Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals

As of 7 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 34 of 34 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2505.23124.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2505.23124 v2

Coverage vector

measured 34 of 34 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.099350Z

measured 34 of 34 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

34 of 34 outbound references displayed

verified exact3
verified fuzzy17
unresolved13
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 42a2f4df-6928-40ea-ac1f-51e7a0af0e8f · outbound

This paper cites write newline.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals write newline

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.250411Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a1866754-f6e1-4bcd-b6e2-16da248e316a · outbound

This paper cites Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Information.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Information

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.339861Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 85dd2d88-cd1c-4e5f-83dc-4d8ff2ba6a96 · outbound

This paper cites Principal-agent reward shaping in mdps.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Principal-agent reward shaping in mdps

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:02.419844Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 31ec152e-7f95-4de3-9410-d8b0dcc2f3ce · outbound

This paper cites Optimal rates and efficient algorithms for online bayesian persuasion.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Optimal rates and efficient algorithms for online bayesian persuasion

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:02.249370Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e75ba6e5-2a03-43fd-81b8-e31b967ab5eb · outbound

This paper cites and Dewatripont, M.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Dewatripont, M

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:02.040640Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e656ab1b-c7b1-4b92-af6d-9f8fb6360012 · outbound

This paper cites Robustness and linear contracts.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Robustness and linear contracts

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:01.815171Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation deeec76f-974e-49f7-bb12-1389c2d328c4 · outbound

This paper cites Learning to Price Homogeneous Data.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Learning to Price Homogeneous Data

Reference 7

Resolution: metadata mismatch; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.698148Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e6bfac6a-ee86-4ec2-b333-2015fa4f6c22 · outbound

This paper cites Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.914058Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8535712b-1ea0-4538-81e9-31e4fd8f4e20 · outbound

This paper cites Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:55.983445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 8e4ca8b3-98c5-4937-a88c-dd3c77d65b30 · outbound

This paper cites Multi-agent combinatorial contracts.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Multi-agent combinatorial contracts

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:01.591506Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 16e8b822-2992-4ad2-8965-c4a651ab64e9 · outbound

This paper cites Simple versus optimal contracts.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Simple versus optimal contracts

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:01.376280Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation e09c02dd-e28a-4d9f-beaf-7da48169562b · outbound

This paper cites Combinatorial contracts.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Combinatorial contracts

Reference 12

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:01.119324Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 0237acb8-d9f4-451f-a689-4ecfe3e760c8 · outbound

This paper cites Multi-agent contracts.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Multi-agent contracts

Reference 13

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:00.898863Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 80fd2c91-5f50-47ce-8596-18b9156c8bfc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Unresolved cited work

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:00.672928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 4551f37c-0668-4da8-8dd6-4f47d3a50c72 · outbound

This paper cites and Miller, R.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Miller, R

Reference 15

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:00.460405Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 35e206c3-a181-450d-b2ad-6d617ab3d55a · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Unresolved cited work

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:00.292546Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation f857fabb-98e6-4fb2-ba7b-a98ad9c76a32 · outbound

This paper cites Z., and Balcan, M.-F.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Z., and Balcan, M.-F

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:04:00.108777Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 8d7285fc-1858-434a-a66d-ee1e967d5c94 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Unresolved cited work

Reference 18

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.945634Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation f64ebdb7-15f4-40aa-80a5-bd24a182ceb1 · outbound

This paper cites Moral hazard and observability.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Moral hazard and observability

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.744244Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation cdc8f525-ca14-423d-ab26-0679c422614c · outbound

This paper cites J., Rand, D.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals J., Rand, D

Reference 20

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.634972Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 03d54429-0d98-4eb9-9244-45a7f9a2108d · outbound

This paper cites and Siddiq, A.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Siddiq, A

Reference 21

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.465278Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 653aad28-cde3-4c75-aac6-2d938902be0c · outbound

This paper cites and Szepesv \'a ri, C.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Szepesv \'a ri, C

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.089780Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation af64217d-881b-43b3-a166-02718cfa7c29 · outbound

This paper cites Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents

Reference 23

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.582546Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation ea1f350f-e5be-44dd-9dd4-09217f4cc620 · outbound

This paper cites On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.238622Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 7419b645-f73e-46af-a77b-5d6f5fff10c8 · outbound

This paper cites Efficient Near-Optimal Algorithm for Online Shortest Paths in Directed Acyclic Graphs with Bandit Feedback Against Adaptive Adversaries.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Efficient Near-Optimal Algorithm for Online Shortest Paths in Directed Acyclic Graphs with Bandit Feedback Against Adaptive Adversaries

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.337942Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6c3b199b-d782-4d64-97a5-f9ccfbeb5c11 · outbound

This paper cites and Nair, H.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Nair, H

Reference 26

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.332062Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 121ef90f-431f-43c6-b3b1-cdb6fade7362 · outbound

This paper cites T., and Narasimhan, C.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals T., and Narasimhan, C

Reference 27

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.209606Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 37e4a06d-bbbf-426b-8140-18d4a4623f49 · outbound

This paper cites and Slivkins, A.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Slivkins, A

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:59.098326Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation b49c2a9e-a8ba-4958-a2e2-8ebcfc773255 · outbound

This paper cites Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality

Reference 29

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.428319Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 62bd797d-15ec-4e52-ab61-0ffe285344b3 · outbound

This paper cites Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games

Reference 30

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.299182Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation b4cd5186-42a8-4770-86eb-aa33b367ed34 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Unresolved cited work

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.990757Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Observation 46d66d4f-ee05-4395-9569-8465266007b3 · outbound

This paper cites Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands

Reference 32

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.940291Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a6b3d551-4122-4822-b98e-5645994c4db2 · outbound

This paper cites The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.056440Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation ecfdb087-a3f5-4bbc-b31f-7059bb66d8bb · outbound

This paper cites and Seldin, Y.

Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals and Seldin, Y

Reference 34

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:58.881888Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.