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Centralized Versus Decentralized Team Games of Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision Systems with Noiseless Information Structures-Part II: Applications
Optimization and Control · Submitted 14 Feb 2013
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim Through the examples, we illustrate the effect of information signaling among the decision makers in reducing the computational complexity of optimal decentralized decision strategies.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless information structures. We present examples of such team games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic forms. In some cases we obtain closed form expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies. Through the examples, we illustrate the effect of information signaling among the decision makers in reducing the computational complexity of optimal decentralized decision strategies.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless information structures. | contribution 0.69 | 0.93 | 0.25 | asserted 1.00 |
| s1 | We present examples of such team games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic forms. | contribution 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.08 | asserted 1.00 |
| s2 | In some cases we obtain closed form expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies. | result 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.11 | asserted 0.82 |
| s3 | Through the examples, we illustrate the effect of information signaling among the decision makers in reducing the computational complexity of optimal decentralized decision strategies. | interpretation 0.63 | 0.92 | 0.28 | asserted 1.00 |
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The paper
Original abstract
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless information structures. We present examples of such team games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic forms. In some cases we obtain closed form expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies. Through the examples, we illustrate the effect of information signaling among the decision makers in reducing the computational complexity of optimal decentralized decision strategies.
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4 arXiv papers cite this in 8 sentences
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Compares with it 1 paper
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(O1): The optimal strategies or laws ([ref]), ([ref]) are precisely the optimal strategies obtained in [ref] for noiseless decentralized information structures.
Team Games Optimality Conditions of Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision Systems with Decentralized Noisy Information Structures · Decentralized Information Structures · 0.96
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