Algorithms learn EF1/PROP1 allocations of indivisible items from limited adversarial feedback on violations, in polynomial time for additive valuations via polytope maintenance and ellipsoid emulation.
Journal of Political Economy119, 6 (2011), 1061–1103
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Monadic fixed-point logic with counting is proposed as a natural specification language for properties on improvement graphs in social choice and games, with an efficient model checking algorithm whose complexity depends on graph size.
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.
A systematic mapping study of Karma mechanisms that compares applications, structures design parameters, and maps future research directions in non-monetary resource allocation.
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Learning Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items from Limited Feedback
Algorithms learn EF1/PROP1 allocations of indivisible items from limited adversarial feedback on violations, in polynomial time for additive valuations via polytope maintenance and ellipsoid emulation.
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Reasoning about Social Choice and Games in Monadic Fixed-Point Logic
Monadic fixed-point logic with counting is proposed as a natural specification language for properties on improvement graphs in social choice and games, with an efficient model checking algorithm whose complexity depends on graph size.
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Multi-Dimensional Matching in Market Design
Proposes SVD-based reduction of multi-dimensional matching to 1D problem for O(N log N) computation that approximates Nash Social Welfare under low effective dimensionality.
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Resource Allocation with Karma Mechanisms
A systematic mapping study of Karma mechanisms that compares applications, structures design parameters, and maps future research directions in non-monetary resource allocation.