Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 major objections 7 minor 176 references

Security and Privacy Management of IoT Using Quantum Computing

T0 review · 3 major / 7 minor · reviewed 2026-08-03 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

Pith's one-line read The chapter argues that quantum computers will break today's IoT cryptography and that a layered migration to post-quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, and quantum random number generators must begin before today's devices age in

desk verdict A competent tutorial survey of quantum threats and post-quantum IoT security, with no new results and a few factual inconsistencies that a careful referee should fix. read the letter →

arxiv 2511.03538 v1 pith:TAGMIOAN submitted 2025-11-05 cs.CR

Jaydip Sen This is my paper
classification cs.CR
keywords quantumcomputingpost-quantumcryptographyIoTsecurityShor'salgorithmGrover'sKeyDistributionsmartcityhybridquantum-classicalarchitecture
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This tutorial chapter's central claim is that the Internet of Things has a quantum deadline. Shor's algorithm can break the RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC public-key systems that most IoT devices rely on, and Grover's algorithm halves the effective key strength of symmetric ciphers like AES. Because IoT devices remain in service for years and attackers can store encrypted traffic for later quantum decryption, the chapter argues that waiting for quantum computers to arrive is too late. It surveys post-quantum cryptographic families (lattice-, hash-, code-, and multivariate-based) and quantum-assisted tools (QKD and QRNG), assessing which fit constrained devices, and concludes that a hybrid quantum-classical architecture is the realistic route to quantum-safe IoT, especially in smart cities, healthcare, and critical infrastructure.

What carries the argument

The argument's load-bearing machinery is a pair of quantum algorithms plus a resource-estimation framework. Shor's algorithm reduces integer factorization and discrete logarithms to polynomial time, directly threatening RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC; Grover's algorithm gives a quadratic speedup for exhaustive key search, halving the effective key length of symmetric ciphers. The resource-estimation framework—logical versus physical qubits, surface-code error correction, circuit depth, and gate fidelity—turns these abstract threats into concrete numbers such as ~20 million physical qubits and ~8 hours for RSA-2048, which sets the migration timeline. On the defensive side, the machinery is the

What would settle it

If a fault-tolerant quantum computer with roughly 20 million physical qubits can factor a 2048-bit RSA modulus in about a day of coherent computation, the paper's core threat is confirmed; if classical algorithms factor 2048-bit RSA or solve ECDLP in feasible time, the quantum-threat premise is moot. Short of these, tracking the progression of error-corrected logical qubit counts and gate error rates over the next decade would empirically test the 10-30 year viability window.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The chapter's thesis is that the convergence of quantum computing and IoT changes the security paradigm from 'secure today' to 'secure against a future adversary that can break today's math.' Quantum resource estimates place cryptographically relevant machines 10-30 years away; RSA-2048 would fall to Shor's algorithm in roughly 8 hours with on the order of 20 million physical qubits, while Grover's algorithm reduces AES-128 to about 64 bits of effective security. Since IoT devices are resource-constrained, no single PQC scheme dominates: lattice-based schemes are the most practical for general IoT, hash-based signatures suit firmware and archival, code-based schemes are too heavy for embedde

Load-bearing premise

The whole migration strategy rests on the assumption that published estimates of quantum threat—RSA-2048 broken in about 8 hours with ~20 million physical qubits and cryptographically relevant machines within 10-30 years—are reliable enough to act on; if those numbers are wrong, the urgency and recommended timing change.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If the quantum resource estimates are correct, RSA-2048 and ECC-256 should be treated as broken once an error-corrected quantum computer in the 20-million-physical-qubit class exists; all long-lived IoT data should be encrypted under PQC before that date.
  • Grover's algorithm makes AES-128 effectively 64-bit; IoT systems that cannot afford AES-256 should plan for shorter-lived keys or alternative lightweight primitives.
  • The 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat implies that data confidentiality is already at risk for data encrypted today with RSA/ECC, so PQC migration is urgent for data with long retention periods, such as medical records and infrastructure logs.
  • Lattice-based schemes are the most suitable PQC class for constrained IoT devices; hash-based signatures remain viable for specific low-frequency uses like firmware signing; code-based and multivariate schemes face serious size or speed barriers.
  • Hybrid quantum-classical architectures—QKD for key agreement on high-value links, AES-256/PQC for payload encryption—are the most deployment-ready model for smart cities before full QKD networks mature.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The paper's timeline argument implies that procurement decisions made today should enforce quantum-safe defaults; a device bought now will likely still be deployed when the first cryptographically relevant quantum computers appear, making migration-at-purchase cheaper than retrofitting.
  • The chapter does not quantify migration costs; a natural extension is a cost-benefit model comparing PQC upgrade expenses against expected losses from harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks for different device lifetimes and data sensitivities.
  • Because trusted-node QKD concentrates risk at physical relays, the paper's smart-city blueprint points to a research priority: device-independent and satellite QKD, if they scale, would eliminate the main remaining trust assumption.
  • The resource estimates cited imply a testable schedule: tracking the growth of error-corrected logical qubits and gate error rates on leading quantum processors over the next decade would let operators calibrate the urgency of migration instead of relying on static projections.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 7 minor

Summary. This book chapter surveys the impact of quantum computing on IoT security and privacy. It reviews classical cryptographic primitives (AES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC, hash functions), explains Shor's and Grover's algorithms, and gives resource estimates for breaking RSA-2048 and ECC-256. It then surveys post-quantum cryptography (lattice-, hash-, code-, multivariate-, and isogeny-based schemes), quantum-based mechanisms (QKD, QRNG), hybrid quantum-classical architectures, smart-city deployments, standardization efforts, and regulatory issues. The central claim is that quantum computers will threaten classical IoT cryptography, and that proactive migration to PQC/QKD/QRNG is necessary, with urgency driven by expert timelines for cryptographically relevant quantum computers and by the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat.

Significance. As a tutorial survey, the chapter provides a broad and readable synthesis of a large literature, with useful tables (Tables 4.1–4.10), coverage of NIST/ETSI/ITU-T standardization, real-world QKD pilots, and a clear explanation of why Shor's and Grover's algorithms matter for IoT. The main narrative is conventional and broadly correct. However, the chapter's action-oriented conclusion—that IoT must migrate now—rests on quantitative claims that are internally inconsistent, and there are several factual inaccuracies in the PQC survey. If these are corrected, the chapter would be a useful reference for students and practitioners; in its current form, the inconsistencies undermine the reliability of the guidance it offers.

major comments (3)
  1. [§4.3.5, §4.6.2, Table 4.3] The load-bearing argument for urgent PQC adoption is based on inconsistent quantitative claims. §4.3.5 states that cryptographically relevant quantum computers could become feasible in 10–30 years, while §4.6.2 states that IBM and QED-C expect CRQCs within 10–15 years. More strikingly, Table 4.3 reports that factoring RSA-2048 would take approximately 8 hours with ~20 million physical qubits, whereas §4.6.2 says Shor's algorithm will break 2048-bit RSA or 256-bit ECC 'in seconds'. These are not minor differences; they are directly connected to the chapter's recommendation that migration must happen now. The authors should reconcile the numbers, specify which sources and assumptions underlie each estimate, and state the uncertainty explicitly.
  2. [§4.6.3 (Isogeny-Based Cryptography)] The chapter presents SIKE as a promising isogeny-based scheme that is 'thought to be quantum resistant' and 'seemingly ideal for IoT devices' because of its small key sizes. It fails to mention that SIKE was broken in 2022 by Castryck and Decru and was subsequently withdrawn from the NIST PQC process. Since the chapter's stated contribution is to assess PQC families and their suitability for IoT, presenting a broken scheme as viable is a significant factual omission that misleads readers about the current state of the field.
  3. [§4.6.6.1 and reference [152]] The text claims that QPIR can achieve sub-linear communication complexity and cites reference [152] (Baumeler and Broadbent, 'Quantum private information retrieval has linear communication complexity'). The cited paper's title and result state linear communication complexity, not sub-linear. The sub-linear result is associated with reference [155] (Le Gall). This is a direct misattribution of a central result in the section and should be corrected.
minor comments (7)
  1. [§4.2.1.2] AES key sizes are listed as '128, 102, and 256 bits'; the correct sizes are 128, 192, and 256 bits.
  2. [§4.2.2.2] In the Diffie-Hellman protocol description, Bob's secret key is said to satisfy 1 < b < q, but q is never defined; it should be the prime modulus p (or the group order, if explicitly introduced).
  3. [§4.2.3 (Fundamental Properties)] The 'deterministic' property states H(m1)=H(m2) ⇔ m1=m2. This is incorrect: hash functions are not injective. Determinism means the same input always yields the same output; the equivalence should be one-directional (m1=m2 ⇒ H(m1)=H(m2)).
  4. [§4.3.3] The target logical error rate for cryptographic applications is written as '10-15'; it should be 10^-15.
  5. [Table 4.8] The quantum threat row for confidentiality says 'Grover’s reduces AES-128 or 64-bit effort'. This is ambiguous and should be clarified, e.g., Grover's reduces AES-128 key search to about 2^64 operations.
  6. [Abstract and various] Several typos: 'salability' should be 'scalability'; §4.2.2.1 has 'Addleman' for 'Adleman'; §4.1 has 'Gover’s' for 'Grover’s'; Table 4.10 repeats 'Multivariate (Signature)' in the GeMSS row.
  7. [§4.6.4.2] The text cites reference [50] for TLS, but [50] is RFC 5280 (X.509 PKI certificate profile). The appropriate reference for TLS 1.3 would be RFC 8446.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 2.0 of 10

No circular derivation: the chapter is a tutorial survey whose claims rest on external literature; the two self-citations are background references and do not carry the argument.

full rationale

The chapter explicitly disclaims presenting a new derivation: 'Rather than presenting a novel algorithm or scheme, it aims to provide a structured and accessible explanation of the issues, solutions, and future directions' (Section 4.1). All load-bearing content—Shor's and Grover's threats, quantum resource estimates (Table 4.3), PQC families, QKD/QRNG roles, and standardization status—is attributed to external sources such as Gidney–Ekerå, NIST, ETSI, ITU-T, and Mosca/QED-C. I checked the only self-citations: [2] (Bandyopadhyay and Sen) is used as one of several general IoT survey references for background definitions; [156] (Sen, 'Homomorphic encryption: Theory and applications') is cited when introducing homomorphic encryption as a privacy-preserving technique. Neither justifies the central quantum-threat claim or the PQC migration recommendation. No fitted parameter is renamed as a prediction, no equation reduces to its input, and no load-bearing assertion depends on a self-citation chain. The internal tension between the 10–30 year timeline in Section 4.3.5 and the 10–15 year timeline in Section 4.6.2, and between '~8 hours' and 'in seconds' for breaking RSA-2048, is a consistency/accuracy concern, not circularity. Hence the paper is essentially self-contained as a survey and shows no significant circularity.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 2 assumptions · 0 invented entities

No free parameters or invented entities; the chapter is a survey that transfers existing results. The listed assumptions are external facts the survey's recommendations depend on.

assumptions (2)
  • domain assumption The cited quantum resource estimates (Gidney-Ekerå, Table 4.3) and threat timelines (10–30 years, Section 4.3.5) are accurate.
    The chapter's urgency and recommendations rest on these external quantitative projections, which it does not independently verify.
  • domain assumption The surveyed PQC families and standardization statuses are correctly represented as of 2024–2025.
    The chapter's educational value depends on the accuracy of its descriptions of Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+, McEliece, and the NIST/ETSI standardization process.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Security and Privacy Management of IoT Using Quantum Computing." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/TAGMIOAN

@misc{pith2026251103538,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Security and Privacy Management of IoT Using Quantum Computing},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/TAGMIOAN}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2511.03538}
}
read the original abstract

The convergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) and quantum computing is redefining the security paradigm of interconnected digital systems. Classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) have long provided the foundation for securing IoT communication. However, the emergence of quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's threatens to render these techniques vulnerable, necessitating the development of quantum-resilient alternatives. This chapter examines the implications of quantum computing for IoT security and explores strategies for building cryptographically robust systems in the post-quantum era. It presents an overview of Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) families, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate approaches, analyzing their potential for deployment in resource-constrained IoT environments. In addition, quantum-based methods such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) are discussed for their ability to enhance confidentiality and privacy through physics-based security guarantees. The chapter also highlights issues of privacy management, regulatory compliance, and standardization, emphasizing the need for collaborative efforts across academia, industry, and governance. Overall, it provides a comprehensive perspective on security IoT ecosystems against quantum threats and ensures resilience in the next generation of intelligent networks.

Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

176 extracted references · 4 linked inside Pith

  1. [152]

    Quantum private information retrieval has linear communication complexity,

    Ä. Baumeler and A. Broadbent, “Quantum private information retrieval has linear communication complexity,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 28, pp. 161–175, 2014

    2014

  2. [155]

    Quantum private information retrieval with sublinear communication complexity,

    F. Le Gall, “Quantum private information retrieval with sublinear communication complexity,” Theory of Computing, vol. 8, art 16, pp. 369–374, 2012

    2012

  3. [1]

    The Internet of Things: A survey,

    L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “The Internet of Things: A survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 15, pp. 2787–2805, 2010

    2010

  4. [2]

    Internet of Things: Applications and challenges in technology and standardization,

    D. Bandyopadhyay and J. Sen , “Internet of Things: Applications and challenges in technology and standardization,” Wireless Personal Communications, vol 58, no 1, pp. 49-69, 2011

    2011

  5. [3]

    Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges,

    D. Miorandi, S. Sicari, F. De Pellegrini, and I. Chlamtac, “Internet of things: Vision, applications and research challenges,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 1497–1516, 2012

    2012

  6. [4]

    The Internet of Things: A survey,

    Li, L. D. Xu, and S. Zhao, “The Internet of Things: A survey,” Information Systems Frontiers, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 243–259, 2015

    2015

  7. [5]

    Securing the Internet of Things,

    R. Roman, P. Najera, and J. Lopez, “Securing the Internet of Things,” IEEE Computer, vol. 44, no. 9, pp. 51–58, 2011

    2011

  8. [6]

    Internet of Things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions,

    J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, and M. Palaniswami , “Internet of Things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions,” Future Generation Computer Systems , vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 1645 –1660, 2013

    2013

Show all 176 references
  1. [7]

    Botnets and Internet of Things Security,

    E. Bertino and N. Islam, “Botnets and Internet of Things Security,” Computer, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 76 –79, 2017

    2017

  2. [8]

    Security in the Internet of Things: A review,

    H. Suo, J. Wan, C. Zou, and J. Liu, “Security in the Internet of Things: A review,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer Science and Electronics Engineering, pp. 648–651, 2012

    2012

  3. [9]

    The brave new world of bodacious assumptions in cryptography,

    N. Koblitz and A. J. Menezes, “The brave new world of bodacious assumptions in cryptography,” Notices of the AMS, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 357–365, 2010

    2010

  4. [10]

    M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information, Cambridge University Press, 2010

    2010

  5. [11]

    Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring,

    P. W. Shor, “Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring,” in Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Santa Fe, NM, USA, 1994, pp. 124–134

    1994

  6. [12]

    A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search,

    L. K. Grover, “A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search,” in Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC'96), 1996, pp. 212–219

    1996

  7. [13]

    Introduction to post-quantum cryptography,

    D. Bernstein, “Introduction to post-quantum cryptography,” Post-Quantum Cryptography, Springer, 2009, pp. 1–14

    2009

  8. [14]

    L. Chen, S. Jordan, Y. Liu, D. Moody, R. Peralta, R. Perlner, and D. Smith-Tone, Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography, NISTIR 8105, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016

    2016

  9. [15]

    From pre -quantum to post -quantum IoT security: A survey on quantum - resistant cryptosystems for the Internet of Things,

    T. M. Fernandez -Carames, “From pre -quantum to post -quantum IoT security: A survey on quantum - resistant cryptosystems for the Internet of Things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 6457- 6480, 2020

    2020

  10. [16]

    Securing the future internet of things with post-quantum cryptography,

    A. Kumar, C. Ottaviani, S. S. Gill, and R. Buyya, “Securing the future internet of things with post-quantum cryptography,” Security and Privacy, vol 5, no 2, e20, 2022

    2022

  11. [17]

    Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,

    C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol 560, part 1, pp. 7-11, 2014

    2014

  12. [18]

    The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna,

    M. Peev et al., “The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 11, art id. 075001, Jul. 2009

    2009

  13. [19]

    Advances in quantum cryptography,

    S. Pirandola et al., “Advances in quantum cryptography,” Advances in Optics and Photonics , vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1012–1236, 2020

    2020

  14. [20]

    Barker, William Polk, and Murugiah Souppaya, Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST, 2021

    W. Barker, William Polk, and Murugiah Souppaya, Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST, 2021

    2021

  15. [21]

    Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, 6th ed., Pearson, 2013

    W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, 6th ed., Pearson, 2013

    2013

  16. [22]

    NIST, FIPS‑197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) , Nov. 2001. Available at: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final (Accessed on: June 27, 2025)

    2001

  17. [23]

    Misuse of electronic CodeBook mode,

    B. Schneier, “Misuse of electronic CodeBook mode,” Crypto-Gram Newsletter , Dec. 1999. Available: https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/1999/1215.html (Accessed on 27 June, 2025)

    1999

  18. [24]

    Periodicity detection of the substitution box in the CBC mode of operation: Experiment and study,

    Z. Alimzhanova, M. Skublewska -Paszkowska, and D. Nazarbayev, “Periodicity detection of the substitution box in the CBC mode of operation: Experiment and study,” IEEE Access, 2023

    2023

  19. [25]

    The security and performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation,

    D. McGrew and J. Viega, “The security and performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation,” in Proceedings of INDOCRPYPT’04, LNCS vol 3348, Springer, pp. 343-355, 2004

    2004

  20. [26]

    Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques , NIST Special Publication 800‑38A, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001

    M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques , NIST Special Publication 800‑38A, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001

    2001

  21. [27]

    A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography , CRC Press, Chapter 6, 1996

    1996

  22. [28]

    A practical a ttack on broadcast RC4,

    I. Mantin and A. Shamir, “A practical a ttack on broadcast RC4,” in Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption (FSE), LNCS, Springer, pp. 152–164, 2001

    2001

  23. [29]

    Available: https://docs.oasis- open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/mqtt-v3.1.1.html (Accessed on: 27 June, 2025)

    OASIS Standard, MQTT Version 3.1.1, 2015. Available: https://docs.oasis- open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/mqtt-v3.1.1.html (Accessed on: 27 June, 2025)

    2015

  24. [30]

    Shelby, K

    Z. Shelby, K. Hartke, and C. Bormann, The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) , IETF RFC 7252, 2023

    2023

  25. [31]

    Rescorla and N

    E. Rescorla and N. Modadugu, DTLS: Datagram Transport Layer Security, IETF RFC 6347, 2012

    2012

  26. [32]

    PRESENT: An ultra-lightweight block cipher,

    A. Bogdanov et al., “PRESENT: An ultra-lightweight block cipher,” in Proceedings of CHES'07, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4727, Springer, pp. 450-466, 2007

    2007

  27. [33]

    The SIMON and SPECK lightweight block ciphers,

    R. Beaulieu et al., “The SIMON and SPECK lightweight block ciphers,” in Proceedings of the 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC'15), San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 1-6, 2015

    2015

  28. [34]

    A method for obtaining digital signatures and public -key cryptosystems,

    R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures and public -key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978

    1978

  29. [35]

    New directions in cryptography,

    W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography, ” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, 1976

    1976

  30. [36]

    Use of elliptic curves in cryptography,

    V. S. Miller, “Use of elliptic curves in cryptography,” Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'85, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 218, Springer, pp. 417–426, 1986

    1986

  31. [37]

    Elliptic curve cryptosystems,

    N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems, ” Mathematics of Computation , vol. 48, no. 177, pp. 203 –209, 1987

    1987

  32. [38]

    I. F. Blake, G. Seroussi, and N. Smart, Elliptic Curves in Cryptography, Cambridge University Press, 1999

    1999

  33. [39]

    Hankerson, S

    D. Hankerson, S. Vanstone, and A. Menezes, Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Springer, 2004

    2004

  34. [40]

    Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography , Version 2.0, 2009

    2009

  35. [41]

    The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA),

    D. Johnson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, “The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA),” International Journal. Information Security., vol. 1, no 1, pp. 36–63, 2001

    2001

  36. [42]

    Dierks and E

    T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 , IETF RFC 5246, 2008

    2008

  37. [43]

    Cryptographic hash functions: Theory and practice,

    B. Preneel, “Cryptographic hash functions: Theory and practice,” in Proceedings of INDOCRYPT 2020 , Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6498, Springer, pp. 115-117, 2010

    2020

  38. [44]

    Rivest, The MD5 Message‑Digest Algorithm, RFC 1321, 1992

    R. Rivest, The MD5 Message‑Digest Algorithm, RFC 1321, 1992

    1992

  39. [45]

    Katz and Y

    J. Katz and Y. Lindell, Introduction to Modern Cryptography, 3rd ed., CRC Press, 2020

    2020

  40. [46]

    How to break MD5 and other hash functions,

    X. Wang and H. Yu, “How to break MD5 and other hash functions,” Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3494, Springer, pp. 19-35, 2005

    2005

  41. [47]

    Available: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4

    NIST, Secure Hash Standard , FIPS‑180‑4, Federal Information Processing Standards, 2015. Available: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4. (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2015 doi

  42. [48]

    Finding collisions in the full SHA-1,

    X. Wang, Y. L. Yin, and H. Yu, “Finding collisions in the full SHA-1,” Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3621, Springer, pp. 17–36, 2005

    2005

  43. [49]

    The first collision for full SHA -1,

    M. Stevens, E. Bursztein, P. Karpman, A. Albertini, and Y. Markov, “The first collision for full SHA -1,” Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’2017, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10401, Springer, pp.570- 596, 2017

    2017

  44. [50]

    Cooper, S

    D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC 5280, 2008

    2008

  45. [51]

    SHA -1 si gned content to be retired,

    Microsoft, “SHA -1 si gned content to be retired,” Microsoft Security Advisory, April 2021. Available: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/announcements/sha-1-signed-content-retired (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2021

  46. [52]

    Department of Commerce, Aug

    NIST, FIPS PUB 180‑2: Secure Hash Standard (SHS) , U.S. Department of Commerce, Aug. 1, 2002. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-2/final/docs/fips180-2.pdf (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2002

  47. [53]

    Bertoni, J

    G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, and G. Van Assche, Keccak Sponge Function Family Main Document, Version 2.1, June 2010. Available: https://keccak.team/obsolete/Keccak -main-2.1.pdf (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2010

  48. [54]

    NIST, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, Aug

  49. [55]

    Kampanakis and Q

    P. Kampanakis and Q. Dang, Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) , IETF RFC 8702, 2025. Available: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8702 (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2025

  50. [56]

    Krawczyk, M

    H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed‑Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, 1997

    1997

  51. [57]

    A lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoT,

    B. B. Ehui, Y. Han, H. Guo, and J. Liu, “A lightweight mutual authentication protocol for IoT,” Journal of Communications and Information Networks, vol 7, issue 2, pp. 181-191, 2022

    2022

  52. [58]

    MQTT protocol: Fundamentals, tools and future directions,

    S. Quincozes, T. Emilio, and J. Kazienko, “MQTT protocol: Fundamentals, tools and future directions,” IEEE Latin America Transactions, vol 17, issue 9, pp. 1439-1448, 2019

    2019

  53. [59]

    CoAP: An application protocol for billions of tiny Internet nodes,

    C. Bormann, A. P. Castellani, and Z. Shelby, “CoAP: An application protocol for billions of tiny Internet nodes,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol 16, issue 2, pp. 62-67, 2012

    2012

  54. [60]

    Polynomial‑ time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer,

    P. W. Shor, “Polynomial‑ time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1484–1509, 1997

    1997

  55. [61]

    How to factor 2048‑bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits,

    C. Gidney and M. Ekerå, “How to factor 2048‑bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits,” Quantum, vol. 5, p. 433, 2021

  56. [62]

    Quantum accuracy threshold for concatenated distance‑3 codes,

    P. Aliferis, D. Gottesman, and J. Preskill, “Quantum accuracy threshold for concatenated distance‑3 codes,” Quantum Information a Computation, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 97–165, 2006

    2006

  57. [63]

    M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information , 10 th Anniversary Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010

    2010

  58. [64]

    Reversible computing,

    T. Toffoli, “Reversible computing,” in Proceedings of ICALP, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 85, Springer, pp. 632-644, 1980

    1980

  59. [65]

    Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms,

    M. Roetteler, M. Naehrig, K.M. Svore, and K. Lauter, “Quantum resource estimates for computing elliptic curve discrete logarithms, ” Advances in Cryptology -ASIACRYPT 2017 , Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10625, Springer, pp. 241-270, 2017

    2017

  60. [66]

    NIST, PQC Standardization: Selected Algorithms - CRYSTALS‑Kyber and CRYSTALS‑Dilithium , NIST News, 2022; NIST Post‑Quantum Cryptography Project Page, updated May 12, 2025

    2022

  61. [67]

    How to factor 2048‑bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits,

    C. Gidney, “How to factor 2048‑bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits,” arXiv: 2505.15917, 2025

    arXiv

  62. [68]

    Post-quantum cryptography,

    D. J. Bernstein and T. Lange, “Post-quantum cryptography,” Nature, vol. 549, pp. 188–194, 2017

    2017

  63. [69]

    A decade of lattice cryptography,

    C. Peikert, “A decade of lattice cryptography,” Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 283–424, 2016

    2016

  64. [70]

    The learning with errors problem ( Invited Survey),

    O. Regev, “The learning with errors problem ( Invited Survey), ” in Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference on Computational Complexity, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2010, pp. 191-204

    2010

  65. [71]

    CRYSTALS -Dilithium: A lattice -based digital signature scheme,

    J. Bos et al., “CRYSTALS -Dilithium: A lattice -based digital signature scheme,” in Proceedings of IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, London, UK, 2018, pp. 353–367

    2018

  66. [72]

    CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A lattice-based digital signature scheme,

    L. Ducas et al., “CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A lattice-based digital signature scheme,” IACR Transactions in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, vol 1, pp. 238-268, 2018

    2018

  67. [73]

    A certified digital signature,

    R. C. Merkle, “A certified digital signature,” Advances in Cryptology -CRYPTO'89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer, pp. 218-238, 1990

    1990

  68. [74]

    A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function,

    R. C. Merkle, “A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function,” Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’87, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 293, Springer, pp. 369-378, Springer, 1988

    1988

  69. [75]

    SPHINCS: Practical stateless hash -based signatures,

    D. J. Bernstein et al., “SPHINCS: Practical stateless hash -based signatures,” Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT’15, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9056, Springer, pp. 487–506, 2015

    2015

  70. [76]

    A public -key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory,

    R. J. McEliece, “A public -key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory,” DSN Progress Report, vol. 42‑44, pp. 114–116, 1978

    1978

  71. [77]

    A new identification scheme based on syndrome decoding,

    J. Stern, “A new identification scheme based on syndrome decoding,” Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 773, Springer, pp. 198-211, 1994

    1994

  72. [78]

    A new class of linear error-correcting codes,

    V. D. Goppa, “A new class of linear error-correcting codes,” Problems of Information Transmission , vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 207–212, 1970

    1970

  73. [79]

    Rainbow, a new multivariable polynomial signature scheme,

    J. Ding and J. E. Schmidt, “Rainbow, a new multivariable polynomial signature scheme,” Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2005) , L ecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3531, Springer, pp. 164–175, 2005

    2005

  74. [80]

    Novel and efficient Rainbow signature scheme based on circulant and Toeplitz matrices for intelligent IoT,

    Y. Gao, W. Feng, L. He, and M. Dong, “Novel and efficient Rainbow signature scheme based on circulant and Toeplitz matrices for intelligent IoT,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol 12, no 12, pp. 19167-19176, 2025

    2025

  75. [81]

    Breaking Rainbow takes a weekend on a laptop,

    W. Beullens, “Breaking Rainbow takes a weekend on a laptop,” in Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’22, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 464-479, 2022

    2022

  76. [82]

    Cryptanalysis of Rainbow,

    O. Billet and H. Gilbert, “Cryptanalysis of Rainbow,” in Security and Cryptography for Networks , R. De Prisco, M. Yung, Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4116, Springer, pp. 336-347, 2006

    2006

  77. [83]

    Quantum cryptography,

    N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Review of Modern Physics , vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 145–195, 2002

    2002

  78. [84]

    Quantum random number generators,

    M. Herrero-Collantes and J. C. Garcia -Escartin, “Quantum random number generators,” Review Modern Physics, vol. 89, no. 1, 2017

    2017

  79. [85]

    Low Power Wide Area Networks: An Overview,

    U. Raza, P. Kulkarni, and M. Sooriyabandara, “Low Power Wide Area Networks: An Overview, ” IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 855–873, 2017

    2017

  80. [86]

    A reference model of information assurance and security,

    Y. Cherdantseva and P. Hilton, “A reference model of information assurance and security,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Avialability, Reliability and Security, Regensburg, Germany, 2015, pp. 546-555

    2015

  81. [87]

    Security and privacy in the Internet of Things: Current status and open issues,

    M. Abomhara and G. M. Køien, “Security and privacy in the Internet of Things: Current status and open issues,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems (PRISMS), pp. 1–8, 2014

    2014

  82. [88]

    Advanced social engineering attacks,

    K. Krombholz, H. Hobel, M. Huber, and E. Weippl, “Advanced social engineering attacks, ” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 22, pp. 113–122, 2014

    2014

  83. [89]

    Cutting the Gordian Knot: A look under the hood of ransomware attacks,

    A. Kharraz, W. Robertson, D. Balzarotti, L. Bilge, and E. Kirda, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: A look under the hood of ransomware attacks,” in Proceedings of the 12 th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA’15) , pp. ...

    2015

  84. [90]

    Lessons from Stuxnet,

    T. Chen and S. Abu-Nimeh, “Lessons from Stuxnet,” Computer, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 91–93, 2011

    2011

  85. [91]

    Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,

    A. K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Physics Review Letters , vol. 67, no. 6, pp. 661–663, 1991

    1991

  86. [92]

    Quantum communication,

    N. Gisin and R. Thew, “Quantum communication,” Nature Photonics, vol. 1, pp. 165–171, 2007

    2007

  87. [93]

    Quantum random number generation,

    X. Ma, X. Yuan, Z. Cao, Z. Zhang, and B. Qi, “Quantum random number generation,” Nature Partner Journal Quantum Information, vol 2, 2016

    2016

  88. [94]

    Field and long -term demonstration of a wide area quantum key distribution network,

    S. Wang et al., “Field and long -term demonstration of a wide area quantum key distribution network,” Optics Express, vol 22, no 18, pp. 21739-21756, 2014

    2014

  89. [95]

    Quantum Internet: A Vision for the Road Ahead,

    S. Wehner, D. Elkouss, and R. Hanson, “Quantum Internet: A Vision for the Road Ahead,” Science, vol. 362, no. 6412, 2018

    2018

  90. [96]

    Secure quantum key distribution,

    H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, “Secure quantum key distribution,” Nature Photonics, vol. 8, pp. 595– 604, Sep. 2014

    2014

  91. [97]

    PUL-ABE: An efficient and quantum -resistant CP-ABE with po licy update in cloud storage,

    M. Yang, H. Wang, and Z. Wan, “PUL-ABE: An efficient and quantum -resistant CP-ABE with po licy update in cloud storage,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1126-1139, 2023

    2023

  92. [98]

    Mosca and M

    M. Mosca and M. Piani, 2021 Quantum Threat Timeline Report: Global Risk Institute , 2021

    2021

  93. [99]

    Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: A survey,

    R. Alléaume et al., “Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: A survey,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 560, pp. 62–81, 2014

    2014

  94. [100]

    Experimental authentication of quantum key distribution with post -quantum cryptography,

    L-J. Wang et al., “Experimental authentication of quantum key distribution with post -quantum cryptography,” Quantum Information, vol 7, art no 67, 2021

    2021

  95. [101]

    Public key infrastructure in the post -quantum era,

    F. Bene and A. Kiss, “Public key infrastructure in the post -quantum era,” in Proceedings of the IEEE 17th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics (SACI ’23), Timisoara, Romania, 2023, pp. 77-82

    2023

  96. [102]

    A survey on blockchain -based identity management systems for the Internet of Things,

    X. Zhu and Y. Badr, “A survey on blockchain -based identity management systems for the Internet of Things,” in Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical ...

    2018

  97. [103]

    Quantum-secure hybrid blockchain system for DID-based verifiable random function with NTRU linkable ring signature,

    B. G. Kim, D. Wong, and Y. S. Yang, “Quantum-secure hybrid blockchain system for DID-based verifiable random function with NTRU linkable ring signature,” International Journal of Cryptography and Information Security (IJCIS), vol 13, no 4, 2024

    2024

  98. [104]

    On the construction of a post‑quantum blockchain for smart city,

    J. Chen, W. Gan, M. Hu, and C -M. Chen, “On the construction of a post‑quantum blockchain for smart city,” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 58, 2021

    2021

  99. [105]

    Security orchestration, automation, and response engine for deployment of behavioral honeypots,

    U. Bartwal, S. Mukhopadhyay, R. Negi, and Sandeep Shukla, “Security orchestration, automation, and response engine for deployment of behavioral honeypots,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing (DSC), Edinburgh, UK, 2022, pp. 1-8

    2022

  100. [106]

    An integrated s pace-to-ground quantum communication network over 4,600 kilometres,

    Y-A. Chen, “An integrated s pace-to-ground quantum communication network over 4,600 kilometres,” Nature, vol 589, pp. 214-219, 2021

    2021

  101. [107]

    A fast and versatile quantum key distribution system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing,

    N. Walenta et al., “A fast and versatile quantum key distribution system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 16, 2014

    2014

  102. [108]

    Intelligent transportation systems for s ustainable smart cities,

    M. Elassy, M. Al -Hattab, M. Takruri, and S. Badawi, “Intelligent transportation systems for s ustainable smart cities,” Transportation Engineering, vol 16, 2024

    2024

  103. [109]

    Federated learning for secure IoMT -applications in smart healthcare systems: A comprehensive review,

    S. Rani, A. Kataria, S. Kumar, and P. Ti wari, “Federated learning for secure IoMT -applications in smart healthcare systems: A comprehensive review,” Knowledge-Based Systems, vol 274, 2023

    2023

  104. [110]

    Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj

    European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regul ation), Official Jou...

    2016

  105. [111]

    ETSI GS QKD 016 v2 1.1, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD): Common Criteria Protection Profile – Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules, 2024

    2024

  106. [112]

    Fouque et al., FALCON: Fast-Fourier Lattice-based Compact Signatures over NTRU, v1.0, 2022

    P-A. Fouque et al., FALCON: Fast-Fourier Lattice-based Compact Signatures over NTRU, v1.0, 2022

    2022

  107. [113]

    The SPHINCS+ signature framework,

    D. J. Bernstein et al., “The SPHINCS+ signature framework, ” September 2019. Available: https://sphincs.org/data/sphincs+-paper.pdf (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2019

  108. [114]

    NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem,

    J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, and J. H. Silverman, “NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem,” in Algorithmic Number Theory (ANTS 1998), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1423, Springer, pp. 267-288, 1998

    1998

  109. [115]

    ITU-T Recommendation Y.3800, Overview on Networks Supporting Quantum Key Distribution, International Telecommunication Union, Oct. 2019. Available: https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.3800- 201910-Pms (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2019

  110. [116]

    New quantum project aims for ultra-secure communication in Europe,

    European Commission, “New quantum project aims for ultra-secure communication in Europe,” : Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Sep. 2, 2019 . Available: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/new- quantum-project-aims-ultra-secure-communication-europe

    2019

  111. [117]

    A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptology,

    N. Aquina, “A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptology,” EPJ Quantum Technology, vol 12, art no 51, 2025

    2025

  112. [118]

    Available: https://www.quantumcommshub.net (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    The Quantum Communications Hub . Available: https://www.quantumcommshub.net (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2025

  113. [119]

    NIST NCCoE, Migration to Post‑Quantum Cryptography: NIST SP 1800‑38B (Preliminary Draft), Dec. 2023. Available: https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/crypto-agility-considerations-migrating-post-quantum- cryptographic-algorithms (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2023

  114. [120]

    Cloudflare Blog: Inside the Infamous Mirai IoT Botnet: A Retrospective Analysis, 2017

    2017

  115. [121]

    CISA: Heightened DDoS Threat Posed by Mirai and Other Botnets, Alert:TA16‑288A, 2016

    2016

  116. [122]

    A hacker accessed a family's Ring security camera and told their 8‑year‑old daughter he was Santa Claus,

    E. Wolfe and B. Ries, “A hacker accessed a family's Ring security camera and told their 8‑year‑old daughter he was Santa Claus,” CNN Business, 2019

    2019

  117. [123]

    Hackers hijack Philips Hue lights with a drone,

    T. J. Seppala, “Hackers hijack Philips Hue lights with a drone,” Engadget, 2016

    2016

  118. [124]

    Researchers hack Philips Hue lights via a drone; IoT worm could cause city blackout,

    D. Storm, “Researchers hack Philips Hue lights via a drone; IoT worm could cause city blackout,” Computerworld, 2016

    2016

  119. [125]

    A smart home is no castle: Privacy vulnerabilities of encrypted IoT traffic,

    N. Apthorpe, D. Reisman, and N. Feamster, “A smart home is no castle: Privacy vulnerabilities of encrypted IoT traffic,” arXiv:1705.06805, 2017

    2017 arXiv

  120. [126]

    Every byte matters: Traffic analysis of Bluetooth wearable devices,

    L. Barman, A. Dumur, A. Pyrgelis , and J.-P. Hubaux, “Every byte matters: Traffic analysis of Bluetooth wearable devices,” Proc of the ACM Interactive Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, vol 5, no 2, pp. 1-45, 2021

    2021

  121. [127]

    Privacy in the Internet of Things: Threats and challenges,

    J. Ziegeldorf, O. García Morchon, and K. Wehrle, “Privacy in the Internet of Things: Threats and challenges,” Security and Communication Networks, vol 7, pp. 2728-2742, 2013

    2013

  122. [128]

    Boecki et al

    K. Boecki et al. , Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks , NIST Internal Report 8228, 2019

    2019

  123. [129]

    Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: Will we be ready?

    M. Mosca, “Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: Will we be ready?” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 38–41, 2018

    2018

  124. [130]

    Department of Health and Human Services, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191, 1996

    U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191, 1996. Available: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa

    1996

  125. [131]

    Available: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264196391-en

    OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2002. Available: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264196391-en

    2002 doi

  126. [132]

    Kott and I

    A. Kott and I. Linkov, Cyber Resilience of Systems and Networks, 1st Edition, Springer, 2019

    2019

  127. [133]

    Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and Applications,

    A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and M. Ayyash, “Internet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and Applications,” IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2347–2376, 2015

    2015

  128. [134]

    A bird's eye view on quantum computing: Current and future trends,

    B. Branchini, D. Conficconi, F. Peverelli, D. Sciuto, and M.D. Santambrogo, “A bird's eye view on quantum computing: Current and future trends, ” in Proceedings of the IEEE EUROCON ’23 – 20th International Conference on Smart Technologies, Torino, Italy, 2023, pp. 689-694

    2023

  129. [135]

    Available: https://quantumconsortium.org/publication/preparing-for-the-quantum-leap/ (Accessed: June 2025)

    Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED -C), Preparing for the Quantum Leap, 2025. Available: https://quantumconsortium.org/publication/preparing-for-the-quantum-leap/ (Accessed: June 2025)

    2025

  130. [136]

    Casanova, J -C

    A. Casanova, J -C. Faugere, G. Macario -Rat, J. Patarin, L. Perret, and J. Ryckeghem, GeMSS: A Great Multivariate Short Signature , NIST PQC Standardization Process, 2020. Available: https://www - polsys.lip6.fr/Links/NIST/GeMSS_specification_round2.pdf (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2020

  131. [137]

    Jao et al., Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation

    D. Jao et al., Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation . NIST PQC Project, September 2022. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/documents/round- 4/submissions/SIKE-spec.pdf

    2022

  132. [138]

    A new mode of operation for block ciphers and length -preserving MACs,

    Y. Dodis, K. Piet rzak, and P. Puniya, “A new mode of operation for block ciphers and length -preserving MACs,” in Advances in Cryptology -EUROCRYPT 2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4965, Springer, pp. 198-219, 2008

    2008

  133. [139]

    A high‑speed integrated quantum random number generator with on‑chip real‑time randomness extraction,

    F. Regazzoni et al., “A high‑speed integrated quantum random number generator with on‑chip real‑time randomness extraction,” arXiv:2102.06238, 2021

    2021 arXiv

  134. [140]

    Available: https://quside.com/quantum-random-number-generators-why-how-where

    Quside, Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG ): Everything You Need to Know , Quside, 2023 . Available: https://quside.com/quantum-random-number-generators-why-how-where. (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2023

  135. [141]

    Authentication of smart grid communications using quantum key distribution,

    M. Alshowkan, P.G. Evans, M. Starke, D. Ea rl, and N. A. Peters, “Authentication of smart grid communications using quantum key distribution,” Scientific Reports, vol 12, art no 12731, 2022

    2022

  136. [142]

    Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network,

    M. Sasaki et al., “Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network,” Optics Express, vol. 19, no. 11, pp. 10387–10409, 2011

    2011

  137. [143]

    Direct and full -scale experimental verifications towards ground –satellite quantum key distribution,

    J.-Y. Wang et al., “Direct and full -scale experimental verifications towards ground –satellite quantum key distribution,” Nature Photonics, vol. 7, pp. 387–393, 2013

    2013

  138. [144]

    DDKA-QKDN: Dynamic on-demand key allocation scheme for quantum Internet of Things secured by QKD network,

    L. Chen et al., “DDKA-QKDN: Dynamic on-demand key allocation scheme for quantum Internet of Things secured by QKD network,” Entropy, vol. 24, no. 2:149, 2022

    2022

  139. [145]

    Trusted node QKD at an electrical utility,

    P. G. Evans, M. Alshowkan, D. Earl, D. D. Mulkey, R. Newell, and G. Peterson, “Trusted node QKD at an electrical utility,” IEEE Access, vol 9, pp. 105220-105229, 2021

    2021

  140. [146]

    Qkd@Edge: Online admission control of edge applications with QKD -secured communications,

    C. Cicconetti, M. Conti, and A. Passarella, “Qkd@Edge: Online admission control of edge applications with QKD -secured communications,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP’23), Nashville, TN, USA, 2023, pp. 65-73

    2023

  141. [147]

    Applications of quantum key distribution in intelligent security operation and maintenance of power communication networks,

    H. Wen, A. Xu, and H. Qi, “Applications of quantum key distribution in intelligent security operation and maintenance of power communication networks,” Results in Physics, vol 54, art no 107041, 2023

    2023

  142. [148]

    Device -independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks,

    S. Pironio et al., “Device -independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks,” New Journal of Physics, vol 11, art no 045021, 2009

    2009

  143. [149]

    Bell nonlocality,

    N. Brunner, D. Cavalcanti, S. Pironio, and S. Wehner, “Bell nonlocality,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 419–478, 2014

    2014

  144. [150]

    Quantum key distribution networks – key management: A survey,

    E. Dervisevic, “Quantum key distribution networks – key management: A survey,” arXiv: 2408.0458, 2024

    2024

  145. [151]

    Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution,

    S.-K. Liao et al., “Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution,” Nature, vol. 549, pp. 43–47, 2017

    2017

  146. [153]

    Quantum delegated and federated learning via quantum homomorphic encryption,

    W. Li and D.-L. Deng, “Quantum delegated and federated learning via quantum homomorphic encryption,” Research Directions: Quantum Technologies, vol 3, 2025

    2025

  147. [154]

    Post‑ quantum multi‑party computation,

    A. Agarwal, J. Bartusek, V. Goyal, D. Khurana, and G. Malavolta, “Post‑ quantum multi‑party computation,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science , vol 12696, Springer, pp. 435-464, 2021

    2021

  148. [156]

    Sen, “Homomorphic encryption: Theory and applications, in Theory and Practice of Cryptography and Network Security Protocols and Technologies, J

    J. Sen, “Homomorphic encryption: Theory and applications, in Theory and Practice of Cryptography and Network Security Protocols and Technologies, J. Sen, Eds., pp. 1-31, INTECH, 2013

    2013

  149. [157]

    Quantum homomorphic encryption for polynomial-sized circuits,

    Y. Dulek, C. Schaffner, and F. Speelman, “Quantum homomorphic encryption for polynomial-sized circuits,” in Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016 , L ecture Notes in Computer Science , vol. 9815, Springer, pp. 3–32, 2016

    2016

  150. [158]

    Concise and efficient multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption scheme,

    G. Tu, W. Liu, T. Zhou, X. Yang, and F. Zhang, “Concise and efficient multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption scheme,” IEEE Access (Early Access), 2024

    2024

  151. [159]

    Secure multi-party computation-based privacy- preserving authentication for smart cities,

    V. Sucasas, A. Aly, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez, and N. Aaraj, “Secure multi-party computation-based privacy- preserving authentication for smart cities,” IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, vol 11, no 4, pp. 3555- 3572, 2023

    2023

  152. [160]

    Secure multiparty quantum computation for summation and multiplication,

    R-H. Shi, Y. Mu, H. Zhong, J. Cui, and S. Zhang, “Secure multiparty quantum computation for summation and multiplication,” Scientific Reports, vol 6, art no 19655, 2016

    2016

  153. [161]

    https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/post-quantum-cryptography-current-state-and-quantum- mitigation (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    ENISA, Post‑Quantum Cryptography Current State and Quantum Mitigation, ENISA Report, May 2021. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/post-quantum-cryptography-current-state-and-quantum- mitigation (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2021

  154. [162]

    Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 117‑260, Dec. 21, 2022 . Available: https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ260/PLAW-117publ260.pdf. (Accessed: June 27, 2025)

    2022

  155. [163]

    ITU-T SG17, “Y.3810 Series: Quantum Key Distribution Network Interworking- Framework, 2022

    2022

  156. [164]

    Stebila, S

    D. Stebila, S. Fluhrer, and S. Gueron, Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3, IETF -TLS-Hybrid-Design-13 (work in progress) Last updated: June 2025. Available: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid- design. (Accessed: 27 June, 2025)

    2025

  157. [165]

    Open Quantum Safe Project – PQC Toolkit,

    Open Quantum Safe, “Open Quantum Safe Project – PQC Toolkit,” 2024. https://openquantumsafe.org

    2024

  158. [166]

    Available: https://www.iso.org/committee/45306.html

    ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, Information Security, Cybersecurity and Privacy Protection - Post-Quantum Cryptography Harmonisation. Available: https://www.iso.org/committee/45306.html

  159. [167]

    Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography,

    NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, “Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography,” 2024

    2024

  160. [168]

    https://quantuminternetalliance.org/

    Quantum Internet Alliance (QIA). https://quantuminternetalliance.org/

  161. [169]

    A survey on post‑quantum based approaches for edge computing security,

    A. Karakaya and A. Ulu, “A survey on post‑quantum based approaches for edge computing security,” WIREs Computational Statistics, vol 16, issue 1, art no e1644, 2024

    2024

  162. [170]

    Securing IoT Communication with the Integration of Quantum Cryptography and Machine Learning,

    M. A. Khan and P. A. Khan, “Securing IoT Communication with the Integration of Quantum Cryptography and Machine Learning,” International Journal Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering, vol. 12, no. 3, 2023

    2023

  163. [171]

    Quantum repeaters in space,

    C. Liorni, H. Kampermann, and D. Bruß, “Quantum repeaters in space,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 23, art no 053021, 2021

    2021

  164. [172]

    Advances in entanglement‑based QKD for space applications,

    S. Ecker, J. Pseiner, J. Piris, and M. Bohmann, “Advances in entanglement‑based QKD for space applications,” arXiv:2210.02229, 2022

    2022 arXiv

  165. [173]

    Frequency-bin entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution,

    N. Tagliavacche, “Frequency-bin entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution,” Quantum Information, vol 11, art no 60, 2025

    2025

  166. [174]

    Progress in satellite quantum key distribution,

    R. Bedington, J. M. Arrazola, and A. Ling, “Progress in satellite quantum key distribution,” Quantum Information, vol 3, art no 30, 2017

    2017

  167. [175]

    Microsatellite-based real-time quantum key distribution,

    Y. Li, “Microsatellite-based real-time quantum key distribution,” Nature, vol 640, pp. 47-54, 2025

    2025

  168. [2015]

    Available: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202 (Accessed: June 27, 2025)

    2025 doi

Pith tools

Reviewed August 3, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.