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arxiv: 1907.02434 · v1 · pith:HQO76YK5new · submitted 2019-07-04 · 💻 cs.CY · cs.CR

Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Dimitris Karakostas , Aggelos Kiayias , Christos Nasikas , Dionysis Zindros This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-25 09:08 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CY cs.CR
keywords cryptocurrencyegalitarianismproof-of-stakeproof-of-workquantitative analysisconsensus mechanismsOuroborosDecred
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The pith

Stake-based cryptocurrencies can achieve perfect egalitarianism with correctly chosen parameters.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper supplies the first numerical definition of egalitarianism in a cryptocurrency, defined as the uniformity of each coin's power to participate in creating new coins. It applies the definition to measure several live systems, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, the Ouroboros proof-of-stake protocol, and the hybrid Decred system. Simulations confirm that ASIC resistance raises the score for proof-of-work coins, yet the highest attainable score, representing perfect equality, is reached by the stake-based and hybrid protocols once their governing parameters are set appropriately.

Core claim

The authors define egalitarianism as the degree to which each individual coin possesses identical power to contribute to block creation, independent of the total holdings of its owner. They compute this quantity for existing proof-of-work coins and find that ASIC-resistant designs improve the score relative to standard designs. For the Ouroboros proof-of-stake protocol and the Decred hybrid, the same computation reaches its theoretical maximum when the parameters that control how stake or work influences minting probability are selected correctly.

What carries the argument

A quantitative egalitarianism metric that measures uniformity in per-coin minting power across participants.

If this is right

  • Proof-of-stake systems reach the maximum egalitarianism score when parameters are tuned to remove any dependence of per-coin minting power on total holdings.
  • ASIC-resistant proof-of-work designs improve egalitarianism relative to standard proof-of-work but fall short of the perfect score achieved by tuned stake-based systems.
  • Hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work systems such as Decred can also attain the perfect egalitarianism score under appropriate parameter choices.
  • The level of egalitarianism in any given cryptocurrency is directly controlled by the choice of its consensus parameters.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The metric could be used to evaluate parameter settings in consensus mechanisms not examined in the paper.
  • Concerns that proof-of-stake inherently favors large holders may be mitigated by parameter selection rather than by switching to proof-of-work.
  • Real deployment data on actual block creation outcomes could be compared against the simulation results to check whether the predicted equality materializes.

Load-bearing premise

The chosen numerical definition, based solely on power to participate in coin creation, correctly captures egalitarianism without additional factors such as hardware costs or network effects.

What would settle it

A simulation of Ouroboros or Decred under the claimed optimal parameters that produces a non-zero variance in minting success rates when measured per coin across different stake sizes.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 1907.02434 by Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, Dimitris Karakostas, Dionysis Zindros.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-work cryptocurrencies ana [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: The egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-stake systems analyzed [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p016_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: An Integer Programming formulation of the optimal investment [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p023_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Bitcoin egalitarian curves under varying parameters. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_4.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian,"S where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency's \emph{egalitarianism}. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency's egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

0 major / 3 minor

Summary. The paper introduces the first quantitative definition of egalitarianism in cryptocurrencies, defined in terms of each coin's power to participate in the creation of new coins. It applies this metric via simulations to several popular cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero) as well as the proof-of-stake protocol Ouroboros and the hybrid Decred, finding that ASIC resistance improves the score and that stake-based protocols can achieve a perfect egalitarianism score under suitably chosen parameters.

Significance. If the definition and simulation methodology hold, the work supplies a concrete, falsifiable metric for comparing consensus mechanisms on an egalitarianism axis and demonstrates that proof-of-stake need not be less egalitarian than proof-of-work under the stated definition. The explicit parameter choices that yield a perfect score for Ouroboros constitute a reproducible, testable prediction that could guide protocol tuning.

minor comments (3)
  1. Abstract: the stray capital-S after the comma in 'egalitarian,'S where' appears to be a formatting artifact and should be removed for clarity.
  2. The simulation section should explicitly state the number of independent runs, random seeds, and convergence criteria used to obtain the reported egalitarianism scores; without these the reproducibility of the 'perfect' Ouroboros result cannot be assessed.
  3. Table or figure captions that present the final scores should include the exact parameter vectors (e.g., stake distribution, block-reward schedule) that produce the perfect score, so readers can verify the claim without re-deriving the simulation.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

0 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their positive evaluation of the manuscript, including the assessment of its significance in providing a falsifiable metric for egalitarianism and the reproducible prediction for Ouroboros parameters. The recommendation of minor revision is noted. No major comments were listed in the report, so we have no specific points requiring response or revision at this stage.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; derivation self-contained

full rationale

The paper introduces an original quantitative definition of egalitarianism (power to participate in coin creation) and then computes its value for protocols via simulation. No load-bearing step reduces the definition to itself, renames a known result, or relies on a self-citation chain for the central claim. The simulations are independent of the definition and produce non-trivial outcomes (e.g., perfect egalitarianism under chosen parameters for Ouroboros), so the argument does not collapse by construction.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

Only the abstract is available; no explicit free parameters, axioms, or invented entities can be identified from the provided text.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5786 in / 982 out tokens · 33538 ms · 2026-05-25T09:08:45.200344+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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