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Prior-Independent Auctions for the Demand Side of Federated Learning

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arxiv 2103.14375 v2 pith:RLJFQ7RS submitted 2021-03-26 cs.LG cs.GT

classification cs.LGcs.GT
keywords clientsfederatedfipialearningmodelprior-independentauctionsdatasets
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Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that allows distributed clients to learn a shared machine learning model without sharing their sensitive training data. While largely decentralized, FL requires resources to fund a central orchestrator or to reimburse contributors of datasets to incentivize participation. Inspired by insights from prior-independent auction design, we propose a mechanism, FIPIA (Federated Incentive Payments via Prior-Independent Auctions), to collect monetary contributions from self-interested clients. The mechanism operates in the semi-honest trust model and works even if clients have a heterogeneous interest in receiving high-quality models, and the server does not know the clients' level of interest. We run experiments on the MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets to test clients' model quality under FIPIA and FIPIA's incentive properties.

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