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Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
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Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits the same imperfection. In our attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of either the signal pulse or the synchronization pulse or both between Alice and Bob. In particular, in a QKD system where Bob employs time-multiplexing technique to detect both bit "0" and bit "1" with the same SPD, Eve, in principle, could acquire full information on the final key without introducing any error. Finally, we discuss some counter measures against our and earlier attacks.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Beyond the Quantum Promise: A Security Analysis of Classical Control in Quantum Key Distribution
Symbolic Tamarin models of standards-grounded QKD protocols reveal three control-plane vulnerabilities and confirm two countermeasures.
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Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution: Protocols, Quantum Games, and Security
This paper surveys device-independent QKD, covering protocols, nonlocal games, security proofs, experimental demonstrations, and open problems.
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