Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:13.367060Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
As of 20 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 51 of 51 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.09291.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
51 of 51 outbound references displayed
- verified exact2
- verified fuzzy46
- unresolved3
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation b28514f9-1461-469e-8d7b-b96907d21c5c · outbound
This paper cites Pricing with samples.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Pricing with samples
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:23.116914Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 2c0291da-1e93-4b15-89fa-59eac28fec1a · outbound
This paper cites Optimal pricing with a single point.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal pricing with a single point
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.936895Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation d48bdef4-1a42-4b27-a59e-791e27511198 · outbound
This paper cites Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.756857Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 70b43694-faad-4c1e-bc62-090b1759902c · outbound
This paper cites Optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.592150Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation d44c4b73-9ac5-42a7-adbe-554b5b363ede · outbound
This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Matthew Weinberg
Reference 5
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.430394Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation f54e8594-338d-43e9-be3a-4dd31b515ab7 · outbound
This paper cites Properties of probability distributions with monotone hazard rate.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Properties of probability distributions with monotone hazard rate
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.198488Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation c6f7d953-cee2-4062-be13-9112a5a7d311 · outbound
This paper cites Revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:22.092985Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation fef90caf-23a5-44ec-919b-8837d2077b1a · outbound
This paper cites Haupt, and Alex Smolin.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Haupt, and Alex Smolin
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:21.900862Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 319afcbb-0993-451d-a5c9-1d4bf9df660c · outbound
This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Matthew Weinberg
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:21.698249Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 71e2994b-3f1c-4662-9c89-477af0a1e111 · outbound
This paper cites Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:21.476285Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 061a08e0-88b6-4542-8e11-168723b53baf · outbound
This paper cites Auctions versus negotiations.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Auctions versus negotiations
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:21.237537Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 0f0c3682-965f-4127-be3f-557555af3fc0 · outbound
This paper cites The simple economics of optimal auctions.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The simple economics of optimal auctions
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:21.059273Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 3035224c-6132-443c-85d9-761a49202ed9 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Unresolved cited work
Reference 13
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:20.820986Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 3eacfd9f-3a51-4fc7-ae66-0d6c5a12153e · outbound
This paper cites Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:20.619497Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation cc01520a-7a18-453d-8e41-002abb274095 · outbound
This paper cites Devanur, and S.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Devanur, and S
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:20.460634Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 48240c1d-7ac8-4403-ab2f-a57fc06be6cc · outbound
This paper cites Benjamin Miller.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Benjamin Miller
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:20.295124Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation dde8222c-dcea-4c53-9061-02f1d1723b52 · outbound
This paper cites Hartline, and Robert D.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Hartline, and Robert D
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:20.070898Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 195d81c6-07bf-4494-8acb-810cfd4f77ac · outbound
This paper cites Hartline, David L.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Hartline, David L
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.880256Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation a6c9c806-a5db-4d9d-9cf5-b7eff81e3632 · outbound
This paper cites The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.681421Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 4a2d034e-2285-4899-aa4d-a3d8db7d5cfb · outbound
This paper cites Applications of \( \) -strongly regular distributions to bayesian auctions.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Applications of \( \) -strongly regular distributions to bayesian auctions
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.519672Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 73b9e2ab-ee7b-4652-97ae-8d1d7a02580a · outbound
This paper cites The sample complexity of revenue maximization.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The sample complexity of revenue maximization
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.362374Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation b8cb5fad-cfc5-4565-b76f-4a2f86f2d951 · outbound
This paper cites An introduction to statistical modeling of extreme values, volume 208.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity An introduction to statistical modeling of extreme values, volume 208
Reference 22
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:11.100394Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation d7815aa1-8aa6-474a-a8a3-3015da70503a · outbound
This paper cites Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
Reference 23
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.230416Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation f3489799-ea32-477e-9d7c-71c61624652a · outbound
This paper cites Matthew Weinberg, and Eric Xue.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Matthew Weinberg, and Eric Xue
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:19.072127Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation a95ff3bd-eb1f-4c63-97e5-c2e19695c829 · outbound
This paper cites The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: The general case.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: The general case
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.892082Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 34e1bce6-41df-4dab-8dcc-7e4226851169 · outbound
This paper cites Revenue maximization with a single sample.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Revenue maximization with a single sample
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.732980Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 03e7641f-83b9-4b38-bb53-db2e8e86a5f6 · outbound
This paper cites The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.560886Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 03867a07-ba73-410f-9242-e113b7c293a4 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Unresolved cited work
Reference 28
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.405431Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation ef004a7c-e4bd-42f0-bb21-6ad0da7b1029 · outbound
This paper cites Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:13.775315Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation a1f7f4fe-33d0-42f0-911c-efd1a73fc9e6 · outbound
This paper cites The vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.214051Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation a622dfdd-8201-4125-a715-fa78a55d4115 · outbound
This paper cites A characterization for optimal bundling of products with nonadditive values.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity A characterization for optimal bundling of products with nonadditive values
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:18.048299Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 54ddfb05-87a8-4c54-85c2-947a6dfb0d35 · outbound
This paper cites Selling two goods optimally.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Selling two goods optimally
Reference 32
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.907983Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 674c602d-6eb4-46bf-b51b-5941ef6d8d83 · outbound
This paper cites Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.762316Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 93f2b9f6-08b2-40ee-89be-12772766ec42 · outbound
This paper cites Optimal pricing for mhr and -regular distributions.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal pricing for mhr and -regular distributions
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.612999Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 4c41f2ed-4614-412f-b241-ef2ee1246558 · outbound
This paper cites Robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information
Reference 35
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.484329Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 8d1fbc79-9c55-489d-a138-a7df8a18d015 · outbound
This paper cites When is pure bundling optimal? The Review of Economic Studies, 88 0 (3): 0 1127--1156, 2021.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity When is pure bundling optimal? The Review of Economic Studies, 88 0 (3): 0 1127--1156, 2021
Reference 36
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.326207Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 8e429e46-91fd-44d2-baf0-9cf3dee7b1fb · outbound
This paper cites Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
Reference 37
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:17.076329Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation ea4990e2-6534-4c6a-9e7c-c9474710712f · outbound
This paper cites Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:16.842186Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 1825e406-b025-44af-9d99-6a7298d833fb · outbound
This paper cites Hartline and Tim Roughgarden.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Hartline and Tim Roughgarden
Reference 39
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:16.637016Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation c539c304-a039-40ab-bd38-40e1c2331565 · outbound
This paper cites On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:16.354957Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 5ef364c4-672e-44ee-a102-cf86e882a4a6 · outbound
This paper cites On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design
Reference 41
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:16.082336Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 169d8c10-9eb6-46b5-af44-142a6cff08a6 · outbound
This paper cites Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
Reference 42
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:15.846600Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 31d53f41-d004-414e-a168-c48aee703147 · outbound
This paper cites Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
Reference 43
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:15.625766Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 95aa6d5a-7f7b-47b9-adcb-7efac7f5bc4d · outbound
This paper cites Bidding rings.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Bidding rings
Reference 44
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:15.381474Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 8d95b316-860d-48e5-b28d-50fc2bf83ec9 · outbound
This paper cites Optimal auction design.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal auction design
Reference 45
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:15.166039Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 7b6e39e4-4d8e-46ca-ac17-3b7f1fd5510a · outbound
This paper cites Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
Reference 46
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:14.801792Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation eb5820fa-526a-4b51-afa7-27328c89ba32 · outbound
This paper cites Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
Reference 47
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:14.596789Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation 332f18a4-ce92-4c66-81d9-d12e3e1c9712 · outbound
This paper cites Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations
Reference 48
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:14.383314Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation ed3e0bd4-16c1-42e2-a82d-71c8633ff7c3 · outbound
This paper cites Optimal mechanisms with simple menus.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
Reference 49
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:14.188865Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation db0e0aaa-bc5a-483a-987e-1a77e5cd03fe · outbound
This paper cites The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling
Reference 50
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:13.575647Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.
Observation bc2fbd74-529c-4489-9a05-c9142aeddfa5 · outbound
This paper cites An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications.
Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
Reference 51
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- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T05:08:13.981651Z
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