Centralized matching mechanisms outperform free negotiation in stability and efficiency with LLM agents, who also report preferences truthfully more often than humans, though not always in line with strategy-proofness predictions.
American Economic Review95, 2 (May 2005), 364–367
2 Pith papers cite this work, alongside 691 external citations. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.
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Do Matching Mechanisms Work with LLM Agents?
Centralized matching mechanisms outperform free negotiation in stability and efficiency with LLM agents, who also report preferences truthfully more often than humans, though not always in line with strategy-proofness predictions.
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Multi-Dimensional Matching in Market Design
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.