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arxiv: 2602.02751 · v2 · pith:ENI5T7DTnew · submitted 2026-02-02 · 💻 cs.MA · cs.AI· cs.CL

Scaling Small Agents Through Strategy Auctions

classification 💻 cs.MA cs.AIcs.CL
keywords agentssmallagentagenticmodelstaskcomplexitylargest
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Small language models are increasingly viewed as a promising, cost-effective approach to agentic AI, with proponents claiming they are sufficiently capable for agentic workflows. However, while smaller agents can closely match larger ones on simple tasks, it remains unclear how their performance scales with task complexity, when large models become necessary, and how to better leverage small agents for long-horizon workloads. In this work, we empirically show that small agents' performance fails to scale with task complexity on deep search and coding tasks, and we introduce Strategy Auctions for Workload Efficiency (SALE), an agent framework inspired by freelancer marketplaces. In SALE, agents bid with short strategic plans, which are scored by a systematic cost-value mechanism and refined via a shared auction memory, enabling per-task routing and continual self-improvement without training a separate router or running all models to completion. Across deep search and coding tasks of varying complexity, SALE reduces reliance on the largest agent by 52%, lowers overall cost by 35%, and consistently improves upon the largest agent's pass@1 with only a negligible overhead beyond executing the final trace. In contrast, established routers that rely on task descriptions either underperform the largest agent or fail to reduce cost, often both, underscoring their poor fit for agentic workflows. These results suggest that while small agents may be insufficient for complex workloads, they can be effectively "scaled up" through coordinated task allocation and test-time self-improvement. More broadly, they motivate a systems-level view of agentic AI in which performance gains come less from ever-larger individual models and more from market-inspired coordination mechanisms that organize heterogeneous agents into efficient, adaptive ecosystems.

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  1. MarketBench: Evaluating AI Agents as Market Participants

    cs.AI 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    LLMs show poor calibration in predicting task success and token use on software engineering benchmarks, causing market auctions to underperform compared to perfect information scenarios, with limited improvement from ...