does a reasonable job of sketching how the layers might fit together for a social-impact use case. That is the extent of what it does well. The soft spot is the load-bearing assertion about maximized value. Without a formal objective function, a closed-form result, or even a small agent-based run, the claim stays unexamined. The assumption that real users will follow the incentives without adoption problems or misaligned behavior is also left untested. No code, data, or machine-checked elements are mentioned, so there is nothing reproducible to credit. This work would interest people already working on blockchain applications to nonprofits or decentralized social finance. A reader looking for concrete mechanisms or comparative results will find little to use. It does not show the kind of formal or empirical engagement that would justify sending it to referees. I would not bring it to a reading group and would not cite it. Recommendation is to desk reject rather than send for peer review.

Referee Report

1 major / 0 minor

Summary. The paper proposes the governance framework of a gamified social network for charity crowdfunding fueled by public computing. It introduces an optimal scarce resource allocation model, the technological configuration of the FIRE consensus protocol, and a multi-layer incentivization structure that maximizes value creation within the network.

Significance. If the proposed structures were accompanied by formal derivations or reproducible simulations establishing net value maximization relative to alternatives, the work could contribute to research on blockchain governance and incentivized crowdfunding. As presented, the absence of any such validation restricts significance to an untested conceptual proposal.

major comments (1)

[Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the multi-layer incentivization structure (combined with the optimal scarce resource allocation model and FIRE consensus protocol) maximizes value creation is asserted without any objective function, closed-form derivation, agent-based simulation, or comparative analysis establishing superiority over alternatives.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their review. The manuscript is a conceptual proposal for a governance framework, and we respond to the major comment below.

read point-by-point responses

Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that the multi-layer incentivization structure (combined with the optimal scarce resource allocation model and FIRE consensus protocol) maximizes value creation is asserted without any objective function, closed-form derivation, agent-based simulation, or comparative analysis establishing superiority over alternatives.

Authors: The referee correctly notes that the manuscript asserts value maximization without an objective function, closed-form derivation, agent-based simulation, or comparative analysis. The paper is positioned as a conceptual proposal describing the governance framework, optimal scarce resource allocation model, FIRE consensus protocol configuration, and multi-layer incentivization structure. The claim follows from the intended incentive alignment in the gamified charity crowdfunding and public computing context, but no quantitative validation is provided. We do not intend to revise the manuscript to incorporate such elements, as the contribution is the proposed architecture itself. revision: no

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No derivation chain or self-referential steps present in available text

full rationale

The abstract asserts that the proposed multi-layer incentivization structure 'maximizes value creation' but supplies no equations, optimization objective, derivation, simulation, or parameter-fitting procedure. No load-bearing claim reduces to a fitted input, self-definition, or self-citation chain because no such chain is exhibited. The text is a high-level proposal rather than a mathematical argument that could be inspected for circularity under the enumerated patterns.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 1 invented entities

Based on abstract only; no explicit free parameters, axioms, or invented entities are detailed beyond the named FIRE protocol and allocation model, which appear to be introduced by the paper.

invented entities (1)

FIRE consensus protocol no independent evidence
purpose: Technological configuration for the network's consensus and operation
Introduced in the abstract as a core component without prior reference or independent evidence provided.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5550 in / 1111 out tokens · 35140 ms · 2026-05-24T19:38:42.684202+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

27 extracted references · 27 canonical work pages · 1 internal anchor

[1]

tragedy of the commons

i Mechanics Draft 4.1 Beka Dalakishvili Ana Mikatadze Last Revision 15 February, 2019 Tbilisi, Georgia ii Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..............................................................

work page 2019
[2]

items of unequal value

Our model has several major advantages over existing ones – firstly, backers have the opportunity to financially support charitable causes without monetary expenditure, moreover, directing the shared processing power towards scientific research creates additional layer of incentives. On top of social, psychological and emotional benefits derived from the ...

work page 2010
[3]

aggregate contributions of individuals to social welfare or other organizations

Even though altruism is a common term for economists, empirical evidence refutes against some assumptions derived from it. By definition, altruism refers to the concept of giving without expecting something in return, and implies that a positive change in other’s welfare positively changes the giver’s utility as well (Andreoni, 2002). This phenomenon was ...

work page 2002
[4]

stretching the social fabric

These results extend to social learning - a process of learning from and inheriting the habits and beliefs of surrounding community, which depends heavily on idea flows - the spreading of ideas within the exchange network. Social learning is a natural process, which is stronger, safer, and more frequent than independent formation of individual preferences...

work page 2014
[5]

pseudonymity provides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, contract state and user input must be public in order for miners to verify correct computation (Cox, 2018)

Privacy - in Ethereum users are pseudonymous rather than anonymous, and a number of studies show that “pseudonymity provides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, contract state and user input must be public in order for miners to verify correct computation (Cox, 2018).” Hence, it is virtually impossible to conduct a private ballot outlined in the previ...

work page 2018
[6]

in August 2017, it cost $26.55 to add 2 numbers together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract

Transition costs - “in August 2017, it cost $26.55 to add 2 numbers together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract” (Cheng et al. 2018), computation of the complex algorithms described in this document will inevitably result in higher Gas price paid for each state transition. 5 Under Consideration 16 The proposed solution is that of EKIDEN that ...

work page 2017
[7]

EKIDEN however is at the initial stage of development, but if executed as planned, it is closest to the requirements posed by the FIRE consensus protocol

as well as reduces transaction costs. EKIDEN however is at the initial stage of development, but if executed as planned, it is closest to the requirements posed by the FIRE consensus protocol. We believe that Blockchain is the missing piece in the technological revolution we are now witnessing, since it greatly contributes to a more distributed and fair a...

work page 2011
[8]

After both of those projects failed due to market conditions and legal issues (Cox, 2018), Coinhive was introduced in September 2017 (Symantec, 1982). Coinhive scripts are being utilized by the alpha platform of Powershare (at www.powershare.fund), as well as the prototype deployed in February 2017, and enables the model of CPU donation through a web brow...

work page 2018
[9]

BOINC is a software system that makes it easy for scientists to create and operate public-resource computing projects

suggests, that the amount raised should be negligible, taking into account the inefficiency of mining Monero (XMR) with a personal computer, market conditions and the number of supporters. The major challenge in adoption of browser-based mining is the negligible reward for user’s processing power resulting in negative profitability of the process. Berkele...

work page 2000
[10]

and Leskovec, J., 2015, May

Further testing and upgrading the alpha platform 21 References: Althoff, T. and Leskovec, J., 2015, May. Donor retention in online crowdfunding communities: A case study of donorschoose. org. In Proceedings of the 24th international conference on world wide web (pp. 34-44). International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee. Anderson, D.P., 2004,...

work page 2015
[11]

Utrecht University

Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and psychological perspectives. Utrecht University. Bekkers, R.H.F.P., 2005, November. It’s not all in the ask: Effects and effectiveness of recruitment strategies used by nonprofits in the Netherlands. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K.,

work page 2005
[12]

Available at: https://boincstats.com/en/stats/15/project/detail/user [Accessed 27 Nov

Detailed stats: World Community Grid. Available at: https://boincstats.com/en/stats/15/project/detail/user [Accessed 27 Nov. 2018] Bollier, D. and Clippinger, J.,

work page 2018
[13]

arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05141

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contract Execution. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05141. Chou, Y.K.,

work page arXiv
[14]

The Quest for Autonomy and Identity in a Digital Society,* Boston, MA and Amherst, MA: ID3 and Off the Common

From bitcoin to burning man and beyond. The Quest for Autonomy and Identity in a Digital Society,* Boston, MA and Amherst, MA: ID3 and Off the Common. Coinmarketcap. Gridcoin. [online] Available at: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/gridcoin/ [Accessed 26 Nov. 2018] Cox, J.,

work page 2018
[15]

[online] Available at: https://goo.gl/X5Lu9i [Accessed 5 May.2018] Crowdfunding.com

Creators of In-Browser Cryptocurrency Miner 'Coinhive' Say Their Reputation Couldn't Be Much Worse. [online] Available at: https://goo.gl/X5Lu9i [Accessed 5 May.2018] Crowdfunding.com. Best Fundraising platforms comparison [online] Available at: https://www.crowdfunding.com/ [Accessed 5 May. 2018] Curecoin

work page 2018
[16]

Journal of economic behavior & organization, 3(4), pp.367-388 Hertig, Alyssa., 2018 Blockchain’s once feared 51% attack is now becoming regular

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 3(4), pp.367-388 Hertig, Alyssa., 2018 Blockchain’s once feared 51% attack is now becoming regular. Coindesk, 8 June. Available at: https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-becoming-regular?fbclid=IwAR0cHrIaJiKoA-shnpr_lJBxKyZwUid0lAjcj-EaRXw-_z...

work page 2018
[17]

Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, 1, pp.1-122

Introduction to the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity. Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, 1, pp.1-122. Liu, L., Suh, A. and Wagner, C., 2017, January. Donation Behavior in Online Micro Charities: An Investigation of Charitable Crowdfunding Projects. In Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on Syste...

work page 2017
[18]

2018] Ostrom, E.,

Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread, The Lessons from a New Science [online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StIs_gIzbhs&t=1925s [Accessed 25 Nov. 2018] Ostrom, E.,

work page 2018
[19]

Behavioral and brain sciences, 25(1), pp.1-20

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioral and brain sciences, 25(1), pp.1-20. Recomendes, Joe., 2015 How much does it cost to run a crowdfudning campaign? Socialmediatoday, 26 February. Available at: https://www.socialmediatoday.com/marketing/2015-02-26/how-much-does-it-cost-run-crowdfunding-campaign [Accessed 20 Sep. 2018] Reed, D.P.,

work page 2015
[20]

End-to-End Analysis of In-Browser Cryptojacking

End-to-End Analysis of In-Browser Cryptojacking. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.02152. Smith, V.L.,

work page internal anchor Pith review Pith/arXiv arXiv
[21]

Journal of political economy, 70(2), pp.111-137

An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of political economy, 70(2), pp.111-137. Social Physics. [online] Available at: http://www.socialphysics.org/ [Accessed 27 Nov. 2018] Sokolowski, S.W.,

work page 2018
[22]

Stats.Foldingathome

The Antecedents of Interest in Social Crowdfunding. Stats.Foldingathome. Available at: https://stats.foldingathome.org/os [Accessed 26 Nov. 2018] Stalnaker, Stan.,

work page 2018
[23]

Hub Culture Group

Ven and the nature of money. Hub Culture Group. Sun, S.F., Au, M.H., Liu, J.K. and Yuen, T.H., 2017, September. RingCT 2.0: a compact accumulator-based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency monero. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (pp. 456-474). Springer, Cham. Symantec

work page 2017
[24]

[online] Available at: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/browser-mining-cryptocurrency [Accessed 5 May 2018.] 24 Ulieru, M.,

Software company. [online] Available at: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/browser-mining-cryptocurrency [Accessed 5 May 2018.] 24 Ulieru, M.,

work page 2018
[25]

Bitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond, ID3, 2014, pp.113-129

Organic governance through the logic of holonic systems. Bitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond, ID3, 2014, pp.113-129. Van Saberhagen, N.,

work page 2014
[26]

The community’s property of self-organization is an absolute requirement for building a sustainable ecosystem

Flexibility is paramount for reaching the huge number of n2 of value creation in Group Forming Networks (Clippinger, Bollier, 2014). The community’s property of self-organization is an absolute requirement for building a sustainable ecosystem. In CryptoNote difficulty target, block size and transaction fees are dynamically adjusted by the algorithm, takin...

work page 2014
[27]

This is a natural restriction based only on implementation limits, not on intuition such as “N coins ought to be enough for anybody

(for example creation of smart contracts), which is a major concern for further development. One of the extraordinary features of CryptoNote is that it defines the optimal quantity of total supply as MSupply= 264 − 1 Which equals to 18446744073709551615 atomic units. “This is a natural restriction based only on implementation limits, not on intuition such...

work page 2013

[1] [1]

tragedy of the commons

i Mechanics Draft 4.1 Beka Dalakishvili Ana Mikatadze Last Revision 15 February, 2019 Tbilisi, Georgia ii Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..............................................................

work page 2019

[2] [2]

items of unequal value

Our model has several major advantages over existing ones – firstly, backers have the opportunity to financially support charitable causes without monetary expenditure, moreover, directing the shared processing power towards scientific research creates additional layer of incentives. On top of social, psychological and emotional benefits derived from the ...

work page 2010

[3] [3]

aggregate contributions of individuals to social welfare or other organizations

Even though altruism is a common term for economists, empirical evidence refutes against some assumptions derived from it. By definition, altruism refers to the concept of giving without expecting something in return, and implies that a positive change in other’s welfare positively changes the giver’s utility as well (Andreoni, 2002). This phenomenon was ...

work page 2002

[4] [4]

stretching the social fabric

These results extend to social learning - a process of learning from and inheriting the habits and beliefs of surrounding community, which depends heavily on idea flows - the spreading of ideas within the exchange network. Social learning is a natural process, which is stronger, safer, and more frequent than independent formation of individual preferences...

work page 2014

[5] [5]

pseudonymity provides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, contract state and user input must be public in order for miners to verify correct computation (Cox, 2018)

Privacy - in Ethereum users are pseudonymous rather than anonymous, and a number of studies show that “pseudonymity provides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, contract state and user input must be public in order for miners to verify correct computation (Cox, 2018).” Hence, it is virtually impossible to conduct a private ballot outlined in the previ...

work page 2018

[6] [6]

in August 2017, it cost $26.55 to add 2 numbers together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract

Transition costs - “in August 2017, it cost $26.55 to add 2 numbers together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract” (Cheng et al. 2018), computation of the complex algorithms described in this document will inevitably result in higher Gas price paid for each state transition. 5 Under Consideration 16 The proposed solution is that of EKIDEN that ...

work page 2017

[7] [7]

EKIDEN however is at the initial stage of development, but if executed as planned, it is closest to the requirements posed by the FIRE consensus protocol

as well as reduces transaction costs. EKIDEN however is at the initial stage of development, but if executed as planned, it is closest to the requirements posed by the FIRE consensus protocol. We believe that Blockchain is the missing piece in the technological revolution we are now witnessing, since it greatly contributes to a more distributed and fair a...

work page 2011

[8] [8]

After both of those projects failed due to market conditions and legal issues (Cox, 2018), Coinhive was introduced in September 2017 (Symantec, 1982). Coinhive scripts are being utilized by the alpha platform of Powershare (at www.powershare.fund), as well as the prototype deployed in February 2017, and enables the model of CPU donation through a web brow...

work page 2018

[9] [9]

BOINC is a software system that makes it easy for scientists to create and operate public-resource computing projects

suggests, that the amount raised should be negligible, taking into account the inefficiency of mining Monero (XMR) with a personal computer, market conditions and the number of supporters. The major challenge in adoption of browser-based mining is the negligible reward for user’s processing power resulting in negative profitability of the process. Berkele...

work page 2000

[10] [10]

and Leskovec, J., 2015, May

Further testing and upgrading the alpha platform 21 References: Althoff, T. and Leskovec, J., 2015, May. Donor retention in online crowdfunding communities: A case study of donorschoose. org. In Proceedings of the 24th international conference on world wide web (pp. 34-44). International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee. Anderson, D.P., 2004,...

work page 2015

[11] [11]

Utrecht University

Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological and psychological perspectives. Utrecht University. Bekkers, R.H.F.P., 2005, November. It’s not all in the ask: Effects and effectiveness of recruitment strategies used by nonprofits in the Netherlands. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K.,

work page 2005

[12] [12]

Available at: https://boincstats.com/en/stats/15/project/detail/user [Accessed 27 Nov

Detailed stats: World Community Grid. Available at: https://boincstats.com/en/stats/15/project/detail/user [Accessed 27 Nov. 2018] Bollier, D. and Clippinger, J.,

work page 2018

[13] [13]

arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05141

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contract Execution. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05141. Chou, Y.K.,

work page arXiv

[14] [14]

The Quest for Autonomy and Identity in a Digital Society,* Boston, MA and Amherst, MA: ID3 and Off the Common

From bitcoin to burning man and beyond. The Quest for Autonomy and Identity in a Digital Society,* Boston, MA and Amherst, MA: ID3 and Off the Common. Coinmarketcap. Gridcoin. [online] Available at: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/gridcoin/ [Accessed 26 Nov. 2018] Cox, J.,

work page 2018

[15] [15]

[online] Available at: https://goo.gl/X5Lu9i [Accessed 5 May.2018] Crowdfunding.com

Creators of In-Browser Cryptocurrency Miner 'Coinhive' Say Their Reputation Couldn't Be Much Worse. [online] Available at: https://goo.gl/X5Lu9i [Accessed 5 May.2018] Crowdfunding.com. Best Fundraising platforms comparison [online] Available at: https://www.crowdfunding.com/ [Accessed 5 May. 2018] Curecoin

work page 2018

[16] [16]

Journal of economic behavior & organization, 3(4), pp.367-388 Hertig, Alyssa., 2018 Blockchain’s once feared 51% attack is now becoming regular

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 3(4), pp.367-388 Hertig, Alyssa., 2018 Blockchain’s once feared 51% attack is now becoming regular. Coindesk, 8 June. Available at: https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-becoming-regular?fbclid=IwAR0cHrIaJiKoA-shnpr_lJBxKyZwUid0lAjcj-EaRXw-_z...

work page 2018

[17] [17]

Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, 1, pp.1-122

Introduction to the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity. Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, 1, pp.1-122. Liu, L., Suh, A. and Wagner, C., 2017, January. Donation Behavior in Online Micro Charities: An Investigation of Charitable Crowdfunding Projects. In Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on Syste...

work page 2017

[18] [18]

2018] Ostrom, E.,

Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread, The Lessons from a New Science [online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StIs_gIzbhs&t=1925s [Accessed 25 Nov. 2018] Ostrom, E.,

work page 2018

[19] [19]

Behavioral and brain sciences, 25(1), pp.1-20

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioral and brain sciences, 25(1), pp.1-20. Recomendes, Joe., 2015 How much does it cost to run a crowdfudning campaign? Socialmediatoday, 26 February. Available at: https://www.socialmediatoday.com/marketing/2015-02-26/how-much-does-it-cost-run-crowdfunding-campaign [Accessed 20 Sep. 2018] Reed, D.P.,

work page 2015

[20] [20]

End-to-End Analysis of In-Browser Cryptojacking

End-to-End Analysis of In-Browser Cryptojacking. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.02152. Smith, V.L.,

work page internal anchor Pith review Pith/arXiv arXiv

[21] [21]

Journal of political economy, 70(2), pp.111-137

An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of political economy, 70(2), pp.111-137. Social Physics. [online] Available at: http://www.socialphysics.org/ [Accessed 27 Nov. 2018] Sokolowski, S.W.,

work page 2018

[22] [22]

Stats.Foldingathome

The Antecedents of Interest in Social Crowdfunding. Stats.Foldingathome. Available at: https://stats.foldingathome.org/os [Accessed 26 Nov. 2018] Stalnaker, Stan.,

work page 2018

[23] [23]

Hub Culture Group

Ven and the nature of money. Hub Culture Group. Sun, S.F., Au, M.H., Liu, J.K. and Yuen, T.H., 2017, September. RingCT 2.0: a compact accumulator-based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency monero. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (pp. 456-474). Springer, Cham. Symantec

work page 2017

[24] [24]

[online] Available at: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/browser-mining-cryptocurrency [Accessed 5 May 2018.] 24 Ulieru, M.,

Software company. [online] Available at: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/browser-mining-cryptocurrency [Accessed 5 May 2018.] 24 Ulieru, M.,

work page 2018

[25] [25]

Bitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond, ID3, 2014, pp.113-129

Organic governance through the logic of holonic systems. Bitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond, ID3, 2014, pp.113-129. Van Saberhagen, N.,

work page 2014

[26] [26]

The community’s property of self-organization is an absolute requirement for building a sustainable ecosystem

Flexibility is paramount for reaching the huge number of n2 of value creation in Group Forming Networks (Clippinger, Bollier, 2014). The community’s property of self-organization is an absolute requirement for building a sustainable ecosystem. In CryptoNote difficulty target, block size and transaction fees are dynamically adjusted by the algorithm, takin...

work page 2014

[27] [27]

This is a natural restriction based only on implementation limits, not on intuition such as “N coins ought to be enough for anybody

(for example creation of smart contracts), which is a major concern for further development. One of the extraordinary features of CryptoNote is that it defines the optimal quantity of total supply as MSupply= 264 − 1 Which equals to 18446744073709551615 atomic units. “This is a natural restriction based only on implementation limits, not on intuition such...

work page 2013