Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback
As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2108.08843.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T14:53:56.997108Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: pith, observed 2026-08-07T11:07:06.956690Z
Reference resolution
0 of 0 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy0
- unresolved0
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.
Pith citing papers
Observation d4ea4499-ec8e-43b7-8c2f-4d2b21dda6d1 · inbound
Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition cites this paper.
Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback
Reference 36
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:53:56.997108Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 2504b3d0-d8b6-4862-9f5a-1f6e6f64bcab · inbound
Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback cites this paper.
Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback
Reference 26
- Resolution
- metadata mismatch
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T11:07:06.961736Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.
Observation 51b09b5b-2c40-42d5-9632-572a58642bac · inbound
Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching under Two-Sided Uncertainty cites this paper.
Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching under Two-Sided Uncertainty Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback
Reference 98
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-07-11T12:55:57.279598Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.