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arxiv: 2604.16101 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-17 · 🪐 quant-ph · cs.CR

Recognition: unknown

Quantum-Resistant Quantum Teleportation

Xin Jin , Nitish Kumar Chandra , Mohadeseh Azari , Jinglei Cheng , Zilin Shen , Kaushik P. Seshadreesan , Junyu Liu
Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-10 08:33 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🪐 quant-ph cs.CR
keywords quantum teleportationpost-quantum cryptographyquantum memoryclassical correction channelHolevo quantityteleportation fidelityleakage modelsquantum adversaries
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The pith

Post-quantum cryptography secures the classical correction channel in quantum teleportation, yet quantum memory coherence time caps practical secure distances at roughly 200 km.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper introduces a framework that applies post-quantum cryptography to encrypt the classical bits that complete quantum teleportation, thereby removing the vulnerability to future quantum computers that could break standard encryption on those bits. It demonstrates that the short lifetime of quantum memory acts as a single bottleneck connecting physical transmission limits, the extra time required for heavier post-quantum algorithms, and the window during which an adversary can try to extract information. This connection produces a bell-shaped curve for overall attack success that rises then falls with time, and it supplies closed-form expressions for information leakage and teleportation fidelity under four different leakage patterns plus amplitude damping on the shared entangled pair.

Core claim

Quantum-resistant quantum teleportation is achieved by encrypting the classical correction bits with post-quantum schemes such as Kyber512 or FrodoKEM-1344; under a 1 ms coherence time and fiber-optic propagation the maximum secure distance lies between 191 km and 199 km, the joint attack probability follows a non-monotonic Bell-shaped profile arising from the opposing time scales of classical cryptanalysis and quantum decoherence, and closed-form Holevo quantities and fidelities are obtained for independent-exponential, sequential, burst, and correlated leakage models that also incorporate amplitude damping on the Bell pair.

What carries the argument

The finite coherence time of quantum memory, which simultaneously bounds propagation distance, tolerable post-quantum cryptographic overhead, and the adversary's usable attack interval.

If this is right

  • Secure teleportation remains feasible only inside a bounded distance window set by memory lifetime.
  • Attack success reaches a maximum at an intermediate time before decaying exponentially once decoherence dominates.
  • Average extractable information can be bounded without performing measurements by using the Holevo quantity expressions.
  • Leakage-resilient protocol designs can be guided by the closed-form fidelity formulas for each of the four leakage scenarios.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Longer-coherence quantum memories would directly extend both the reachable distance and the allowable computational overhead of the classical encryption.
  • The same time-dependent tradeoff could be applied to other protocols that mix quantum states with classical control messages.
  • Optimizing the timing of the classical correction step could be used to minimize the peak attack probability for a given memory lifetime.

Load-bearing premise

The chosen post-quantum schemes remain computationally secure for the full duration of the quantum memory coherence time and the four stochastic leakage models accurately represent real side-channel behavior on the classical correction bits.

What would settle it

An experiment that varies the delay between entanglement distribution and classical correction transmission, then measures whether the observed joint attack success rate rises and then falls in the predicted non-monotonic shape while teleportation fidelity matches the derived expressions.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.16101 by Jinglei Cheng, Junyu Liu, Kaushik P. Seshadreesan, Mohadeseh Azari, Nitish Kumar Chandra, Xin Jin, Zilin Shen.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: FIG. 1: Quantum Resistant Quantum Teleportation (QRQT) framework. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: FIG. 2 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: FIG. 3 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: FIG. 4 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: FIG. 5 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: FIG. 6 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: FIG. 7 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: shows that, under independent exponential leakage, the residual hidden information decreases monotonically over time as Eve gains access to more correction data, while her reconstruction fidelity correspondingly increases. Larger val￾ues of the amplitude damping parameter 𝛾 degrade the Bob’s state and lower the maximum fidelity achievable by Eve. At any time 𝑡, the subset 𝐾(𝑡) ⊆ {1, 2} of leaked keys de￾te… view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: top subplot shows the expected Holevo information E[𝜒 (𝑡)] in the sequential leakage model. At 𝑡 = 0, Eve has no access to either correction bit, so the Holevo information starts at its maximum value 𝜒∅ = 1 − ℎ(𝛿). As time increases, leakage of the first key 𝑚1 reduces Eve’s uncertainty, caus￾ing E[𝜒 (𝑡)] to decrease. Because the second key cannot leak before the first, the decay is constrained by the orde… view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: illustrates the temporal behavior of Eve’s expected Holevo information and reconstruction capability in the burst leakage model. Since both correction bits leak simultaneously at a single exponentially distributed time, there is no interme￾diate regime corresponding to partial key knowledge. The top panel shows the expected Holevo information E[𝜒 (𝑡)] = 𝑒 −𝑘𝑡 𝜒∅, which decays exponentially from its ini￾ti… view at source ↗
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: illustrates the effect of correlation in classical key leakage on Eve’s expected Holevo information and optimal fidelity. The top subplot shows E[𝜒 (𝑡)], which decreases monotonically with time for all values of 𝜇. The curves remain close, but larger values of 𝜇 produce a slightly faster decay. The bottom panel shows Eve’s optimal fidelity 𝐹 (𝑡), which increases monotonically with time for all values of 𝜇… view at source ↗
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: FIG. 12 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p031_12.png] view at source ↗
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: FIG. 13 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p031_13.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

We propose a quantum-resistant quantum teleportation (QRQT) framework protected by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to secure the classical correction channel, which is vulnerable to quantum adversaries. By applying PQC to the classical control bits, QRQT eliminates the classical attack surface of quantum teleportation. Our analysis reveals that quantum memory is a hidden bottleneck linking physical and computational security: its finite coherence time simultaneously limits communication distance, constrains tolerable PQC overhead, and restricts the adversary attack window. Under realistic parameters (1 ms coherence, fiber-optic propagation), the maximum secure teleportation distance ranges from 191 km (FrodoKEM-1344) to 199 km (Kyber512). We show that the joint classical-quantum attack probability exhibits a non-monotonic, Bell-shaped profile due to the opposing time dependencies of classical cryptanalysis and quantum decoherence, establishing a bounded optimal attack window beyond which adversarial success decays exponentially. We further analyze how leakage of classical correction bits affects teleportation security under four stochastic leakage models: independent exponential, sequential, burst, and correlated leakage, also accounting for amplitude damping on the shared Bell pair. For each scenario, we derive closed-form expressions for the average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity as functions of time, providing measurement-independent upper bounds on extractable information and guiding the design of leakage-resilient quantum communication protocols.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript proposes a quantum-resistant quantum teleportation (QRQT) framework that applies post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to secure the classical correction channel against quantum adversaries. It identifies finite quantum memory coherence time as a bottleneck simultaneously limiting communication distance, tolerable PQC overhead, and adversary attack window. Under 1 ms coherence time and fiber-optic parameters, maximum secure distances are reported as 191 km (FrodoKEM-1344) to 199 km (Kyber512). Closed-form expressions are claimed for average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity under four stochastic leakage models plus amplitude damping, with the joint attack probability exhibiting a non-monotonic Bell-shaped profile due to opposing time dependencies.

Significance. If the derivations hold and the numerical results are robust, the work offers a useful conceptual link between physical-layer constraints (decoherence) and computational security (PQC) in quantum communication. The closed-form bounds on extractable information under leakage models could inform leakage-resilient protocol design, and the identification of an optimal attack window is a potentially actionable insight. The explicit parameter-driven distance estimates provide concrete benchmarks, though their generality remains to be established.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract and analysis section] Abstract and main analysis: The manuscript asserts closed-form expressions for the average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity as functions of time, yet supplies no derivations, intermediate steps, error analysis, or verification that the non-monotonic profile persists under realistic parameter variation. This is load-bearing for the central claims on bounded attack windows and the reported secure distances.
  2. [Numerical results section] Numerical results on secure distance: The maximum distances (191 km for FrodoKEM-1344, 199 km for Kyber512) are obtained directly from externally supplied inputs (1 ms coherence time, fiber propagation loss, PQC overhead) rather than derived or fitted internally from teleportation data; no sensitivity analysis or error propagation is shown, which directly affects the claimed robustness of the Bell-shaped profile.
  3. [Leakage models analysis] Leakage models: The four stochastic leakage models (independent exponential, sequential, burst, correlated) are invoked to bound security, but no justification, empirical grounding, or references are provided for their accuracy in modeling side-channel leakage on classical correction bits; this assumption is central to the Holevo and fidelity bounds.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Notation and models] The notation and parameter definitions for the leakage models would be clarified by a summary table listing their functional forms, rate parameters, and any assumptions about amplitude damping.
  2. [Figures] Figures depicting the Bell-shaped attack probability or fidelity versus time should explicitly list all numerical parameter values (coherence time, loss coefficients, PQC overhead) used to generate the plots.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive and detailed feedback on our manuscript. We address each major comment point by point below, providing clarifications and committing to revisions that enhance the rigor and transparency of the derivations, numerical analysis, and modeling assumptions.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract and analysis section] Abstract and main analysis: The manuscript asserts closed-form expressions for the average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity as functions of time, yet supplies no derivations, intermediate steps, error analysis, or verification that the non-monotonic profile persists under realistic parameter variation. This is load-bearing for the central claims on bounded attack windows and the reported secure distances.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the step-by-step derivations were not presented in the main text to preserve conciseness. In the revised manuscript we will add a dedicated appendix containing the complete derivations of the closed-form expressions for the average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity (including all intermediate algebraic steps, error bounds, and the explicit time-dependent forms). We will also include numerical checks confirming that the non-monotonic Bell-shaped profile of the joint attack probability remains stable across realistic ranges of coherence time and fiber loss. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Numerical results section] Numerical results on secure distance: The maximum distances (191 km for FrodoKEM-1344, 199 km for Kyber512) are obtained directly from externally supplied inputs (1 ms coherence time, fiber propagation loss, PQC overhead) rather than derived or fitted internally from teleportation data; no sensitivity analysis or error propagation is shown, which directly affects the claimed robustness of the Bell-shaped profile.

    Authors: The quoted distances are computed from standard, literature-accepted fiber-optic loss coefficients and a representative 1 ms coherence time. To strengthen the robustness claim we will insert a new sensitivity-analysis subsection that systematically varies coherence time, propagation loss, and PQC overhead, together with first-order error-propagation estimates. This will explicitly demonstrate the stability of both the secure-distance bounds and the non-monotonic profile. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [Leakage models analysis] Leakage models: The four stochastic leakage models (independent exponential, sequential, burst, correlated) are invoked to bound security, but no justification, empirical grounding, or references are provided for their accuracy in modeling side-channel leakage on classical correction bits; this assumption is central to the Holevo and fidelity bounds.

    Authors: These four models are introduced as representative stochastic processes that bracket plausible side-channel leakage behaviors on classical control bits. In the revision we will add (i) citations to established side-channel leakage literature and (ii) a short justification paragraph explaining why the chosen processes are appropriate conservative bounds for the classical channel in QRQT. We will also note that direct empirical data for these exact models in quantum-teleportation settings are currently limited and flag this as an assumption requiring future experimental validation. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity; derivations use external parameters and standard models

full rationale

The paper computes maximum secure teleportation distances and joint attack probabilities directly from externally supplied inputs (1 ms coherence time, fiber-optic loss rates, PQC scheme overheads) and standard quantum information expressions for Holevo quantity under amplitude damping plus four leakage models. The Bell-shaped profile arises mathematically from the product of an exponentially decaying quantum fidelity term and a time-dependent classical cryptanalysis success probability; this is not a fitted or self-defined relation but follows from the opposing functional forms. No parameters are obtained by fitting to teleportation data, no self-citations supply load-bearing uniqueness theorems or ansatzes, and the closed-form expressions are derived from established channel models without redefinition of outputs as inputs. The central claims therefore remain independent of the results they produce.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

2 free parameters · 2 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claims rest on standard quantum information axioms plus the domain assumption that selected PQC schemes remain hard for quantum adversaries throughout the coherence window; no new entities are postulated and the numerical parameters are treated as realistic inputs rather than fitted constants.

free parameters (2)
  • coherence time = 1 ms
    Fixed at 1 ms as a realistic value to compute maximum distances and attack windows.
  • fiber propagation parameters
    Used to translate coherence time into physical distance limits.
axioms (2)
  • standard math Standard quantum teleportation protocol using Bell pairs and classical correction bits
    Invoked throughout as the base protocol whose classical channel is being protected.
  • domain assumption Post-quantum cryptography schemes (Kyber, FrodoKEM) remain secure against quantum adversaries for the relevant time scales
    Required for the claim that the classical channel is quantum-resistant.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5564 in / 1636 out tokens · 29663 ms · 2026-05-10T08:33:26.639874+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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