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MultiKG: Multi-Source Threat Intelligence Aggregation for High-Quality Knowledge Graph Representation of Attack Techniques
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MultiKG: Multi-Source Threat Intelligence Aggregation for High-Quality Knowledge Graph Representation of Attack Techniques
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The construction of attack technique knowledge graphs aims to transform various types of attack knowledge into structured representations for more effective attack procedure modeling. Existing methods typically rely on textual data, such as Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports, which are often coarse-grained and unstructured, resulting in incomplete and inaccurate knowledge graphs. To address these issues, we expand attack knowledge sources by incorporating audit logs and static code analysis alongside CTI reports, providing finer-grained data for constructing attack technique knowledge graphs. We propose MultiKG, a fully automated framework that integrates multiple threat knowledge sources. MultiKG processes data from CTI reports, dynamic logs, and static code separately, then merges them into a unified attack knowledge graph. Through system design and the utilization of the Large Language Model (LLM), MultiKG automates the analysis, construction, and merging of attack graphs across these sources, producing a fine-grained, multi-source attack knowledge graph. We implemented MultiKG and evaluated it using 1,015 real attack techniques and 9,006 attack intelligence entries from CTI reports. Results show that MultiKG effectively extracts attack knowledge graphs from diverse sources and aggregates them into accurate, comprehensive representations. Through case studies, we demonstrate that our approach directly benefits security tasks such as attack reconstruction and detection.
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