Systematic review of thirteen malicious-code prompt corpora for coding LLM refusal evaluation that catalogs construction methods, surfaces gaps in human baselines, cross-corpus comparability, and malware taxonomies, and proposes methodological improvements.
Annotation alignment: Comparing LLM and human annotations of conversational safety
6 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Annotator Policy Models learn safety policies from labeling behavior alone, accurately predicting responses and revealing sources of disagreement like policy ambiguity and value pluralism.
Consolidates eight corpora into a 6,671-prompt bank with five-judge consensus labels separating executable malicious code requests (4,748) from harmful security knowledge requests (1,923), achieving Fleiss' kappa 0.767.
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.
State-of-the-art LLMs respond inconsistently to queries from protected-group personas, with some responses omitting key information that should be provided.
Simple supervision improves LLM distributional alignment with diverse population groups on three datasets, with evaluation across multiple models and prompts providing a benchmark.
citing papers explorer
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Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)
Systematic review of thirteen malicious-code prompt corpora for coding LLM refusal evaluation that catalogs construction methods, surfaces gaps in human baselines, cross-corpus comparability, and malware taxonomies, and proposes methodological improvements.
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Code as a Weapon: A Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests
Consolidates eight corpora into a 6,671-prompt bank with five-judge consensus labels separating executable malicious code requests (4,748) from harmful security knowledge requests (1,923), achieving Fleiss' kappa 0.767.
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A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts
The paper releases a 1,554-prompt consensus-labeled bank separating executable malicious code requests from security knowledge requests, validated by five-model majority labeling with Fleiss' kappa of 0.876.