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Attacking Binarized Neural Networks
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Attacking Binarized Neural Networks
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Neural networks with low-precision weights and activations offer compelling efficiency advantages over their full-precision equivalents. The two most frequently discussed benefits of quantization are reduced memory consumption, and a faster forward pass when implemented with efficient bitwise operations. We propose a third benefit of very low-precision neural networks: improved robustness against some adversarial attacks, and in the worst case, performance that is on par with full-precision models. We focus on the very low-precision case where weights and activations are both quantized to $\pm$1, and note that stochastically quantizing weights in just one layer can sharply reduce the impact of iterative attacks. We observe that non-scaled binary neural networks exhibit a similar effect to the original defensive distillation procedure that led to gradient masking, and a false notion of security. We address this by conducting both black-box and white-box experiments with binary models that do not artificially mask gradients.
Forward citations
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