Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 major objections 4 minor 187 references

TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture

T0 review · 3 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-08 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

Pith's one-line read TNIC claims that a minimal, formally verified root of trust at the network interface can give distributed systems Byzantine fault tolerance at 2f+1 replicas with up to 6x better throughput than CPU TEEs.

desk verdict A genuine SmartNIC-attestation system with real FPGA work and public artifacts, but the headline non-equivocation guarantee is per-session, not global, and the system-level performance is emulated. read the letter →

arxiv 2502.05338 v1 pith:S2Y5IKK4 submitted 2025-02-07 cs.CR

Dimitra Giantsidi , Julian Pritzi , Felix Gust , Antonios Katsarakis , Atsushi Koshiba , Pramod Bhatotia This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.CR
keywords trustedNICByzantinefaulttolerancenon-equivocationtransferableauthenticationsmartFPGAformalverificationattestation
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

TNIC puts a minimal root of trust directly on the network interface card instead of the CPU. The paper claims that a small attestation kernel in the NIC guarantees two properties, transferable authentication and non-equivocation, and that these two properties are enough to turn any crash-fault-tolerant (CFT) protocol into a Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT) protocol at 2f+1 replicas, which is fewer than the classical 3f+1. This matters for cloud systems because the NIC is host-CPU agnostic, so the same trusted substrate works across heterogeneous machines, and because offloading attestation to hardware avoids the large trusted computing bases and performance penalties of CPU TEEs. The authors show four distributed systems built on this substrate and report up to 6x throughput improvement over TEE-based versions. The central promise is that trustworthy distributed systems in Byzantine clouds can be built from a small, verifiable, fast hardware primitive rather than from a large software trust anchor.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing mechanism is the attestation kernel, a hardware module inserted between the host DMA path and the network protocol engine. For each connection it keeps a send counter and a receive counter, and it stamps every outgoing message with an attestation of the form HMAC(shared key, message || device ID || send counter), incrementing the counter monotonically. Incoming messages are accepted only if the HMAC verifies and the receive counter matches, which gives per-session FIFO order, no lost messages, and no double delivery. Transferable authentication comes from binding the device ID and key into the attestation; non-equivocation comes from the monotonic counter chain, which the formal lemmas show prevents reordering, loss, and duplication. The same kernel is small enough to occupy about 2.6 percent of the FPGA's lookup tables, keeping the trusted computing base around 2,114 lines of hardware code.

What would settle it

Set up one sender and two receivers, open two separate sessions from the sender, and have the sender transmit two different attested messages for the same logical step, one to each receiver. If both receivers' TNIC hardware verifies both messages and neither can detect the conflict without application-level state, then the hardware does not by itself deliver the global non-equivocation the 2f+1 transformation requires.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper's central claim is that the two security properties of transferable authentication and non-equivocation, realized in NIC hardware, are a lower bound sufficient to transform CFT protocols into BFT protocols at 2f+1 replicas without changing the protocol logic. TNIC materializes these properties in an attestation kernel placed in the RDMA data path: on send it computes an HMAC over the message, the device ID, and a per-session monotonic counter; on receive it re-computes the HMAC and checks that the counter matches the expected value. A Byzantine host therefore cannot forge or replay attested messages within a session, and correct nodes can forward an attested message to others who verify the original sender. The paper reports formal verification of the safety and security properties in a symbolic protocol model and demonstrates the recipe by building an attested append-only memory, a BFT replicated counter, a Byzantine chain replication, and an accountability system. Evaluations show 3x to 5x lower attestation latency than CPU TEE baselines and up to 6x throughput improvement for the distributed systems.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that per-session monotonic counters give non-equivocation in the sense of preventing a node from making conflicting statements to different nodes; the hardware alone only orders messages within one session, so global non-equivocation depends on extra application-level counter tracking or a shared attestation for multicast.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Any CFT protocol that follows the send/recv wrapper recipe can be run in Byzantine settings at 2f+1 replicas instead of 3f+1, as long as its specification is deterministic.
  • Attestation latency on the NIC is 3x to 5x lower than a CPU TEE, so trust decisions no longer sit on the critical path of network I/O.
  • The trusted computing base shrinks from roughly 2.3 million lines in a TEE-hosted system to about 2,114 lines of hardware code, making formal verification feasible.
  • The four demonstrated systems, an attested log, a BFT counter, chain replication, and an accountability system, show the substrate is generic across prevention-based and detection-based Byzantine models.
  • Because the root of trust is in the NIC, the same security architecture applies across heterogeneous host CPUs.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The per-session counter design implies that global non-equivocation across multiple connections is only as strong as the application-level state that ties sessions together; a host that opens two sessions can send conflicting attested messages unless the system tracks counters or reuses one local attestation for multicast.
  • If TNIC were integrated into ASIC NICs rather than FPGAs, the attestation cost per byte would likely drop further, since the current HMAC serial latency dominates small-message performance; measuring this on real hardware end-to-end is a natural next step.
  • The same two-property abstraction could be applied to other trust-sensitive network functions, such as authenticated DNS responses or secure logging at switches, wherever a small in-network anchor is more attractive than a large CPU TEE.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper proposes TNIC, a trusted NIC architecture on FPGA-based SmartNICs. A minimal "attestation kernel" in the NIC data path computes HMAC-based attestations over messages with per-session counters and device IDs, intended to provide non-equivocation and transferable authentication with a small verifiable TCB. The paper presents a remote attestation/bootstrapping protocol, a kernel-bypass network stack and RDMA-like APIs, a generic recipe to transform CFT protocols into BFT protocols at 2f+1 replicas, and four systems (A2M, BFT, Chain Replication, PeerReview) built with those APIs. The authors report Tamarin proofs for the protocols, a 23us attestation latency on an Alveo U280, and up to 6x throughput improvement over TEE-based baselines.

Significance. If the two properties were truly delivered by a minimal NIC-resident TCB and sufficed for the CFT-to-BFT transformation, TNIC would be a significant contribution: it would provide a host-agnostic, hardware root of trust with a TCB of about 2K LoC, machine-checked symbolic proofs, and measured latency/throughput advantages over CPU TEEs. The paper also ships reproducible artifacts (FPGA code, software, Tamarin models) and gives a clear resource-usage analysis. However, as reviewed below, the implemented attestation kernel delivers only per-session FIFO and not the global non-equivocation or third-party verifiability defined in Section 2.1, so the central theoretical claim is not yet supported.

major comments (3)
  1. [§2.1, §4.1 (Algorithm 1), App. B] The non-equivocation property claimed in §2.1 is global: "a node cannot make conflicting statements to different nodes." Algorithm 1, however, increments per-session counters (send_cnts[c_id], recv_cnts[c_id]) and computes HMAC with a per-session key (keys[c_id]). Nothing prevents a Byzantine host from opening two sessions and using local_send() twice to produce valid attested messages with different contents to two receivers; the per-session counters can even have identical values. The Tamarin lemmas in Appendix B (no_lost_messages, no_message_reordering, no_double_messages) prove only FIFO and uniqueness within one session/connection; none states that a sender cannot present conflicting messages to different receivers. The paper's own §6.2 and §8.2 therefore fall back on an application-level "equivocation-free multicast" convention (uni-casting the same local_send() output), which is not a hardware-enforced guarantee. Since the generic CFT-to-BFT transformation of Clement et al. [70] requires the global property, the central claim that TNIC's attestation kernel delivers the non-equivocation needed for the 2f+1 transformation is not supported by the implementation or the formal model.
  2. [§2.1, §4.1 (Algorithm 1)] Transferable authentication as defined in §2.1 requires a third party p_k to be able to evaluate verify(m, sigma(p_i)) on the original sender's token even when the message is forwarded. In Algorithm 1 the verification token is HMAC(keys[c_id], msg||ID||cnt), and keys[c_id] is a per-session key. A NIC that is not the session endpoint does not possess that key, so it cannot verify the original sender's attestation; it can only verify a re-attestation by the forwarder. The paper does not describe a key-distribution scheme or a forwarding-friendly token format that would realize the property as stated. Thus the second core property is also not delivered by the hardware as implemented.
  3. [§8.3, Table 3, Figs. 10-12] The system-level evaluation is not run on TNIC hardware. Section 8.3 states that the four codebases use the DRCT-IO stack with injected busy waits to emulate tnic's attestation delays, and the artifact appendix confirms that the systems "run in emulated hardware." Consequently the headline "up to 6x performance improvement compared to CPU-centric TEE systems" for the distributed systems is based on an emulation, not on measurements of the actual TNIC hardware end-to-end. The authors disclose this, and the emulation may be conservative, but it leaves the end-to-end system performance and the claim that TNIC "demonstrates its use by building four trustworthy distributed systems" unvalidated on the proposed substrate.
minor comments (4)
  1. [§8.5] The sentence "tnic encrypts PCIe transactions for CPU-to-device communication, allowing attackers to modify the PCIe transactions" is self-contradictory; it should presumably read that tnic does not encrypt PCIe transactions, or that the encryption does not prevent modification.
  2. [§4.1] The Counters store is described as keeping the message's latest sent and received "timestamp," but the counters are monotonic sequence numbers, not timestamps; please use consistent terminology.
  3. [Fig. 9 / §8.2] The figure legend uses "TNIC-att" while the text introduces "tnic-att"; please unify the names and state explicitly in the caption which configurations include attestation verification.
  4. [App. B, Eq. (4)] As printed, the no_message_reordering lemma has existential quantifiers over m_k and m_l that are not connected to the universally quantified m_i and m_j, so the formula does not express the intended property; please correct the quantification or refer readers to the machine-checked model.

Circularity Check

1 steps flagged · score 4.0 of 10

Non-equivocation is redefined as per-session FIFO counters, so the global 2f+1 transformation property is assumed at the application layer rather than derived from TNIC hardware.

  1. self definitional [Section 4.1 (Algorithm 1) and Section 4.4 vs Section 2.1; applied in Section 6.2]
    "Second, non-equivocation guarantees that a node cannot make conflicting statements to different nodes. ... The counters represent the messages' timestamp and are increased monotonically and deterministically after every send and receive operation to ensure that unique messages are assigned to unique counters for non-equivocation. ... The consistency requirement is enforced through the tnic's non-equivocation primitive that assigns a (unique) monotonic sequence number to each outgoing message, enforcing a total order on the sender's outgoing messages."

    Algorithm 1 increments a per-connection counter (send_cnts[c_id]++) and Verify() checks recv_cnts[c_id], so the 'unique monotonic sequence number' is unique only within one session. The Tamarin lemmas (no_lost_messages, no_message_reordering, no_double_messages) are scoped to a session by the init_ctrs rule in Appendix B. The paper labels this per-session FIFO behavior 'non-equivocation' and then invokes the global non-equivocation theorem of Clement et al. to obtain the 2f+1 transformation. The global property — no conflicting statements to different nodes — is not derived from the hardware; it is supplied by the application-level convention of 'equivocation-free multicast uni-casting the same attested message generated by local_send()' noted in Section 6.1.

full rationale

No fitted parameters or statistically forced predictions appear; the CFT-to-BFT transformation theorem is cited from external work (Clement et al.), and the Tamarin models are publicly archived, machine-checkable artifacts. The single circularity-adjacent step is definitional: the paper equates the per-session counter guarantee with the global non-equivocation property required by the transformation. Because that global property is not established by the hardware or the formal lemmas, the load-bearing security claim for the 2f+1 result is an assumption about application behavior (equivocation-free multicast via local_send) rather than a consequence of the silicon root of trust. This is a definitional slide rather than a fitted-input prediction; the rest of the architecture and evaluation retain independent content, so the score is moderate.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 4 assumptions · 0 invented entities

No free parameters are fitted; performance numbers are measurements. The main axioms are the trust assumptions of the threat model and the symbolic-model idealization. The attestation kernel is an implemented hardware module, not a postulated entity.

assumptions (4)
  • domain assumption Manufacturer, system designer, IP vendor, and tool flow are trusted; physical package and supply chain are trusted.
    Section 3.2 states the physical package, supply chain, and manufacturer of the SmartNICs are trusted, and the bitstream is synthesized by a trusted IP vendor with a trusted tool flow. If false, the silicon root of trust is not trustworthy.
  • domain assumption Cryptographic primitives are perfect in the formal model: hashes are irreversible, collisions are impossible, and no side effects exist.
    Appendix B states the cryptographic functions are assumed to be perfect with no side effects, hashes irreversible and collisions impossible. The Tamarin proofs are symbolic, not computational.
  • domain assumption Transformation requires deterministic protocol specifications.
    Section 6.2 states TNIC cannot transform systems with non-deterministic specifications. This limits the claimed generality of the CFT-to-BFT recipe.
  • domain assumption The RoCE reliable transport provides retransmission and FIFO ordering between correct nodes.
    Section 8.5 says TNIC guarantees packet retransmission between two correct nodes, extending a RoCE implementation that supports reliable operations. If the RoCE kernel misbehaves, the counter chain can break.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/S2Y5IKK4

@misc{pith2026250205338,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/S2Y5IKK4}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2502.05338}
}
read the original abstract

We introduce TNIC, a trusted NIC architecture for building trustworthy distributed systems deployed in heterogeneous, untrusted (Byzantine) cloud environments. TNIC builds a minimal, formally verified, silicon root-of-trust at the network interface level. We strive for three primary design goals: (1) a host CPU-agnostic unified security architecture by providing trustworthy network-level isolation; (2) a minimalistic and verifiable TCB based on a silicon root-of-trust by providing two core properties of transferable authentication and non-equivocation; and (3) a hardware-accelerated trustworthy network stack leveraging SmartNICs. Based on the TNIC architecture and associated network stack, we present a generic set of programming APIs and a recipe for building high-performance, trustworthy, distributed systems for Byzantine settings. We formally verify the safety and security properties of our TNIC while demonstrating its use by building four trustworthy distributed systems. Our evaluation of TNIC shows up to 6x performance improvement compared to CPU-centric TEE systems.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2502.05338 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. tnic system overview. minimal hardware module, the attestation kernel, that mate￾rializes the security properties of the non-equivocation and transferable authentication. The tnic network stack config￾ures the tnic device on the control path while it offers the data path as kernel-bypass device access for low-latency oper￾ations. Lastly, the tnic network library exposes programming APIs built on top of (reliable) on… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. tnic hardware architecture. Upon transmission, as shown in [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. tnic remote attestation protocol. 4.3 tnic Attestation Protocol We design a remote attestation protocol to ensure that the tnic device is genuine and the tnic bitstream and secrets are flashed securely in the device. Boostrapping. The tnic hardware is securely bootstrapped in an untrusted third-party cloud by the Manufacturer, Sys￾tem designer, and IP vendor, who trust each other. At the device construction, the Man… view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (6 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: tnic network system stack. 5 tnic Network Stack We build a software tnic system network stack that oper￾ates as the middle layer between the tnic programming APIs (see § 6.1) and the hardware implementation of tnic. Fig￾ure 4 shows an overview of the network stack desi…
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Attest function latency. Intel-x86 AMD SGX AMD-sev TNIC 0 50 100 Latency (us) access+transfer computation [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_5.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Throughput of send operations across the three selected network stacks. transformation for the BFT model. We compare tnic across four other software/hardware network stacks with different security properties as follows: (i) RDMA-hw, an untrusted RoCE protocol on FPGAs,…
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: Latency of send operations across five competitive network stacks with various security properties. for packet sizes less than 1 KiB, doubling the packet size in tnic resultsin a 13%—20%incrementin the overalllatency. For packet sizes bigger or equal to 1 KiB, doubling…
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Throughput (and latency numbers) of BFT. SSL-lib SSL-server SGX AMD-sev TNIC TEEs-CR 10 1 10 2 10 3 kOp/s 5.04us 29.58us 118.21us 82.05us 23.47us 11.49us [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_10.png]
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: The scalability analysis of tnic hardware. The resource usage is normalized to the U280 FPGA capacity. tnic bridges the gap between BFT and prior limitations, de￾signing a silicon root-of-trust with generic trusted networking abstractions that materialize the BFT secu…

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

187 extracted references · 47 canonical work pages

  1. [70]

    Allen Clement, Flavio Junqueira, Aniket Kate, and Rodrigo Rodrigues

  2. [1]

    [n. d.]. A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specifi- cation. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5040. ([n. d.]). https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5040 Last accessed: Jan, 2021

    2021

  3. [2]

    [n. d.]. Alveo SN1000 SmartNIC Accelerator Card. ([n. d.]). https: //www.xilinx.com/products/boards-and-kits/alveo/sn1000.html Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  4. [3]

    [n. d.]. Alveo U280 Data Center Accelerator Card. ([n. d.]). https://www.xilinx.com/products/boards-and-kits/alveo/u280.html February 11, 2025

    2025

  5. [4]

    [n. d.]. Amazon EC2. https://aws.amazon.com/pm/ec2. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  6. [5]

    [n. d.]. AMD OpenNIC Project. https://github.com/Xilinx/open-nic. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  7. [6]

    [n. d.]. AMDSEV. https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  8. [7]

    [n. d.]. Arm Confidential Compute Architecture. https://www.arm. com/why-arm/architecture/security-features/arm-confidential- compute-architecture. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

Show all 187 references
  1. [8]

    [n. d.]. AWS Lambda. https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  2. [9]

    [n. d.]. AWS Nitro System. ([n. d.]).https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/nitro/ February 11, 2025

    2025

  3. [10]

    [n. d.]. Azure Functions. https://docs.microsoft.com/en- us/azure/azure-functions/functions-overview. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  4. [11]

    [n. d.]. Broadcom Stingray SmartNIC Accelerates Baidu Cloud Ser- vices. ([n. d.]). https://www.broadcom.com/company/news/product- releases/53106 February 11, 2025

    2025

  5. [12]

    [n. d.]. Build hardware for TNIC.https://github.com/TUM-DSE/TNIC- hw?tab=readme-ov-file#build-hardware-for-fpga . ([n. d.])

  6. [13]

    [n. d.]. Build software for TNIC.https://github.com/TUM-DSE/TNIC- hw?tab=readme-ov-file#build-software . ([n. d.])

  7. [14]

    [n. d.]. CockroachDB Labs: Replication layer. https://www. cockroachlabs.com/docs/stable/architecture/replication-layer.html. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  8. [15]

    [n. d.]. Coyote: OS for FPGAs. ([n. d.]). https://github.com/ fpgasystems/Coyote Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  9. [16]

    [n. d.]. Encryption and Authentication - Bootgen user Guide (UG1283). https://docs.amd.com/r/en-US/ug1283-bootgen-user- guide/Encryption-and-Authentication. ([n. d.])

  10. [17]

    [n. d.]. FoundationDB.https://apple.github.io/foundationdb/. ([n. d.])

  11. [18]

    [n. d.]. Google Compute Engine. https://cloud.google.com/. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  12. [19]

    [n. d.]. Google Functions. https://cloud.google.com/functions. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  13. [20]

    [n. d.]. HMAC. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/tree/master/ crypto/hmac. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  14. [21]

    [n. d.]. How big is RocksDB adoption? https://rocksdb.org/docs/ support/faq.html. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: May 2021

    2021

  15. [22]

    [n. d.]. How to run TNIC. https://github.com/TUM-DSE/TNIC- hw?tab=readme-ov-file#run. ([n. d.])

  16. [23]

    [n. d.]. InfiniBand Architecture Specification. ([n. d.]). https://www.infinibandta.org/ibta-specification/ February 11, 2025

    2025

  17. [24]

    [n. d.]. Intel DPDK. http://dpdk.org/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: Jan, 2021. TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands

    2021

  18. [25]

    [n. d.]. Intel SGX: Not So Safe After All, ÆPIC Leak. https://thenewstack.io/intel-sgx-not-so-safe-after-all-aepic-leak/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  19. [26]

    [n. d.]. Intel TDX. https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html . ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  20. [27]

    [n. d.]. Latest SGAxe and CrossTalk Attacks Leak Sen- sitive Data and Expose New Intel SGX Vulnerability. https://news.hackreports.com/sgaxe-crosstalk-attacks-intel- sgx-vulnerability/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  21. [28]

    [n. d.]. LiquidIO II Smart NICs. ([n. d.]). https://www.marvell.com/ products/infrastructure-processors/liquidio-smart-nics/liquidio-ii- smart-nics.html February 11, 2025

    2025

  22. [29]

    [n. d.]. Microsoft Azure. https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  23. [30]

    [n. d.]. Netronome. ([n. d.]). https://www.netronome.com/ February 11, 2025

    2025

  24. [31]

    [n. d.]. NVIDIA BlueField Data Processing Units. ([n. d.]). https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/networking/products/data- processing-unit/ February 11, 2025

    2025

  25. [32]

    [n. d.]. Project Catapult. ([n. d.]). https://www.microsoft.com/en- us/research/project/project-catapult/ February 11, 2025

    2025

  26. [33]

    [n. d.]. Rackspace. https://www.rackspace.com/en-gb. ([n. d.]). Accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  27. [34]

    [n. d.]. Secure Device Manager. https://www.intel.com/content/ www/us/en/docs/programmable/683762/21-3/secure-device- manager.html. ([n. d.])

  28. [35]

    [n. d.]. Tamarin TLS handshake proof.https://github.com/tamarin- prover/tamarin-prover/blob/develop/examples/classic/TLS_ Handshake.spthy. ([n. d.])

  29. [36]

    [n. d.]. TNIC applications. https://github.com/TUM-DSE/TNIC- sw/tree/7df3d62360d5a693ce1f19bd8045ed2f0ab1b78f?tab=readme- ov-file#tnic-sw-evaluation . ([n. d.])

  30. [37]

    [n. d.]. TNIC security proofs. https://github.com/TUM-DSE/TNIC- proofs?tab=readme-ov-file#t-nic-protocol-verification . ([n. d.])

  31. [38]

    [n. d.]. Ubuntu kernel lifecycle. https://ubuntu.com/kernel/lifecycle. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  32. [39]

    [n. d.]. UltraScale+ Integrated 100G Ethernet Subsys- tem. ([n. d.]). https://www.xilinx.com/products/intellectual- property/cmac_usplus.html February 11, 2025

    2025

  33. [40]

    [n. d.]. Zero-Copy Optimization for Alibaba Cloud Smart NIC Solution. ([n. d.]).https://www.alibabacloud.com/blog/zero-copy-optimization- for-alibaba-cloud-smart-nic-solution_593986 February 11, 2025

    2025

  34. [41]

    [n. d.]. ZippyDB a strongly consistent, geographically distributed key- value store at Facebook. https://engineering.fb.com/2021/08/06/core- data/zippydb/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2021

  35. [42]

    [n. d.]. ÆPIC Leak is an Architectural CPU Bug Affecting 10th, 11th, and 12th Gen Intel Core CPUs. https://wccftech.com/aepic-leak-is- an-architectural-cpu-bug-affecting-10th-11th-and-12th-gen-intel- core-cpus/, note = Last accessed: February 11, 2025,. ([n. d.])

    2025

  36. [43]

    Ganger, Garth R

    Michael Abd-El-Malek, Gregory R. Ganger, Garth R. Goodson, Michael K. Reiter, and Jay J. Wylie. 2005. Fault-scalable Byzantine fault-tolerant services. In Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:2499938

    2005

  37. [44]

    Ittai Abraham, Guy Gueta, and Dahlia Malkhi. 2018. Hot-Stuff the Lin- ear, Optimal-Resilience, One-Message BFT Devil.CoRR abs/1803.05069 (2018). arXiv:1803.05069 http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.05069

    2018 arXiv

  38. [45]

    Ayaz Akram, Venkatesh Akella, Sean Peisert, and Jason Lowe-Power

  39. [46]

    Ayaz Akram, Anna Giannakou, Venkatesh Akella, Jason Lowe-Power, and Sean Peisert. 2021. Performance Analysis of Scientific Computing Workloads on General Purpose TEEs. In 2021 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS) . 1066–1076. https://doi.org...

    2021

  40. [47]

    Amazon. [n. d.]. Amazon S3 Cloud Object Storage. https://aws.amazon.com/s3. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: Dec, 2018

    2018

  41. [48]

    AMD. [n. d.]. AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). https://developer.amd.com/sev/. ([n. d.]). https: //developer.amd.com/sev/ Last accessed: Jan, 2021

    2021

  42. [49]

    Sebastian Angel, Aditya Basu, Weidong Cui, Trent Jaeger, Stella Lau, Srinath Setty, and Sudheesh Singanamalla. 2023. Nimble: Rollback Protection for Confidential Cloud Services. In 17th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implemen- tation (OSDI 23) . USENIX Associ...

    2023

  43. [50]

    Mina Tahmasbi Arashloo, Alexey Lavrov, Manya Ghobadi, Jennifer Rexford, David Walker, and David Wentzlaff. 2020. Enabling Programmable Transport Protocols in High-Speed NICs. In 17th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implemen- tation (NSDI 20) . USENIX Associati...

    2020

  44. [51]

    Stillwell, David Goltzsche, David Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Peter Pietzuch, and Christof Fetzer

    Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas Knauth, Andre Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O’Keeffe, Mark L. Stillwell, David Goltzsche, David Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Peter Pietzuch, and Christof Fetzer. 2016. SCONE: Secure Linux Container...

    2016

  45. [52]

    ars Technica. [n. d.]. New Spectre-like attack uses speculative execution to overflow buffers. https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/07/new-spectre-like-attack- uses-speculative-execution-to-overflow-buffers/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2018

  46. [53]

    Pierre-Louis Aublin, Rachid Guerraoui, Nikola Knežević, Vivien Quéma, and Marko Vukolić. 2015. The Next 700 BFT Protocols. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 32, 4, Article 12 (jan 2015), 45 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2658994

    2015 doi

  47. [54]

    Pierre-Louis Aublin, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Vivien Quéma. 2013. RBFT: Redundant Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In 2013 IEEE 33rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. 297–306. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2013.53

    2013 doi

  48. [55]

    Maurice Bailleu, Dimitra Giantsidi, Vasilis Gavrielatos, Do Le Quoc, Vijay Nagarajan, and Pramod Bhatotia. 2021. Avocado: A Secure In-Memory Distributed Storage System. In 2021 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 21). USENIX Association, 65–79. https://www.usenix.or...

    2021

  49. [56]

    Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, and Galen Hunt. 2014. Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI)

    2014

  50. [57]

    Johannes Behl, Tobias Distler, and Rüdiger Kapitza. 2017. Hybrids on Steroids: SGX-Based High Performance BFT. InProceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys)

    2017

  51. [58]

    Nathan Bronson, Zach Amsden, George Cabrera, Prasad Chakka, Peter Dimov, Hui Ding, Jack Ferris, Anthony Giardullo, Sachin Kulkarni, Harry Li, Mark Marchukov, Dmitri Petrov, Lovro Puzar, Yee Jiun Song, and Venkat Venkataramani. 2013. TAO: Facebook’s Distributed Data Store for t...

    2013

  52. [59]

    Ethan Buchman, Jae Kwon, and Zarko Milosevic. 2018. The latest gos- sip on BFT consensus. CoRR abs/1807.04938 (2018). arXiv:1807.04938 http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.04938

    2018 arXiv

  53. [60]

    Brendan Burns, Brian Grant, David Oppenheimer, Eric Brewer, and John Wilkes. 2016. Borg, Omega, and Kubernetes. Commun. ACM (2016). ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands Giantsidi, et al

    2016

  54. [61]

    Mike Burrows. 2006. The Chubby lock service for loosely-coupled distributed systems. In 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI)

    2006

  55. [62]

    Brad Calder, Ju Wang, Aaron Ogus, Niranjan Nilakantan, Arild Skjolsvold, Sam McKelvie, Yikang Xu, Shashwat Srivastav, Jiesheng Wu, Huseyin Simitci, Jaidev Haridas, Chakravarthy Uddaraju, Hemal Khatri, Andrew Edwards, Vaman Bedekar, Shane Mainali, Rafay Abbasi, Arpit Agarwal, M...

  56. [63]

    Miguel Castro, Peter Druschel, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Animesh Nandi, Antony Rowstron, and Atul Singh. 2003. SplitStream: High- Bandwidth Multicast in Cooperative Environments. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP ’03). Association...

    2003

  57. [64]

    Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. 1999. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. In Proceedings of the Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’99) . USENIX Association, USA, 173–186

    1999

  58. [65]

    Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. 2002. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance and Proactive Recovery.ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. (2002)

    2002

  59. [66]

    Hubert Chan, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi

    T-H. Hubert Chan, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi. 2018. PaLa: A Simple Partially Synchronous Blockchain. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2018 (2018), 981

    2018

  60. [67]

    Hubert Chan, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi

    T-H. Hubert Chan, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi. 2018. PiLi: An Extremely Simple Synchronous Blockchain. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/980. (2018). https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/980 https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/980

    2018

  61. [68]

    Tushar Deepak Chandra and Sam Toueg. 1996. Unreliable Failure Detectors for Reliable Distributed Systems. J. ACM 43, 2 (mar 1996), 225–267. https://doi.org/10.1145/226643.226647

    1996

  62. [69]

    Byung-Gon Chun, Petros Maniatis, Scott Shenker, and John Kubiatow- icz. 2007. Attested Append-only Memory: Making Adversaries Stick to Their Word. InProceedings of Twenty-first ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)

    2007

  63. [71]

    Corbett, Jeffrey Dean, Michael Epstein, Andrew Fikes, Christopher Frost, J

    James C. Corbett, Jeffrey Dean, Michael Epstein, Andrew Fikes, Christopher Frost, J. J. Furman, Sanjay Ghemawat, Andrey Gubarev, Christopher Heiser, Peter Hochschild, Wilson Hsieh, Sebastian Kanthak, Eugene Kogan, Hongyi Li, Alexander Lloyd, Sergey Melnik, David Mwaura, David ...

    2013

  64. [72]

    Correia, N.F

    M. Correia, N.F. Neves, and P. Verissimo. 2004. How to tolerate half less one Byzantine nodes in practical distributed systems. In Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 2004

    2004

  65. [73]

    Victor Costan and Srinivas Devadas. 2016. Intel SGX Explained. (2016)

    2016

  66. [74]

    James Cowling, Daniel Myers, Barbara Liskov, Rodrigo Rodrigues, and Liuba Shrira. 2006. HQ replication: a hybrid quorum protocol for byzantine fault tolerance. InProceedings of the 7th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’06) . USENIX Association, US...

    2006

  67. [75]

    Giuseppe DeCandia, Deniz Hastorun, Madan Jampani, Gunavardhan Kakulapati, Avinash Lakshman, Alex Pilchin, Swaminathan Siva- subramanian, Peter Vosshall, and Werner Vogels. 2007. Dynamo: Amazon’s Highly Available Key-Value Store.ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review (SIGOPS) (2007)

    2007

  68. [76]

    Jérémie Decouchant, David Kozhaya, Vincent Rahli, and Jiangshan Yu. 2022. DAMYSUS: Streamlined BFT Consensus Leveraging Trusted Components. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys ’22) . Association for Computing Machinery, New York, ...

    2022

  69. [77]

    Carole Delporte-Gallet, Hugues Fauconnier, Felix Freiling, Lucia Penso, and Andreas Tielmann. 2007. From Crash-Stop to Permanent Omission: Automatic Transformation and Weakest Failure Detectors, Vol. 4731. 165–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75142-7_15

    2007 doi

  70. [78]

    Cong Ding, David Chu, Evan Zhao, Xiang Li, Lorenzo Alvisi, and Robbert Van Renesse. 2020. Scalog: Seamless Reconfigura- tion and Total Order in a Scalable Shared Log. In 17th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementa- tion (NSDI 20) . USENIX Association, Sant...

    2020

  71. [79]

    Kailun Qin Cedric Xing Pramod Bhatotia Dmitrii Kuvaiskii, Dim- itrios Stavrakakis and Mona Vij. 2024. Gramine-TDX: A Lightweight OS Kernel for Confidential VMs. InProceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’24)

    2024

  72. [80]

    Aleksandar Dragojević, Dushyanth Narayanan, Miguel Castro, and Orion Hodson. 2014. FaRM: Fast Remote Memory. In11th USENIX Sym- posium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 14)

    2014

  73. [81]

    Sisi Duan, Michael Reiter, and Haibin Zhang. 2018. BEAT: Asynchronous BFT Made Practical. 2028–2041. https: //doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243812

    2018

  74. [82]

    Cynthia Dwork, Nancy Lynch, and Larry Stockmeyer. 1988. Con- sensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony.J. ACM 35, 2 (apr 1988), 288–323. https://doi.org/10.1145/42282.42283

    1988

  75. [83]

    Gunawi et al. 2014. What Bugs Live in the Cloud? A Study of 3000+ Issues in Cloud Systems. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC)

    2014

  76. [84]

    Shufan Fei, Zheng Yan, Wenxiu Ding, and Haomeng Xie. 2021. Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Sur- vey. ACM Comput. Surv. 54, 6, Article 126 (jul 2021), 36 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3456631

    2021 doi

  77. [85]

    Maltz, and Albert Greenberg

    Daniel Firestone, Andrew Putnam, Sambhrama Mundkur, Derek Chiou, Alireza Dabagh, Mike Andrewartha, Hari Angepat, Vivek Bhanu, Adrian Caulfield, Eric Chung, Harish Kumar Chandrappa, Somesh Chaturmohta, Matt Humphrey, Jack Lavier, Norman Lam, Fengfen Liu, Kalin Ovtcharov, Jitu P...

  78. [86]

    Snoeren, George Porter, and George Papen

    Alex Forencich, Alex C. Snoeren, George Porter, and George Papen. 2020. Corundum: An Open-Source 100-Gbps Nic. In 2020 IEEE 28th Annual International Symposium on Field- Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM) . 38–46. https://doi.org/10.1109/FCCM48280.2020.00015

    2020

  79. [87]

    Vasilis Gavrielatos, Antonis Katsarakis, and Vijay Nagarajan. 2021. Odyssey: The Impact of Modern Hardware on Strongly-Consistent Replication Protocols. In Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Computer Systems EuroSys’21. Association for Computing Machin- ery (ACM), ...

    2021 doi

  80. [88]

    Sanjay Ghemawat, Howard Gobioff, and Shun-Tak Leung. 2003. The Google File System. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. Bolton Landing, NY, 20–43. TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands

    2003

  81. [89]

    Dimitra Giantsidi, Maurice Bailleu, Natacha Crooks, and Pramod Bhatotia. 2022. Treaty: Secure Distributed Transactions. In2022 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). 14–27. https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN53405.2022.00015

    2022

  82. [90]

    Stewart Grant, Anil Yelam, Maxwell Bland, and Alex C. Snoeren. 2020. SmartNIC Performance Isolation with FairNIC: Programmable Net- working for the Cloud. InProceedings of the Annual Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication on the Applications, Techno...

    2020

  83. [91]

    Chuanxiong Guo, Haitao Wu, Zhong Deng, Gaurav Soni, Jianxi Ye, Jitu Padhye, and Marina Lipshteyn. 2016. RDMA over Commodity Ethernet at Scale. InProceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM ’16). 202–215

    2016

  84. [92]

    Suyash Gupta, Sajjad Rahnama, Shubham Pandey, Natacha Crooks, and Mohammad Sadoghi. 2023. Dissecting BFT Consensus: In Trusted Components We Trust!. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys ’23) . Associ- ation for Computing Machinery, ...

    2023

  85. [93]

    Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kouznetsov, and Peter Druschel. 2006. The Case for Byzantine Fault Detection. In Proceedings of the Second Conference on Hot Topics in System Dependability (HotDep’06). USENIX Association, USA, 5

    2006

  86. [94]

    Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kouznetsov, and Peter Druschel. 2007. PeerReview: Practical Accountability for Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of Twenty-First ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)

    2007

  87. [95]

    Marcus Hähnel, Weidong Cui, and Marcus Peinado. 2017. High- Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems. In2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17)

    2017

  88. [96]

    Zhenhao He, Dario Korolija, and Gustavo Alonso. 2021. EasyNet: 100 Gbps Network for HLS. In 2021 31st International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL) . 197–203. https://doi.org/10.1109/FPL53798.2021.00040

    2021

  89. [97]

    Chi Ho, Danny Dolev, and Robbert Van Renesse. 2007. Making Dis- tributed Applications Robust. 232–246. https://doi.org/10.1007/978- 3-540-77096-1_17

    2007 doi

  90. [98]

    Chi Ho, Robbert Van Renesse, Mark Bickford, and Danny Dolev. 2008. Nysiad: Practical Protocol Transformation to Tolerate Byzantine Failures. In 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 08). USENIX Association, San Francisco, CA

    2008

  91. [99]

    Morteza Hoseinzadeh and Steven Swanson. 2021. Corundum: Statically-Enforced Persistent Memory Safety. In Proceedings of the 26th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS 2021) . Association for Computing Mach...

    2021

  92. [100]

    Junqueira, and Benjamin Reed

    Patrick Hunt, Mahadev Konar, Flavio P. Junqueira, and Benjamin Reed. [n. d.]. ZooKeeper: Wait-free Coordination for Internet-scale Systems. In Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX Conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference

    2010

  93. [101]

    Hyperledger Fabric. [n. d.]. Ordering service implementations. ([n. d.]). https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release- 2.5/orderer/ordering_service.html Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  94. [102]

    Stephen Ibanez, Muhammad Shahbaz, and Nick McKeown. 2019. The Case for a Network Fast Path to the CPU. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets ’19) . Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 52–59. https://doi.org/10.1145/33656...

    2019

  95. [103]

    Intel Software Guard Extensions [n. d.]. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX). https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: Jan, 2021

    2021

  96. [105]

    Anuj Kalia, Michael Kaminsky, and David Andersen. 2019. Datacenter RPCs can be General and Fast. In 16th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI)

    2019

  97. [106]

    Andersen

    Anuj Kalia, Michael Kaminsky, and David G. Andersen. 2016. Design Guidelines for High Performance RDMA Systems. In 2016 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 16). USENIX Association, Denver, CO, 437–450. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc16/ technical-sessions/pres...

    2016

  98. [107]

    Rüdiger Kapitza, Johannes Behl, Christian Cachin, Tobias Distler, Simon Kuhnle, Seyed Vahid Mohammadi, Wolfgang Schröder- Preikschat, and Klaus Stengel. 2012. CheapBFT: Resource-Efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Eu- ropean Conference on Compute...

    2012

  99. [108]

    Alexander Kaplan and Shir Landau Feibish. 2022. Practical handling of DNS in the data plane. In Proceedings of the Symposium on SDN Research (SOSR ’22) . Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 59–66. https://doi.org/10.1145/3563647.3563654

    2022

  100. [109]

    Siavash Katebzadeh, Arpit Joshi, Aleksandar Dragojevic, Boris Grot, and Vijay Nagarajan

    Antonios Katsarakis, Vasilis Gavrielatos, M.R. Siavash Katebzadeh, Arpit Joshi, Aleksandar Dragojevic, Boris Grot, and Vijay Nagarajan

  101. [110]

    Sharma, Thomas Anderson, and Arvind Krishnamurthy

    Antoine Kaufmann, SImon Peter, Naveen Kr. Sharma, Thomas Anderson, and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2016. High Perfor- mance Packet Processing with FlexNIC. In Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Sy...

    2016

  102. [111]

    Hsuan-Chi Kuo, Jianyan Chen, Sibin Mohan, and Tianyin Xu. 2020. Set the Configuration for the Heart of the OS: On the Practicality of Oper- ating System Kernel Debloating. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 4, 1, Article 03 (may 2020), 27 pages.https://doi.org/10.1145/3379469

    2020 doi

  103. [112]

    Leslie Lamport. 1998. The Part-Time Parliament. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 16, 2 (may 1998), 133–169. https://doi.org/10.1145/279227.279229

    1998

  104. [113]

    Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. 1982. The Byzantine Generals Problem. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. (1982)

    1982

  105. [114]

    Swift, and T

    Yanfang Le, Hyunseok Chang, Sarit Mukherjee, Limin Wang, Aditya Akella, Michael M. Swift, and T. V. Lakshman. 2017. UNO: uniflying host and smart NIC offload for flexible packet processing. In Proceedings of the 2017 Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC ’17). Association for Com...

    2017

  106. [115]

    Giuseppe Lettieri, Alessandra Fais, Gianni Antichi, and Grego- rio Procissi. 2023. SmartNIC-Accelerated Stream Processing Analytics. In 2023 IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtu- alization and Software Defined Networks (NFV-SDN) . 135–140. https://doi.org/10.1109/NFV-SDN5...

    2023

  107. [116]

    Dave Levin, John R Douceur, Jacob R Lorch, and Thomas Moscibroda

  108. [117]

    Douceur, Jacob R

    Dave Levin, John R. Douceur, Jacob R. Lorch, and Thomas Moscibroda

  109. [118]

    Bojie Li, Zhenyuan Ruan, Wencong Xiao, Yuanwei Lu, Yongqiang Xiong, Andrew Putnam, Enhong Chen, and Lintao Zhang. 2017. KV-Direct: High-Performance In-Memory Key-Value Store with Programmable NIC. InProceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP ’17). ...

    2017

  110. [119]

    Jinyuan Li, Mn Krohn, D Mazières, and Dennis Shasha. 2004. Secure untrusted data repository (SUNDR). In Proceedings of 6th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI)

    2004

  111. [120]

    Jinyuan Li, Maxwell Krohn, David Mazières, and Dennis Shasha. 2004. Secure Untrusted Data Repository (SUNDR). In 6th Symposium on Operating Systems Design & Implementation (OSDI 04). USENIX Asso- ciation, San Francisco, CA. https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi- 04/secure-unt...

    2004

  112. [121]

    Junru Li, Youyou Lu, Qing Wang, Jiazhen Lin, Zhe Yang, and Jiwu Shu. 2022. AlNiCo: SmartNIC-accelerated Contention-aware Request Scheduling for Transaction Processing. In2022 USENIX Annual Tech- nical Conference (USENIX ATC 22). USENIX Association, Carlsbad, CA, 951–966. https...

    2022

  113. [122]

    Stephens, Anirudh Sivaraman, and Aditya Akella

    Jiaxin Lin, Kiran Patel, Brent E. Stephens, Anirudh Sivaraman, and Aditya Akella. 2020. PANIC: A High-Performance Programmable NIC for Multi-tenant Networks. In14th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI 20). USENIX Association, 243–259. https://...

    2020

  114. [123]

    Junyi Liu, Aleksandar Dragojevic, Shane Flemming, Antonios Katsarakis, Dario Korolija, Igor Zablotchi, Ho-cheung Ng, Anuj Kalia, and Miguel Castro. 2023. Honeycomb: ordered key-value store acceleration on an FPGA-based SmartNIC. (03 2023)

    2023

  115. [124]

    In Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI)

    TrInc: Small Trusted Hardware for Large Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI). ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands Giantsidi, et al

    2025

  116. [125]

    Ming Liu, Tianyi Cui, Henry Schuh, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Simon Peter, and Karan Gupta. 2019. Offloading Distributed Applications onto SmartNICs Using IPipe. In Proceedings of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication (SIGCOMM ’19) . Associ- ation for Computing Machi...

    2019

  117. [126]

    Ming Liu, Simon Peter, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Phitchaya Mangpo Phothilimthana. 2019. E3: Energy-Efficient Microservices on SmartNIC-Accelerated Servers. In2019 USENIX Annual Technical Con- ference (USENIX ATC 19). USENIX Association, Renton, WA, 363–378. https://www.usenix....

    2019

  118. [127]

    Youyou Lu, Jiwu Shu, Youmin Chen, and Tao Li. 2017. Octopus: an RDMA-enabled Distributed Persistent Memory File System. In2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17) . USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 773–785. https://www.usenix.org/ conference/atc17/technical-...

    2017

  119. [128]

    Pieter Maene, Johannes Götzfried, Ruan de Clercq, Tilo Müller, Felix Freiling, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. 2018. Hardware- Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation. IEEE Trans. Comput. 67, 3 (2018), 361–374. https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2017.2647955

    2018

  120. [129]

    Francis Matus. 2020. Distributed Services Architec- ture. In 2020 IEEE Hot Chips 32 Symposium (HCS) . 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1109/HCS49909.2020.9220629

    2020

  121. [130]

    Simon Meier, Benedikt Schmidt, Cas Cremers, and David Basin. 2013. The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CA V)

    2013

  122. [131]

    Karame, and N

    Jian Liu, Wenting Li, Ghassan O. Karame, and N. Asokan

  123. [132]

    Mellette, Rajdeep Das, Yibo Guo, Rob McGuinness, Alex C

    William M. Mellette, Rajdeep Das, Yibo Guo, Rob McGuinness, Alex C. Snoeren, and George Porter. 2020. Expanding across time to deliver bandwidth efficiency and low latency. In 17th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implemen- tation (NSDI 20) . USENIX Association...

    2020

  124. [133]

    Jämes Ménétrey, Christian Göttel, Anum Khurshid, Marcelo Pasin, Pascal Felber, Valerio Schiavoni, and Shahid Raza. 2022. Attestation Mechanisms For Trusted Execution Environments Demystified. In Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems: 22nd IFIP WG 6.1 In- ternation...

    2022

  125. [134]

    Alan Mislove, Ansley Post, Andreas Haeberlen, and Peter Druschel

  126. [135]

    Misra and Virendra C

    Subhas C. Misra and Virendra C. Bhavsar. 2003. Relationships between Selected Software Measures and Latent Bug-Density: Guidelines for Improving Quality. InProceedings of the 2003 International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: PartI (ICCSA’03) . Spring...

    2003

  127. [136]

    Christopher Mitchell, Yifeng Geng, and Jinyang Li. 2013. Pilaf: Using One-Sided RDMA Reads to Build a Fast, CPU-Efficient Key-Value Store. Atc ’13 (2013)

    2013

  128. [137]

    Rui Oliveira, José Pereira, and André Schiper. 2001. Primary- Backup Replication: From a Time-Free Protocol to a Time-Based Implementation. 14–23. https://doi.org/10.1109/RELDIS.2001.969730

    2001

  129. [138]

    Diego Ongaro and John Ousterhout. 2014. In Search of an Under- standable Consensus Algorithm. In Proceedings of the 2014 USENIX Conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference (ATC)

    2014

  130. [139]

    Melanox. [n. d.]. RDMA Aware Networks Programming User Manual. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  131. [140]

    Arttu Paju, Muhammad Owais Javed, Juha Nurmi, Juha Savimäki, Brian McGillion, and Billy Bob Brumley. 2023. SoK: A Systematic Review of TEE Usage for Developing Trusted Applications. InProceed- ings of the 18th International Conference on A vailability, Reliability and Security...

    2023

  132. [141]

    Caulfield, Eric S

    Andrew Putnam, Adrian M. Caulfield, Eric S. Chung, Derek Chiou, Kypros Constantinides, John Demme, Hadi Esmaeilzadeh, Jeremy Fowers, Gopi Prashanth Gopal, Jan Gray, Michael Haselman, Scott Hauck, Stephen Heil, Amir Hormati, Joo-Young Kim, Sitaram Lanka, James Larus, Eric Peter...

    2014

  133. [142]

    Sivasankar Radhakrishnan, Yilong Geng, Vimalkumar Jeyakumar, Abdul Kabbani, George Porter, and Amin Vahdat. 2014. SENIC: Scalable NIC for End-Host Rate Limiting. In 11th USENIX Sympo- sium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 14) . USENIX Association, Seattle, ...

    2014

  134. [143]

    The Register. [n. d.]. Boffins show Intel’s SGX can leak crypto keys . https://www.theregister.com/2017/03/07/eggheads_slip_a_note_ under_intels_door_sgx_can_leak_crypto_keys/. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2017

  135. [144]

    Microsoft Research. [n. d.]. The Confidential Consortium Framework. https://microsoft.github.io/CCF/main/research. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025. TNIC: A Trusted NIC Architecture ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands

    2025

  136. [145]

    RISC-V. [n. d.]. Keystone Open-source Secure Hardware Enclave. https://keystone-enclave.org/. ([n. d.]). https://keystone-enclave.org/ Last accessed: Jan, 2021

    2021

  137. [146]

    Mario Ruiz, David Sidler, Gustavo Sutter, Gustavo Alonso, and Sergio López-Buedo. 2019. Limago: An FPGA-Based Open-Source 100 GbE TCP/IP Stack. In 2019 29th International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL) . 286–292. https://doi.org/10.1109/FPL.2019.00053

    2019

  138. [147]

    Berger, James C

    Hugo Sadok, Nirav Atre, Zhipeng Zhao, Daniel S. Berger, James C. Hoe, Aurojit Panda, Justine Sherry, and Ren Wang. 2023. Enso: A Streaming Interface for NIC-Application Communication. In 17th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implemen- tation (OSDI 23) . USENIX ...

    2023

  139. [148]

    Racyus D. G. Pacífico, Lucas F. S. Duarte, Luiz F. M. Vieira, Barath Raghavan, José A. M. Nacif, and Marcos A. M. Vieira. 2023. eBPFlow: A Hardware/Software Platform to Seamlessly Offload Network Functions Leveraging eBPF. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2023), 1–14. http...

    2023

  140. [150]

    Gianluca Scopelliti, Sepideh Pouyanrad, Job Noorman, Fritz Alder, Frank Piessens, and Jan Tobias Mühlberg. 2021. POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing Heterogeneous Distributed Enclave Applications. In Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com...

    2021

  141. [151]

    Yizhou Shan, Will Lin, Ryan Kosta, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Yiying Zhang. 2022. SuperNIC: A Hardware-Based, Programmable, and Multi-Tenant SmartNIC. (2022). arXiv:cs.DC/2109.07744

    2022 arXiv

  142. [152]

    Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan, and Prateek Saxena. 2016. Preventing page faults from telling your secrets. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCCS)

    2016

  143. [153]

    David Sidler, Zeke Wang, Monica Chiosa, Amit Kulkarni, and Gustavo Alonso. 2020. StRoM: Smart Remote Memory. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys ’20) . Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, Article 29, 16 pages. ht...

    2020

  144. [154]

    Atul Singh, Tathagata Das, Petros Maniatis, and Timothy Roscoe. 2008. BFT Protocols Under Fire. In 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 08). USENIX Association, San Francisco, CA. https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi-08/bft- protocols-under-fire

    2008

  145. [155]

    Anirudh Sivaraman, Thomas Mason, Aurojit Panda, Ravi Netravali, and Sai Anirudh Kondaveeti. 2020. Network architecture in the age of programmability. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev. 50, 1 (mar 2020), 38–44. https://doi.org/10.1145/3390251.3390257

    2020

  146. [156]

    Yee Jiun Song, Flavio Junqueira, and Benjamin Reed. 2009. BFT for the skeptics. (01 2009)

    2009

  147. [157]

    Enrique Saurez, Bharath Balasubramanian, Richard Schlichting, Brendan Tschaen, Zhe Huang, Shankaranarayanan Puzhavakath Narayanan, and Umakishore Ramachandran. 2018. METRIC: A Middleware for Entry Transactional Database Clustering at the Edge. In Proceedings of the 3rd Worksho...

    2018

  148. [158]

    Brent Stephens, Aditya Akella, and Michael Swift. 2019. Loom: Flexible and Efficient NIC Packet Scheduling. In 16th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementa- tion (NSDI 19) . USENIX Association, Boston, MA, 33–46. https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi19/pre...

    2019

  149. [159]

    Brent Stephens, Aditya Akella, and Michael M. Swift. 2018. Your Programmable NIC Should be a Programmable Switch. InProceedings of the 17th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets ’18) . Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 36–42. https://doi.org/10....

    2018

  150. [160]

    Guangda Sun, Mingliang Jiang, Xin Zhe Khooi, Yunfan Li, and Jialin Li. 2023. NeoBFT: Accelerating Byzantine Fault Tolerance Using Authenticated In-Network Ordering. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2023 Conference (ACM SIGCOMM ’23) . Associ- ation for Computing Machinery, New...

    2023

  151. [161]

    Sun Microsystems

    Inc. Sun Microsystems. [n. d.]. NFS: Network File System Protocol Specification. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1094.txt. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: Jan, 2021

    2021

  152. [162]

    Florian Suri-Payer, Matthew Burke, Zheng Wang, Yunhao Zhang, Lorenzo Alvisi, and Natacha Crooks. 2021. Basil. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 28th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles CD-ROM. ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3477132.3483552

    2021

  153. [163]

    Jörg Thalheim, Harshavardhan Unnibhavi, Christian Priebe, Pramod Bhatotia, and Peter Pietzuch. 2021. Rkt-Io: A Direct I/O Stack for Shielded Execution. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth European Conference on Computer Systems (ACM EuroSys 21)

    2021

  154. [164]

    Chia-Che Tsai, Donald E Porter, and Mona Vij. 2017. Graphene-SGX: A practical library OS for unmodified applications on SGX. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC)

    2017

  155. [165]

    Robbert van Renesse, Chi Ho, and Nicolas Schiper. 2012. Byzantine Chain Replication. In Principles of Distributed Systems , Roberto Baldoni, Paola Flocchini, and Ravindran Binoy (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 345–359

    2012

  156. [166]

    Sousa and A

    J. Sousa and A. Bessani. 2012. From Byzantine Consensus to BFT State Machine Replication: A Latency-Optimal Transformation. In 2012 Ninth European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC)

    2012

  157. [167]

    Giuliana Veronese, Miguel Correia, Alysson Bessani, Lau Lung, and Paulo Veríssimo. 2013. Efficient Byzantine Fault- Tolerance. Computers, IEEE Transactions on 62 (01 2013), 16–30. https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2011.221

    2013 doi

  158. [168]

    Guozhang Wang, Joel Koshy, Sriram Subramanian, Kartik Para- masivam, Mammad Zadeh, Neha Narkhede, Jun Rao, Jay Kreps, and Joe Stein. 2015. Building a Replicated Logging System with Apache Kafka. Proc. VLDB Endow. 8, 12 (Aug. 2015), 1654–1655. https://doi.org/10.14778/2824032.2824063

    2015

  159. [169]

    Tao Wang, Xiangrui Yang, Gianni Antichi, Anirudh Sivara- man, and Aurojit Panda. 2022. Isolation Mechanisms for High-Speed Packet-Processing Pipelines. In 19th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementa- tion (NSDI 22) . USENIX Association, Renton, WA, 1289–13...

    2022

  160. [170]

    Zeke Wang, Hongjing Huang, Jie Zhang, Fei Wu, and Gustavo Alonso. 2022. FpgaNIC: An FPGA-based Versatile 100Gb Smart- NIC for GPUs. In 2022 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 22) . USENIX Association, Carlsbad, CA, 967–986. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc22/p...

    2022

  161. [171]

    Ofir Weisse, Valeria Bertacco, and Todd Austin. 2017. Regaining Lost Cycles with HotCalls: A Fast Interface for SGX Secure Enclaves. SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News (2017)

    2017

  162. [172]

    Ofir Weisse, Valeria Bertacco, and Todd Austin. 2017. Regaining Lost Cycles with HotCalls: A Fast Interface for SGX Secure Enclaves. In Proceedings of the 44th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA ’17). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY...

    2017

  163. [173]

    AMD Xilinx. [n. d.]. AMD Vitis HLS. https://www.amd.com/de/ products/software/adaptive-socs-and-fpgas/vitis/vitis-hls.html . ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025. ASPLOS ’25, March 30-April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands Giantsidi, et al

    2025

  164. [174]

    AMD Xilinx. [n. d.]. Vivado ML Edition. https://www.xilinx.com/ products/design-tools/vivado.html. ([n. d.]). Last accessed: February 11, 2025

    2025

  165. [175]

    Schneider

    Robbert van Renesse and Fred B. Schneider. 2004. Chain Replication for Supporting High Throughput and Availability. InProceedings of the 6th Conference on Symposium on Operating Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6 (OSDI)

    2004

  166. [176]

    Junfeng Yang, Can Sar, and Dawson Engler. 2006. EXPLODE: a light- weight, general system for finding serious storage system errors. InPro- ceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7 (OSDI ’06). USENIX Association, USA, 10

    2006

  167. [177]

    Junfeng Yang, Paul Twohey, Dawson Engler, and Madanlal Musu- vathi. 2006. Using model checking to find serious file system errors. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 24, 4 (nov 2006), 393–423. https://doi.org/10.1145/1189256.1189259

    2006

  168. [178]

    Myoungsung You, Jaehyun Nam, Minjae Seo, and Seungwon Shin

  169. [179]

    Mark Zhao, Mingyu Gao, and Christos Kozyrakis. 2022. ShEF: Shielded Enclaves for Cloud FPGAs. In Proceedings of the 27th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Program- ming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS ’22) . Association for Computing Machinery, ...

    2022

  170. [184]

    Jinli Yan, Lu Tang, Junnan Li, Xiangrui Yang, Wei Quan, Hongyi Chen, and Zhigang Sun. 2019. UniSec: a unified security framework with SmartNIC acceleration in public cloud. In Proceedings of the ACM Turing Celebration Conference - China (ACM TURC ’19). Association for Computin...

    2019

  171. [2006]

    SIGOPS Oper

    Experiences in building and operating ePOST, a reliable peer-to-peer application. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 40, 4 (apr 2006), 147–159. https://doi.org/10.1145/1218063.1217950

    2006

  172. [2009]

    In NSDI, Vol

    TrInc: Small Trusted Hardware for Large Distributed Systems.. In NSDI, Vol. 9. 1–14

  173. [2011]

    In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)

    Windows Azure Storage: A Highly Available Cloud Storage Service with Strong Consistency. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)

  174. [2012]

    In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC ’12)

    On the (Limited) Power of Non-Equivocation. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC ’12). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 301–308. https://doi.org/10.1145/2332432.2332490

    2012

  175. [2016]

    CoRR abs/1612.04997 (2016)

    Scalable Byzantine Consensus via Hardware-assisted Secret Sharing. CoRR abs/1612.04997 (2016). arXiv:1612.04997 http://arxiv.org/abs/1612.04997

    2016 arXiv

  176. [2018]

    In 15th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 18)

    Azure Accelerated Networking: SmartNICs in the Public Cloud. In 15th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 18). USENIX Association, Renton, WA, 51–66. https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi18/presentation/firestone

  177. [2020]

    In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS ’20)

    Hermes: A Fast, Fault-Tolerant and Linearizable Replication Protocol. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS ’20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 201–...

  178. [2022]

    In 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Secure and Private Execution Environment Design (SEED)

    SoK: Limitations of Confidential Computing via TEEs for High-Performance Compute Systems. In 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Secure and Private Execution Environment Design (SEED). 121–132. https://doi.org/10.1109/SEED55351.2022.00018

    2022

  179. [2023]

    InProceedings of the 2023 ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC ’23)

    HELIOS: Hardware-assisted High-performance Security Exten- sion for Cloud Networking. InProceedings of the 2023 ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC ’23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 486–501.https://doi.org/10.1145/3620678.3624786

    2023

Pith tools

Reviewed August 8, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.