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Mempool Privacy: An Economic Perspective

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arxiv 2307.10878 v3 pith:UP4VS5HO submitted 2023-07-20 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords blockchainseconomicliteraturemempoolsprivateseveralacrossaddress
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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A growing body of literature is aimed at designing private mempools in blockchains. The ultimate goal of this research is addressing several phenomena broadly classed under MEV with sandwich attacks as the canonical example. The literature has primarily viewed MEV as a problem arising from oversights in distributed systems and cryptographic protocol design and has attempted to address it with the standard tool sets from those disciplines. This paper argues that the impact of private mempools on markets and agent incentives renders analyses that do not consider the economic lens incomplete. The paper presents several observations across blockchains and traditional finance to justify this argument and highlight specific dynamics for future study.

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Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Reveal, Correct, Then Pay: Encrypted Mempools and Perpetual Funding Security

    cs.CR 2026-07 accept novelty 7.0 of 10

    In commit-then-reveal mempools, a self-authored trade is hidden from the arbitrageurs who would correct it, so perpetual-futures funding distortion is amplified; privacy can therefore increase manipulation value despi...

  2. Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    A power-weighted randomized lottery with superlinear bid weights lets a user deter front-runners with a single bid that forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

  3. Themis Consensus Extension v1: MEV Mitigation by Randomized Delayed Execution and Intent-Hiding Transactions in Application-Specific Blockchains

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A precise conditional specification of Themis Consensus Extension v1: under non-colluding validators, randomized delayed execution and two-layer intent-hiding reduce reordering and selective-denial MEV, without elimin...

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