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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Mean-Field Games Modeling of Anticipation in Dense Crowds

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2403.01168.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2403.01168 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T22:58:02.570990Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-15T22:58:02.980326Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 4588d158-3d4d-4b6f-afa5-a472e8cfc846 · inbound

Exploring Dense Crowd Dynamics: State of the Art and Emerging Paradigms cites this paper.

Exploring Dense Crowd Dynamics: State of the Art and Emerging Paradigms Mean-Field Games Modeling of Anticipation in Dense Crowds

Reference 58

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T22:58:02.986763Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-15T22:58:02.570990Z digest=sha256:cad9fed38d587c31872786073deddd03ae5ddcac24354f56f738035affdaa483

Observation 0747bfa1-35ca-4716-b152-bb872d8415a0 · inbound

Pay for The Second-Best Service: A Game-Theoretic Approach Against Dishonest LLM Providers cites this paper.

Pay for The Second-Best Service: A Game-Theoretic Approach Against Dishonest LLM Providers Mean-Field Games Modeling of Anticipation in Dense Crowds

Reference 9

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-04T00:36:01.744151Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-04T00:36:01.744151Z digest=sha256:0a36c98208d39af9e86911d52e2c7168a24283efe7f7a0d163871bd5527e1232