Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits

As of 21 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 51 of 51 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2502.08412.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2502.08412 v3

Coverage vector

measured 51 of 51 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.272710Z

measured 52 of 52 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T18:10:18.380972Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-06T18:11:15.459402Z

Reference resolution

51 of 51 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy27
unresolved24
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation b6912d59-ad11-48a5-815b-339d43726e0d · outbound

This paper cites A dynamic near-optimal algorithm for online linear programming.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits A dynamic near-optimal algorithm for online linear programming

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.055703Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b246648c-8dcb-44f9-b976-c2cf8a37726c · outbound

This paper cites A difficulty in the concept of social welfare.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits A difficulty in the concept of social welfare

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.060682Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e29515c9-a839-4119-a3e8-872bd139343c · outbound

This paper cites The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.898106Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation a98430d7-bba4-46fc-a5f2-de16518bffff · outbound

This paper cites Multiagent mechanism design without money.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Multiagent mechanism design without money

Reference 4

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.070230Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b82d2137-8bc9-4d08-9660-57f8bac11dc4 · outbound

This paper cites The best of many worlds: Dual mirror descent for online allocation problems.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The best of many worlds: Dual mirror descent for online allocation problems

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.875106Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 344890af-77f5-4ced-8713-cb25fabd072e · outbound

This paper cites Robust pseudo-markets for reusable public resources.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Robust pseudo-markets for reusable public resources

Reference 6

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.079327Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 85fa89c0-24fe-41f1-aeae-8e9b814f05c7 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic fairness and vertical equity: Income fairness with irs tax audit models.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Algorithmic fairness and vertical equity: Income fairness with irs tax audit models

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.849790Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 7e8e39e7-caf6-43cc-9835-04c6d31c3da1 · outbound

This paper cites Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.088418Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b0880bbc-b80d-4959-a4ea-280b4428597f · outbound

This paper cites Tight bounds for local glivenko-cantelli.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Tight bounds for local glivenko-cantelli

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.835070Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 2c3a1430-c758-4193-a08a-7902551b100b · outbound

This paper cites The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.820842Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 11304576-5c83-4d89-b9f5-797807fe1b3a · outbound

This paper cites Bringing real market participants' real preferences into the lab: An experiment that changed the course allocation mechanism at Wharton.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Bringing real market participants' real preferences into the lab: An experiment that changed the course allocation mechanism at Wharton

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.806311Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 68e45c11-8387-4dcd-ac5f-3a6f305e0783 · outbound

This paper cites The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.791963Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation c1ba3fd2-7d27-44ce-8319-ea73e1651cbf · outbound

This paper cites Multipart pricing of public goods.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Multipart pricing of public goods

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.109828Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation bf3fbe41-cbd0-480d-be79-c1305c0ded1b · outbound

This paper cites Positive results for mechanism design without money.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Positive results for mechanism design without money

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.114109Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 9b2d7e71-6f22-41a9-be83-9d867e5a2ed7 · outbound

This paper cites What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.759039Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation d3da6968-5767-48a5-a345-66a40096fdd4 · outbound

This paper cites Incentives and incomplete information.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Incentives and incomplete information

Reference 16

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.744821Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation c28ec05a-c815-4996-99b5-f70a529fd450 · outbound

This paper cites The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations

Reference 17

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.126742Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6ca07e0c-85fa-4099-a119-ba6c5d66ee48 · outbound

This paper cites Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.131096Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7687b991-05b0-4a52-8f41-cc35566e558c · outbound

This paper cites Incentivizing truthfulness through audits in strategic classification.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Incentivizing truthfulness through audits in strategic classification

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.712949Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 53562c6d-7a31-4e75-90b9-24c2e80df43f · outbound

This paper cites Incentivizing recourse through auditing in strategic classification.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Incentivizing recourse through auditing in strategic classification

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.698834Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 917fa0d5-4185-4c5f-912b-c6e2cc356598 · outbound

This paper cites Online stochastic packing applied to display ad allocation.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Online stochastic packing applied to display ad allocation

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.143984Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation fd27d337-be15-40b7-98be-a33a32391e04 · outbound

This paper cites Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.148404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6c3cf922-dc3b-4df7-b51c-341a5b189ded · outbound

This paper cites Efficiency and nash equilibria in a scrip system for p2p networks.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Efficiency and nash equilibria in a scrip system for p2p networks

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.675339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation ef3e4a4e-c6fa-443a-a047-5d371ea6245e · outbound

This paper cites The folk theorem with imperfect public information.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The folk theorem with imperfect public information

Reference 24

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.661600Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 03c0a4fb-8c28-4013-b285-d35d4857c9ef · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Unresolved cited work

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.161543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d1dafda0-ecb1-449a-ae15-d5f9dbf06a92 · outbound

This paper cites The remarkable robustness of the repeated fisher market.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The remarkable robustness of the repeated fisher market

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.638371Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation d9519375-e722-4432-a8cf-b5c13cb10f91 · outbound

This paper cites From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.170168Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b9588e86-9010-4657-9aa1-617086c9a61d · outbound

This paper cites Incentives in teams.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Incentives in teams

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.174531Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 85a9f5ab-c709-4190-be07-616976d587df · outbound

This paper cites Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors

Reference 29

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.178671Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 83c05cc6-7412-44e9-afef-791e673d1ba1 · outbound

This paper cites Competitive repeated allocation without payments.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Competitive repeated allocation without payments

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.598045Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation ab17a8a0-43a0-4642-b960-7b2485937ffe · outbound

This paper cites On strategy-proof allocation without payments or priors.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits On strategy-proof allocation without payments or priors

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.187022Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a740590d-1e5a-4ea0-8600-71ed060cefbe · outbound

This paper cites Optimal mechanism design and money burning.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Optimal mechanism design and money burning

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.572430Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 204f8aa1-70e7-4f1e-9c26-d2f540b3ec9e · outbound

This paper cites The theory of assortative matching based on costly signals.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The theory of assortative matching based on costly signals

Reference 33

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.558765Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation eaf372b7-e6a4-483e-93ef-f304f3a63f7e · outbound

This paper cites Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions 1.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions 1

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.544700Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation a0af629e-7468-48c2-be92-281315af5fa9 · outbound

This paper cites Catch Me If You Can: Combatting Fraud in Artificial Currency Based Government Benefits Programs.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Catch Me If You Can: Combatting Fraud in Artificial Currency Based Government Benefits Programs

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.203043Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6bea6942-51ff-4f51-bfc5-239137b41397 · outbound

This paper cites Analyzing scrip systems.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Analyzing scrip systems

Reference 36

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.530937Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 2ec41b36-e28f-4541-bc09-d544ebf33619 · outbound

This paper cites Approximately optimal approximate reinforcement learning.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Approximately optimal approximate reinforcement learning

Reference 37

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.212766Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 618e4b28-0068-4394-a8cd-786f299d3641 · outbound

This paper cites Optimizing scrip systems: Efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Optimizing scrip systems: Efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists

Reference 38

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.508081Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 106c6fd8-7301-49ed-afc8-2c1388ae26ef · outbound

This paper cites An equilibrium analysis of scrip systems.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits An equilibrium analysis of scrip systems

Reference 39

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.493855Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 28fe465f-4e97-40ff-89dc-d6fc8f5c4384 · outbound

This paper cites Allocation for social good: auditing mechanisms for utility maximization.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Allocation for social good: auditing mechanisms for utility maximization

Reference 40

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.479668Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation e77951a8-7be2-40bf-b482-4bf1d5e46aa8 · outbound

This paper cites Redesigning volunteermatch's ranking algorithm: Toward more equitable access to volunteers.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Redesigning volunteermatch's ranking algorithm: Toward more equitable access to volunteers

Reference 41

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.465702Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 70ddc554-3d4d-4d96-a3d3-a3a3ac98e5fb · outbound

This paper cites Cardinal bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Cardinal bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers

Reference 42

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.234198Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3c0be14f-db11-4f29-835b-d90ccd510f2f · outbound

This paper cites The proportional random allocation of indivisible units.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The proportional random allocation of indivisible units

Reference 43

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.441943Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation eae487fd-40ff-43df-8f6d-334bdca75bf0 · outbound

This paper cites Online Mechanism and Virtual Currency Design for Distributed Systems.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Online Mechanism and Virtual Currency Design for Distributed Systems

Reference 44

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.428335Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation bdada2ef-feaf-4489-93b3-8e1a8cba8c72 · outbound

This paper cites How food banks use markets to feed the poor.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits How food banks use markets to feed the poor

Reference 45

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.247508Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation cd3dc893-7e66-4025-97a7-f772df012f30 · outbound

This paper cites The allocation of food to food banks.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits The allocation of food to food banks

Reference 46

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.404849Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 402325dc-1839-4430-a7c0-43f0404bec19 · outbound

This paper cites Approximate mechanism design without money.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Approximate mechanism design without money

Reference 47

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.256095Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3b6c5c65-03d9-43d8-bf5b-38d5023370a7 · outbound

This paper cites Satterthwaite.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Satterthwaite

Reference 48

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.260227Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation dc3ae558-760b-429c-be2c-93c2c0001e5b · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design without money.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Mechanism design without money

Reference 49

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.371348Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.

Observation 189737ff-74ba-4991-b054-b3ba8462367c · outbound

This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders

Reference 50

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.268487Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation bcb19bdd-90a9-4f5d-9206-75d66b91f059 · outbound

This paper cites Online allocation and learning in the presence of strategic agents.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Online allocation and learning in the presence of strategic agents

Reference 51

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.272710Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

Observation bbe95fee-a608-4435-b3ab-b9cc59e464ce · inbound

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation cites this paper.

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits

Reference 21

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T18:11:15.489375Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.