REVIEW 1 cited by
Honest to a Fault: Root-Causing Fault Attacks with Pre-Silicon RISC Pipeline Characterization
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
Honest to a Fault: Root-Causing Fault Attacks with Pre-Silicon RISC Pipeline Characterization
read the original abstract
Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation. Early detection of these vulnerabilities and understanding their root causes along with their propagation from the physical layer to the system software is critical to secure the cyberinfrastructure. This present presents a comprehensive methodology for conducting controlled fault injection attacks at the pre-silicon level and an analysis of the underlying system for root-causing behavior. As the driving application, we use the clock glitch attacks in AI/ML applications for critical misclassification. Our study aims to characterize and diagnose the impact of faults within the RISC-V instruction set and pipeline stages, while tracing fault propagation from the circuit level to the AI/ML application software. This analysis resulted in discovering a novel vulnerability through controlled clock glitch parameters, specifically targeting the RISC-V decode stage.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Divergent Multi-Version Execution (DME): Canonical Instruction-Trace Fault Detection via Structural Address-Space Decorrelation
DME detects faults via canonical instruction-trace comparison across semantically equivalent but address-space-diversified program replicas produced by independent compilation.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.