DICE formalizes multi-agent LLM coordination as discounted incomplete-information Markov games and introduces Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE) to achieve unique stable equilibria with bounded regret, demonstrated via prompt-control and fine-tuning algorithms on eleven benchmarks.
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SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks
Mixed citation behavior. Most common role is background (55%).
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55% of classified citations
abstract
Despite efforts to align large language models (LLMs) with human intentions, widely-used LLMs such as GPT, Llama, and Claude are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks, wherein an adversary fools a targeted LLM into generating objectionable content. To address this vulnerability, we propose SmoothLLM, the first algorithm designed to mitigate jailbreaking attacks. Based on our finding that adversarially-generated prompts are brittle to character-level changes, our defense randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs. Across a range of popular LLMs, SmoothLLM sets the state-of-the-art for robustness against the GCG, PAIR, RandomSearch, and AmpleGCG jailbreaks. SmoothLLM is also resistant against adaptive GCG attacks, exhibits a small, though non-negligible trade-off between robustness and nominal performance, and is compatible with any LLM. Our code is publicly available at \url{https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm}.
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representative citing papers
SlotGCG uses Vulnerable Slot Score (VSS) to identify and target the most vulnerable prompt positions for adversarial token insertion, delivering 14% higher ASR than standard GCG and 42% higher against defenses.
Introduces a cross-validation-based evaluation methodology for LLM security detectors using a global threshold and group-fold leakage checks to avoid per-dataset tuning.
EvoDefense introduces a co-evolving black-box defense using LLMs with an experience memory module and iterative attack-defense optimization that reduces attack success rates across multiple models and attacks while preserving general capabilities.
LASH adaptively composes multiple jailbreak seed prompts via genetic search over subsets and mixture weights to reach 84.5% keyword ASR and 74.5% two-stage ASR on JailbreakBench while using only 30 queries per prompt.
Compilation optimizations can be exploited to create stealthy backdoors in LLMs that remain dormant without optimization but achieve ~90% attack success while preserving clean accuracy near 100%.
OrchJail uses orchestration-guided fuzzing to jailbreak tool-calling T2I agents by targeting high-risk tool patterns, yielding higher attack success rates, better image quality, and lower costs than prior prompt-only methods.
DAPRO provides the first dynamic, theoretically guaranteed way to allocate interaction budgets across test cases for bounding time-to-event in multi-turn LLM evaluations, achieving tighter coverage than static conformal survival methods.
Jailbreak-induced performance loss shrinks as model capability grows, with the strongest models showing almost no degradation on benchmarks.
ARA jailbreaks safety-aligned LLMs like LLaMA-3 and Mistral by redirecting attention in safety-heavy heads with as few as 5 tokens, achieving 30-36% attack success while ablating the same heads barely affects refusals.
PEO optimizes original prompt embeddings continuously over adaptive rounds to jailbreak aligned LLMs, preserving the exact visible prompt text and outperforming discrete suffix, appended embedding, and search-based white-box attacks on harmful-behavior benchmarks.
HMNS is a new jailbreak method that uses causal head identification and nullspace-constrained injection to achieve higher attack success rates than prior techniques on aligned language models.
RACC defines six representation-aware coverage criteria that score jailbreak test suites by measuring activation of safety concepts extracted from LLM hidden states on a calibration set.
Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction in residual stream activations that can be erased to disable safety or added to elicit refusal.
SEAR trains one LLM via adversarial process rewards to explore harmful reasoning paths but flip to safe outputs, reducing over-refusal while preserving safety.
A narrative survey that catalogs fifty papers on diffusion-based adversarial techniques across text, vision, and vision-language models, proposes a six-class taxonomy of diffusion roles plus a unified five-dimension evaluation framework, and releases a companion catalog.
Activation probes, calibrated honeytokens, and multi-turn leakage accounting detect credential exfiltration attempts in LLM agents with high accuracy in controlled open-model tests.
Prompt injection vulnerability in tool-augmented LLMs is a model-surface interaction rather than a fixed channel property; the same payload inverts success rates across models, and adaptive attack rate exceeds single-surface baselines by 9.1 pp on average.
Ellipsoid Control is a white-list test-time jailbreak defense that fits an anisotropic ellipsoid from benign activations to constrain projected gradient descent updates, aiming to improve the safety-utility tradeoff over black-list RepE methods.
An attention-guided RL reward combined with diverse persuasion strategies produces higher attack success rates against large reasoning models than prior jailbreak methods.
BIV audits AI agent skills at scale, finding 80% deviate from declared behavior on 49,943 skills and achieving 0.946 F1 for malicious skill detection.
JBShield is vulnerable to adaptive JB-GCG attacks (up to 53% ASR) because jailbreak representations occupy a distinct region in refusal-direction space; the new RTV defense using Mahalanobis detection on multi-layer fingerprints reaches 0.99 AUROC and limits adaptive ASR to 7%.
PIA achieves lower attack success rates on persona-based jailbreaks via self-play co-evolution of attacks (PLE) and defenses (PICL) that structurally decouples safety from persona context using unilateral KL-divergence.
FLP uses multi-persona foresight simulation to detect infections via response diversity and applies local purification to reduce maximum cumulative infection rates in multi-agent systems from over 95% to below 5.47%.
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