ShadowMerge exploits relation-channel conflicts to poison graph-based agent memory, achieving 93.8% average attack success rate on Mem0 and real-world datasets while bypassing existing defenses.
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Memory poisoning attack and defense on memory based llm-agents
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MemAudit combines counterfactual causal influence scores with memory consistency graphs to identify poisoned records in LLM agent memory, reducing MINJA attack success from 70% to 0% in QA and 83.3% to 0% in reasoning tasks.
OEP poisons self-evolving LLM agents by constructing clean edge-case experiences that appear locally valid yet cause harmful over-generalization during reflection, achieving over 50% attack success rate on GPT-4o agents across three domains.
Agentic memory improves clean reasoning but worsens performance when spurious patterns are present in stored trajectories; CAMEL calibration reduces this reliance while preserving clean performance.
SSRP separates planning from execution in LLM agents to overcome the Attention Latch, delivering 715X resilience gains over ReAct baselines on MultiWOZ tasks.
All six evaluated OpenClaw agent frameworks exhibit substantial security vulnerabilities, with reconnaissance behaviors as the most common weakness and agent systems proving significantly riskier than isolated backbone models.
HARP defines and measures harm amplification as the ratio of global to local deviation in multi-agent LLM traces, instantiated in a seven-agent finance system to compare attacks and defenses.
An external controller for frozen LLMs raises strict validation success on three RL coding tasks from 0/9 to 8/9 by selecting memory records and skills, running fail-fast checks, and propagating credit via eligibility traces.
The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.
The survey organizes security threats and defenses in autonomous LLM agents into four layers and identifies that risks can propagate across layers from inputs to ecosystem impacts.
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.
The paper analyzes security, privacy, and ethical risks in the OpenClaw AI agent system arising from its architecture, storage, tool use, and integrations, arguing these form major barriers to trustworthy adoption.
citing papers explorer
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ShadowMerge: A Novel Poisoning Attack on Graph-Based Agent Memory via Relation-Channel Conflicts
ShadowMerge exploits relation-channel conflicts to poison graph-based agent memory, achieving 93.8% average attack success rate on Mem0 and real-world datasets while bypassing existing defenses.
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OEP: Poisoning Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Locally Correct but Non-Transferable Experiences
OEP poisons self-evolving LLM agents by constructing clean edge-case experiences that appear locally valid yet cause harmful over-generalization during reflection, achieving over 50% attack success rate on GPT-4o agents across three domains.
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A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variants
All six evaluated OpenClaw agent frameworks exhibit substantial security vulnerabilities, with reconnaissance behaviors as the most common weakness and agent systems proving significantly riskier than isolated backbone models.
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HARP: Measuring Harm Amplification in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
HARP defines and measures harm amplification as the ratio of global to local deviation in multi-agent LLM traces, instantiated in a seven-agent finance system to compare attacks and defenses.
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SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce
The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.
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Security Attack and Defense Strategies for Autonomous Agent Frameworks: A Layered Review with OpenClaw as a Case Study
The survey organizes security threats and defenses in autonomous LLM agents into four layers and identifies that risks can propagate across layers from inputs to ecosystem impacts.
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Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.
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Security, Privacy, and Ethical Risks in OpenClaw
The paper analyzes security, privacy, and ethical risks in the OpenClaw AI agent system arising from its architecture, storage, tool use, and integrations, arguing these form major barriers to trustworthy adoption.