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arxiv: 1407.7937 · v1 · pith:27AF6ZTVnew · submitted 2014-07-30 · 💻 cs.GT · cs.LG

Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences

classification 💻 cs.GT cs.LG
keywords learningutilityworkagentclassescomplexitydataefficient
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A recent line of work, starting with Beigman and Vohra (2006) and Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012), has addressed the problem of {\em learning} a utility function from revealed preference data. The goal here is to make use of past data describing the purchases of a utility maximizing agent when faced with certain prices and budget constraints in order to produce a hypothesis function that can accurately forecast the {\em future} behavior of the agent. In this work we advance this line of work by providing sample complexity guarantees and efficient algorithms for a number of important classes. By drawing a connection to recent advances in multi-class learning, we provide a computationally efficient algorithm with tight sample complexity guarantees ($\Theta(d/\epsilon)$ for the case of $d$ goods) for learning linear utility functions under a linear price model. This solves an open question in Zadimoghaddam and Roth (2012). Our technique yields numerous generalizations including the ability to learn other well-studied classes of utility functions, to deal with a misspecified model, and with non-linear prices.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Rationalizing collective revealed preferences with an application in fair resource allocation

    cs.GT 2026-06 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    CRM rationalizes collective revealed preferences via a surrogate market of androids with computable demands, providing generalization risk bounds and privacy-preserving approximations to proportionally fair allocations.