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Securing HPC using Federated Authentication

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arxiv 1908.07573 v1 pith:XDWXWXNX submitted 2019-08-20 cs.DC cs.CR

Securing HPC using Federated Authentication

classification cs.DC cs.CR
keywords authenticationaccountfederatedusermulti-factoroverheadprovidessystem
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Federated authentication can drastically reduce the overhead of basic account maintenance while simultaneously improving overall system security. Integrating with the user's more frequently used account at their primary organization both provides a better experience to the end user and makes account compromise or changes in affiliation more likely to be noticed and acted upon. Additionally, with many organizations transitioning to multi-factor authentication for all account access, the ability to leverage external federated identity management systems provides the benefit of their efforts without the additional overhead of separately implementing a distinct multi-factor authentication process. This paper describes our experiences and the lessons we learned by enabling federated authentication with the U.S. Government PKI and InCommon Federation, scaling it up to the user base of a production HPC system, and the motivations behind those choices. We have received only positive feedback from our users.

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