Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Mean Field Games Flock! The Reinforcement Learning Way

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2105.07933 v1 pith:FO4322QL submitted 2021-05-17 cs.MA cs.AI

classification cs.MAcs.AI
keywords flockagentsalgorithmassumptionsbehaviordeepfieldlarge
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock, which is a natural behavior observed in large populations of animals. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock's average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Finite-Sample Convergence Bounds for Trust Region Policy Optimization in Mean-Field Games

    stat.ML 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Exact and sample-based trust-region policy optimization provably converge to approximate Nash equilibria in finite mean-field games with Õ(1/ε^6) sample complexity.

Pith tools