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Multi-Category Fairness in Sponsored Search Auctions

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arxiv 1906.08732 v2 pith:H3ULAFZ4 submitted 2019-06-20 cs.GT cs.LG

classification cs.GTcs.LG
keywords fairnessmechanismsfairutilitydesiderataadvertisingplatformachievable
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Fairness in advertising is a topic of particular concern motivated by theoretical and empirical observations in both the computer science and economics literature. We examine the problem of fairness in advertising for general purpose platforms that service advertisers from many different categories. First, we propose inter-category and intra-category fairness desiderata that take inspiration from individual fairness and envy-freeness. Second, we investigate the "platform utility" (a proxy for the quality of the allocation) achievable by mechanisms satisfying these desiderata. More specifically, we compare the utility of fair mechanisms against the unfair optimal, and we show by construction that our fairness desiderata are compatible with utility. That is, we construct a family of fair mechanisms with high utility that perform close to optimally within a class of fair mechanisms. Our mechanisms also enjoy nice implementation properties including metric-obliviousness, which allows the platform to produce fair allocations without needing to know the specifics of the fairness requirements.

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