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A Split-and-Privatize Framework for Large Language Model Fine-Tuning
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Fine-tuning is a prominent technique to adapt a pre-trained language model to downstream scenarios. In parameter-efficient fine-tuning, only a small subset of modules are trained over the downstream datasets, while leaving the rest of the pre-trained model frozen to save computation resources. In recent years, a popular productization form arises as Model-as-a-Service (MaaS), in which vendors provide abundant pre-trained language models, server resources and core functions, and customers can fine-tune, deploy and invoke their customized model by accessing the one-stop MaaS with their own private dataset. In this paper, we identify the model and data privacy leakage risks in MaaS fine-tuning, and propose a Split-and-Privatize (SAP) framework, which manage to mitigate the privacy issues by adapting the existing split learning architecture. The proposed SAP framework is sufficiently investigated by experiments, and the results indicate that it can enhance the empirical privacy by 62% at the cost of 1% model performance degradation on the Stanford Sentiment Treebank dataset.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Learning Obfuscations Of LLM Embedding Sequences: Stained Glass Transform
A learned stochastic embedding obfuscator, the Stained Glass Transform, is claimed to reduce mutual information between prompts and their server-side representations while preserving LLM utility.
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SoK: Semantic Privacy in Large Language Models
A systematization of knowledge arguing that LLM privacy threats extend beyond data leakage to semantically inferred attributes, and that current defenses only partially address them.
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