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Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained Unified Foundation Models
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The rise of pre-trained unified foundation models breaks down the barriers between different modalities and tasks, providing comprehensive support to users with unified architectures. However, the backdoor attack on pre-trained models poses a serious threat to their security. Previous research on backdoor attacks has been limited to uni-modal tasks or single tasks across modalities, making it inapplicable to unified foundation models. In this paper, we make proof-of-concept level research on the backdoor attack for pre-trained unified foundation models. Through preliminary experiments on NLP and CV classification tasks, we reveal the vulnerability of these models and suggest future research directions for enhancing the attack approach.
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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Merge Hijacking: Backdoor Attacks to Model Merging of Large Language Models
Merge Hijacking is a backdoor attack that lets a malicious LLM checkpoint poison any model it is merged with while preserving normal behavior.
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