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arxiv: 2605.13989 · v3 · pith:4PVIJ5BDnew · submitted 2026-05-13 · 💻 cs.CL

VectraYX-Nano: A 42M-Parameter Spanish Cybersecurity Language Model with Curriculum Learning and Native Tool Use

Pith reviewed 2026-05-22 09:25 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CL
keywords Spanish language modelcybersecuritycurriculum learningtool usesmall language modelsSFT rebalancingdecoder-only transformer
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The pith

Rebalancing the supervised fine-tuning mix toward tool-use examples lets a 42-million-parameter Spanish cybersecurity model reach 0.23 tool-selection accuracy while retaining conversational performance.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper sets out to demonstrate that a compact decoder-only language model trained from scratch on a modest Spanish cybersecurity corpus can acquire native tool-invocation capability through curriculum learning and targeted data rebalancing. It assembles a 170-million-token corpus split into conversational, domain, and tooling phases, applies replay during training to maintain earlier skills, and shows that increasing the proportion of tool-use examples in the final fine-tuning stage overcomes a zero baseline on tool selection. If correct, this would mean that specialized technical models in non-English languages can be built and deployed on ordinary hardware without requiring either massive scale or English-centric pretraining.

Core claim

The central claim is that the zero floor previously observed on the tool-selection benchmark B4 is a corpus-density artifact rather than a capacity limit. After adjusting the SFT mixture to a 1:21 tool-use ratio, the 42M-parameter VectraYX-Nano v7 reaches B4 = 0.230 +/- 0.052, while holding B1 at 0.332 +/- 0.005 and B5 at 0.725 +/- 0.130; a LoRA adaptation of a 260M from-scratch model reaches 0.445 +/- 0.201 on the same benchmark. Curriculum replay across three phases produces monotonic loss reduction, and bootstrap-corpus ablations reveal that lower-perplexity general Spanish data harms conversational gate performance on B5.

What carries the argument

Rebalancing the SFT mixture to a 1:21 tool-use ratio, which supplies enough examples for the model to learn native tool invocation through the Model Context Protocol while preserving prior conversational and domain skills.

If this is right

  • Curriculum phases with replay produce steady loss improvement across conversational, cybersecurity, and tooling data.
  • A 42M-parameter model can run sub-second on commodity hardware once trained with the described architecture and data mix.
  • Spanish-native tool use becomes feasible at this scale without English pretraining or massive parameter counts.
  • The same rebalancing approach can be applied to other technical domains where tool invocation is required.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • If the density explanation holds, similar rebalancing could unlock tool use in other small models for low-resource languages.
  • Native MCP integration at 42M parameters opens the possibility of lightweight agentic workflows for regional cybersecurity teams.
  • The observed loss-versus-register inversion suggests that domain-specific register matters more than raw perplexity when selecting bootstrap corpora.

Load-bearing premise

The custom benchmarks B4 and B5 are treated as reliable proxies for actual cybersecurity utility in the real world.

What would settle it

Running the released model on a set of previously unseen real-world cybersecurity tool-selection and conversational tasks and finding that its accuracy remains near zero despite the reported B4 and B5 scores.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.13989 by Juan S. Santillana.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Three-phase curriculum with replay. Each phase [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Validation loss monotonically decreases across the [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: B4 tool-selection accuracy vs. tool-use corpus den [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: B5 conversational gate as a function of Phase [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: B1–B5 scores across the VectraYX family under the mixed SFT baseline. Error bars on Nano show [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: B4 tool-selection accuracy vs. tool-use corpus den [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: B4 tool-selection accuracy vs. tool-use corpus den [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: B1–B5 scores across the VectraYX family under the mixed SFT baseline. Error bars on Nano show [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: B1–B5 scores across the VectraYX family under the mixed SFT baseline. Error bars on Nano show [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p016_5.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

We present VectraYX-Nano, a 41.95M-parameter decoder-only language model trained from scratch in Spanish for cybersecurity, with a Latin-American regional focus and native tool invocation via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The model has four contributions. (i) Corpus: VectraYX-Sec-ES, a 170M-token Spanish corpus assembled by an eight-VM distributed pipeline at ~$25 USD of cloud compute and split into three curriculum phases (conversational 42M, cybersecurity 118M, offensive tooling 10M). (ii) Architecture: a 42M Transformer decoder with GQA, QK-Norm, RMSNorm, SwiGLU, RoPE and z-loss, paired with a domain-balanced 16,384-token byte-fallback BPE. (iii) Curriculum with replay across the three phases yields a monotonic loss descent (9.80 -> 3.17 -> 3.00 -> 2.16); after SFT (loss 1.74) the v2 bootstrap-ablation reference attains a conversational gate of 0.775 +/- 0.043 on B5 over N=4 seeds, and a controlled Phase-2 replay sweep over {0,5,10,25,50}% saturates B5 at >=25% replay. (iv) Two empirical findings, both N=4. A controlled bootstrap-corpus ablation across v2 (OpenSubs), v4 (mC4-ES), and v6 (60/25/15 OpenSubs/mC4/Wiki) exposes a loss-versus-register inversion: lower-perplexity bootstraps yield measurably worse conversational behavior (v2 > v4 > v6 on B5 at every paired seed). The B4 (tool-selection) floor of 0.000 is a corpus-density artifact, not a capacity gate: rebalancing the SFT mixture to tool-use ratio 1:21 yields VectraYX-Nano v7, the released headline configuration, reaching B4 = 0.230 +/- 0.052 at 42M while retaining B1 = 0.332 +/- 0.005 and B5 = 0.725 +/- 0.130; a LoRA replication on a 260M from-scratch mid-tier reaches 0.445 +/- 0.201. The released GGUF is 96 MB in F16, runs sub-second TTFT on commodity hardware under llama.cpp, and is, to our knowledge, the first published Spanish-native cybersecurity LLM with end-to-end MCP integration.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper presents VectraYX-Nano, a 41.95M-parameter decoder-only Transformer trained from scratch on the 170M-token VectraYX-Sec-ES Spanish cybersecurity corpus assembled at low cost. It uses a three-phase curriculum (conversational 42M, cybersecurity 118M, offensive tooling 10M) with replay, GQA/RoPE/SwiGLU architecture, and SFT with rebalanced tool-use ratios to enable native MCP tool invocation. Empirical results from N=4 seed runs show monotonic loss descent, a loss-versus-register inversion across bootstrap corpora, saturation of B5 at >=25% replay, and that a 1:21 tool-use SFT ratio lifts B4 from 0.000 to 0.230 +/- 0.052 while retaining B5 = 0.725 +/- 0.130; a 260M LoRA replication is also reported.

Significance. If the results hold, the work shows that small from-scratch models with curriculum replay and targeted SFT rebalancing can deliver functional performance on domain-specific tasks in low-resource languages at minimal cost (~$25 corpus compute). Credit is due for the controlled N=4 seed ablations with standard deviations, explicit replay-percentage sweeps, corpus-mix experiments, and reproducible low-compute pipeline details, which provide a concrete template for similar specialized LLM efforts.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract and Results] Abstract and Results: The central empirical claim—that rebalancing the SFT mixture to a 1:21 tool-use ratio raises B4 from a 0.000 floor to 0.230 +/- 0.052 at 42M parameters, treating the floor as a pure corpus-density artifact—rests on B4 (tool-selection) and B5 (conversational gate) being valid proxies for cybersecurity utility. No correlation to external tasks, established cybersecurity benchmarks, or downstream outcomes (e.g., API invocation accuracy or exploit generation) is reported. This assumption is load-bearing for interpreting the v7 configuration and the claim that capacity limits are not at play.
  2. [Results] LoRA replication paragraph: The 260M LoRA model reports B4 = 0.445 +/- 0.201 (N=4), exhibiting substantially larger variance than the main model's +/- 0.052. This high uncertainty weakens any inference about scaling benefits or generalization and requires explicit discussion or additional controls to support the comparison to the 42M headline result.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: B1 is reported as 0.332 +/- 0.005 without definition; add a brief description of what B1 measures when first introduced in the main text.
  2. [Corpus] Corpus section: The offensive tooling phase (10M tokens) is described at high level but lacks specifics on data sources, collection method, or quality filters used in the eight-VM pipeline.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We appreciate the referee's recognition of our controlled N=4 seed ablations, replay sweeps, and reproducible low-compute pipeline. We address the major comments point by point below.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Abstract and Results] Abstract and Results: The central empirical claim—that rebalancing the SFT mixture to a 1:21 tool-use ratio raises B4 from a 0.000 floor to 0.230 +/- 0.052 at 42M parameters, treating the floor as a pure corpus-density artifact—rests on B4 (tool-selection) and B5 (conversational gate) being valid proxies for cybersecurity utility. No correlation to external tasks, established cybersecurity benchmarks, or downstream outcomes (e.g., API invocation accuracy or exploit generation) is reported. This assumption is load-bearing for interpreting the v7 configuration and the claim that capacity limits are not at play.

    Authors: B4 and B5 are internal evaluation metrics defined to measure the precise capabilities targeted by the work: B4 is the accuracy of correct MCP tool selection and formatting on held-out cybersecurity queries, while B5 measures whether the model appropriately gates tool use versus pure conversational responses. In the low-resource Spanish cybersecurity domain, no established external benchmarks exist that incorporate native MCP-style tool invocation. The rebalancing experiment isolates the effect of tool-use density on lifting B4 from its observed floor, supporting the corpus-density interpretation at this scale. We will add an explicit limitations paragraph acknowledging that these remain proxy metrics without direct correlation to downstream outcomes such as real API success rates or exploit generation. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Results] LoRA replication paragraph: The 260M LoRA model reports B4 = 0.445 +/- 0.201 (N=4), exhibiting substantially larger variance than the main model's +/- 0.052. This high uncertainty weakens any inference about scaling benefits or generalization and requires explicit discussion or additional controls to support the comparison to the 42M headline result.

    Authors: We agree that the reported standard deviation of +/- 0.201 on the 260M LoRA B4 result is substantially larger than the main model's and reduces the strength of any scaling inference. This elevated variance is likely attributable to the smaller effective sample size for tool-use examples under LoRA adaptation. In revision we will qualify the LoRA paragraph to present the result strictly as a replication check, explicitly highlight the higher uncertainty, and refrain from drawing firm generalization conclusions from the comparison. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; empirical results are self-contained

full rationale

The paper reports direct empirical outcomes from training a 42M-parameter decoder-only model on a custom Spanish cybersecurity corpus using curriculum phases, replay, and SFT mixture rebalancing. Benchmark scores such as B4 = 0.230 +/- 0.052 and B5 = 0.725 +/- 0.130 are measured post-training under controlled ablations (e.g., replay percentages and corpus variants), not quantities that reduce by construction to the input mixture ratios or replay fractions via any equation or self-definition. No mathematical derivations, uniqueness theorems, or ansatzes are invoked; loss curves and benchmark lifts are presented as observed experimental results with explicit N=4 seed statistics. The central claims rest on these independent measurements rather than any load-bearing self-citation chain or fitted-input prediction, rendering the reported findings self-contained.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

2 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claims rest on empirical training runs whose success depends on several tuned hyperparameters and the representativeness of the assembled corpus; no new physical or mathematical entities are postulated.

free parameters (2)
  • replay percentage
    Swept over {0,5,10,25,50}% and selected at >=25% to saturate B5 performance.
  • SFT tool-use ratio
    Set to 1:21 after observing B4 floor of 0.000 on default mixture.
axioms (1)
  • domain assumption The chosen transformer components (GQA, QK-Norm, RMSNorm, SwiGLU, RoPE, z-loss) are appropriate for a 42M decoder on this domain.
    Adopted without additional justification or ablation against alternatives.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 6029 in / 1545 out tokens · 54520 ms · 2026-05-22T09:25:55.677944+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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