Centralized matching mechanisms outperform free negotiation in stability and efficiency with LLM agents, who also report preferences truthfully more often than humans, though not always in line with strategy-proofness predictions.
E con A gent: Large Language Model-Empowered Agents for Simulating Macroeconomic Activities
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
years
2026 4verdicts
UNVERDICTED 4representative citing papers
Nexa learns a response-conditioned policy that starts with parallel agent execution and adds at most one round of sequential message passing via a predicted sparse DAG, strictly subsuming pure parallel mode.
Supervised fine-tuning with LoRA on rational benchmark forecasts corrects extrapolation bias out-of-sample in LLM predictions for controlled experiments and cross-sectional stock returns.
Recursive information markets with forgetful LLM buyers can align information prices with true value and extend to scalable oversight in AI alignment.
citing papers explorer
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Do Matching Mechanisms Work with LLM Agents?
Centralized matching mechanisms outperform free negotiation in stability and efficiency with LLM agents, who also report preferences truthfully more often than humans, though not always in line with strategy-proofness predictions.
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Response-Conditioned Parallel-to-Sequential Orchestration for Multi-Agent Systems
Nexa learns a response-conditioned policy that starts with parallel agent execution and adds at most one round of sequential message passing via a predicted sparse DAG, strictly subsuming pure parallel mode.
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Debiasing LLMs by Fine-tuning
Supervised fine-tuning with LoRA on rational benchmark forecasts corrects extrapolation bias out-of-sample in LLM predictions for controlled experiments and cross-sectional stock returns.
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Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets
Recursive information markets with forgetful LLM buyers can align information prices with true value and extend to scalable oversight in AI alignment.