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SENATE: A Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Protocol in Wireless Networks
Information Theory · Submitted 23 Mar 2018
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim Thereby, SENATE is proof against Sybil attacks since pseudonyms of a faulty node are likely to be adjacent in the WNC space and hence fail to be elected.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
The blockchain technology has achieved tremendous success in open (permissionless) decentralized consensus by employing proof-of-work (PoW) or its variants, whereby unauthorized nodes cannot gain disproportionate impact on consensus beyond their computational power. However, PoW-based systems incur a high delay and low throughput, making them ineffective in dealing with real-time applications. On the other hand, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms with better delay and throughput performance have been employed in closed (permissioned) settings to avoid Sybil attacks. In this paper, we present Sybil-proof wirelEss Network coordinAte based byzanTine consEnsus (SENATE), which is based on the conventional BFT consensus framework yet works in open systems of wireless devices where faulty nodes may launch Sybil attacks. As in a Senate in the legislature where the quota of senators per state (district) is a constant irrespective with the population of the state, "senators" in SENATE are selected from participating distributed nodes based on their wireless network coordinates (WNC) with a fixed number of nodes per district in the WNC space. Elected senators then participate in the subsequent consensus reaching process and broadcast the result. Thereby, SENATE is proof against Sybil attacks since pseudonyms of a faulty node are likely to be adjacent in the WNC space and hence fail to be elected.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | The blockchain technology has achieved tremendous success in open (permissionless) decentralized consensus by employing proof-of-work (PoW) or its variants, whereby unauthorized nodes cannot gain disproportionate impact on consensus beyond their computational power. | background 1.00 | 0.04 | 0.03 | asserted 1.00 |
| s1 | However, PoW-based systems incur a high delay and low throughput, making them ineffective in dealing with real-time applications. | background 0.85 | 0.06 | 0.02 | asserted 1.00 |
| s2 | On the other hand, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms with better delay and throughput performance have been employed in closed (permissioned) settings to avoid Sybil attacks. | background 0.97 | 0.04 | 0.03 | asserted 1.00 |
| s3 | In this paper, we present Sybil-proof wirelEss Network coordinAte based byzanTine consEnsus (SENATE), which is based on the conventional BFT consensus framework yet works in open systems of wireless devices where faulty nodes may launch Sybil attacks. | contribution 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.28 | asserted 0.99 |
| s4 | As in a Senate in the legislature where the quota of senators per state (district) is a constant irrespective with the population of the state, "senators" in SENATE are selected from participating distributed nodes based on their wireless network coordinates (WNC) with a fixed number of nodes per district in the WNC space. | method 0.96 | 0.70 | 0.11 | asserted 1.00 |
| s5 | Elected senators then participate in the subsequent consensus reaching process and broadcast the result. | method 0.99 | 0.28 | 0.05 | asserted 0.99 |
| s6 | Thereby, SENATE is proof against Sybil attacks since pseudonyms of a faulty node are likely to be adjacent in the WNC space and hence fail to be elected. | interpretation 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.57 | asserted 0.76 |
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Original abstract
The blockchain technology has achieved tremendous success in open (permissionless) decentralized consensus by employing proof-of-work (PoW) or its variants, whereby unauthorized nodes cannot gain disproportionate impact on consensus beyond their computational power. However, PoW-based systems incur a high delay and low throughput, making them ineffective in dealing with real-time applications. On the other hand, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms with better delay and throughput performance have been employed in closed (permissioned) settings to avoid Sybil attacks. In this paper, we present Sybil-proof wirelEss Network coordinAte based byzanTine consEnsus (SENATE), which is based on the conventional BFT consensus framework yet works in open systems of wireless devices where faulty nodes may launch Sybil attacks. As in a Senate in the legislature where the quota of senators per state (district) is a constant irrespective with the population of the state, "senators" in SENATE are selected from participating distributed nodes based on their wireless network coordinates (WNC) with a fixed number of nodes per district in the WNC space. Elected senators then participate in the subsequent consensus reaching process and broadcast the result. Thereby, SENATE is proof against Sybil attacks since pseudonyms of a faulty node are likely to be adjacent in the WNC space and hence fail to be elected.
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