A framework integrating local direct reciprocity and global indirect reciprocity shows conditional cooperators resist invasion by unconditional strategies and that forgiving strategies best sustain cooperation.
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A single spatial correlation index predicts cooperator fixation across arbitrary heterogeneous landscapes, with segregated environments enhancing and intermixed ones suppressing cooperation under weak selection.
Complexity synchronization, defined as the correlation of sliding-window MDEA and DFA scaling exponents, increases with cooperative performance in a high-interaction regime of a predator-prey multi-agent model with selfish agents and Prisoners Dilemma payoffs.
In spatial public goods games on lattices, allowing agents to reevaluate and change interaction groups promotes cooperation emergence, while high rates of group switching suppress it.
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A model of local and global reciprocity
A framework integrating local direct reciprocity and global indirect reciprocity shows conditional cooperators resist invasion by unconditional strategies and that forgiving strategies best sustain cooperation.
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Predicting success of cooperators across arbitrary heterogeneous environmental landscapes
A single spatial correlation index predicts cooperator fixation across arbitrary heterogeneous landscapes, with segregated environments enhancing and intermixed ones suppressing cooperation under weak selection.
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Complexity synchronization as a diagnostic and control principle for adaptive systems
Complexity synchronization, defined as the correlation of sliding-window MDEA and DFA scaling exponents, increases with cooperative performance in a high-interaction regime of a predator-prey multi-agent model with selfish agents and Prisoners Dilemma payoffs.
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Cooperation in public goods game on square lattices with agents changing interaction groups
In spatial public goods games on lattices, allowing agents to reevaluate and change interaction groups promotes cooperation emergence, while high rates of group switching suppress it.