Multi-tier verification on VULBENCH-CPP shows AI-generated C++ code triggers confirmed runtime violations roughly twice as often as human code, while static analysis misleadingly indicates parity due to code length.
SecCodePLT: A unified benchmark for evaluating the security risks and capabilities of code agents
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
4
Pith papers citing it
citation-role summary
background 1
citation-polarity summary
years
2026 4roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
Systematic review of thirteen malicious-code prompt corpora for coding LLM refusal evaluation that catalogs construction methods, surfaces gaps in human baselines, cross-corpus comparability, and malware taxonomies, and proposes methodological improvements.
MOSAIC-Bench demonstrates that nine production coding agents achieve 53-86% end-to-end attack success rates on staged innocuous tickets across 10 web substrates and 31 CWE classes, far higher than the 0-20.4% rates seen with direct prompts.
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.
citing papers explorer
-
A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.