Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 cited by

Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreak Attacks via Layer-specific Editing

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2405.18166 v2 pith:ZHV6GX25 submitted 2024-05-28 cs.AI

classification cs.AI
keywords llmsattacksjailbreaklayerspromptsharmfuldefendingdefense
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being adopted in a wide range of real-world applications. Despite their impressive performance, recent studies have shown that LLMs are vulnerable to deliberately crafted adversarial prompts even when aligned via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback or supervised fine-tuning. While existing defense methods focus on either detecting harmful prompts or reducing the likelihood of harmful responses through various means, defending LLMs against jailbreak attacks based on the inner mechanisms of LLMs remains largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate how LLMs response to harmful prompts and propose a novel defense method termed \textbf{L}ayer-specific \textbf{Ed}iting (LED) to enhance the resilience of LLMs against jailbreak attacks. Through LED, we reveal that several critical \textit{safety layers} exist among the early layers of LLMs. We then show that realigning these safety layers (and some selected additional layers) with the decoded safe response from selected target layers can significantly improve the alignment of LLMs against jailbreak attacks. Extensive experiments across various LLMs (e.g., Llama2, Mistral) show the effectiveness of LED, which effectively defends against jailbreak attacks while maintaining performance on benign prompts. Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/ledllm/ledllm}.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. PUZZLED: Jailbreaking LLMs through Word-Based Puzzles

    cs.AI 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    PUZZLED masks harmful keywords as word-search, anagram, or crossword puzzles and achieves a reported 88.8% average attack success rate across five leading LLMs.

  2. GloSS over Toxicity: Understanding and Mitigating Toxicity in LLMs via Global Toxic Subspace

    cs.CL 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Detoxifying LLMs by deleting a global, cross-layer 'toxic subspace' from feed-forward weights reduces toxic outputs more than layer-local subspace methods.

  3. Beyond Black-Box Obfuscation: Mechanistic Analysis and Defense of White-Box Monitors

    cs.AI 2025-05 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    SafetyNet is an ensemble of standard outlier detectors for LLM backdoor monitoring, but its key mechanistic claim and headline numbers are contradicted by inconsistent tables and a mismatched abstract.

Pith tools