Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
On Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions , booktitle =
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
fields
cs.GT 2years
2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Optimal deterministic strategyproof (and group strategyproof) mechanisms minimizing envy ratio are characterized for two interval-restricted one-facility location settings on the line, with lower and upper bounds given for randomized mechanisms.
citing papers explorer
-
Benchmark-Tight Approximation Ratio of Simple Mechanism for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
-
Facility Location Game with Envy Ratio
Optimal deterministic strategyproof (and group strategyproof) mechanisms minimizing envy ratio are characterized for two interval-restricted one-facility location settings on the line, with lower and upper bounds given for randomized mechanisms.