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Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium in scalar linear-state differential games with impulse control

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arxiv 2003.05348 v2 pith:UBHCJ4BT submitted 2020-03-11 math.OC

classification math.OC
keywords impulsedifferentialequilibriafeedbacklinear-stateopen-loopcasecontrol
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We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous, we obtain the classical result in linear-state differential games that open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria coincide. When the impulse instants are endogenous, we show that this result no longer holds. In particular, the two equilibria are different. We show that the impulse level is a constant in both equilibria. More importantly, in the open-loop case, we show that the equilibrium number of impulses is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the feedback case.

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