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Understanding the Security of Deepfake Detection

Cryptography and Security · Submitted 5 Jul 2021

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim Our results highlight that deepfake detection should consider the adversarial nature of the problem.

how it is stated · asserted 0.68 read the record →

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arXiv ID2107.02045 (version 3)
Pith IDEOMZQEUS, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationNeil Zhenqiang Gong, Xiaoyu Cao. "Understanding the Security of Deepfake Detection." arXiv:2107.02045 (2021). https://pith.science/paper/EOMZQEUS
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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 9,549 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.13 · states limitation 0.18 · human participants 0.03 · controlled comparison 0.38 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.97 · compares with prior results 0.75 · mentions code or data availability 0.03.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v3. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Deepfakes pose growing challenges to the trust of information on the Internet. Thus, detecting deepfakes has attracted increasing attentions from both academia and industry. State-of-the-art deepfake detection methods consist of two key components, i.e., face extractor and face classifier, which extract the face region in an image and classify it to be real/fake, respectively. Existing studies mainly focused on improving the detection performance in non-adversarial settings, leaving security of deepfake detection in adversarial settings largely unexplored. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap. In particular, we perform a systematic measurement study to understand the security of the state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. We use two large-scale public deepfakes data sources including FaceForensics++ and Facebook Deepfake Detection Challenge, where the deepfakes are fake face images; and we train state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods. These detection methods can achieve 0.94--0.99 accuracies in non-adversarial settings on these datasets. However, our measurement results uncover multiple security limitations of the deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. First, we find that an attacker can evade a face extractor, i.e., the face extractor fails to extract the correct face regions, via adding small Gaussian noise to its deepfake images. Second, we find that a face classifier trained using deepfakes generated by one method cannot detect deepfakes generated by another method, i.e., an attacker can evade detection via generating deepfakes using a new method. Third, we find that an attacker can leverage backdoor attacks developed by the adversarial machine learning community to evade a face classifier. Our results highlight that deepfake detection should consider the adversarial nature of the problem.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Deepfakes pose growing challenges to the trust of information on the Internet. background 1.00 0.03 0.02 asserted 1.00
s1 Thus, detecting deepfakes has attracted increasing attentions from both academia and industry. background 1.00 0.04 0.02 asserted 1.00
s2 State-of-the-art deepfake detection methods consist of two key components, i.e., face extractor and face classifier, which extract the face region in an image and classify it to be real/fake, respectively. background 0.99 0.04 0.02 asserted 1.00
s3 Existing studies mainly focused on improving the detection performance in non-adversarial settings, leaving security of deepfake detection in adversarial settings largely unexplored. gap 1.00 0.05 0.04 asserted 1.00
s4 In this work, we aim to bridge the gap. contribution 0.89 0.31 0.03 asserted 0.65
s5 In particular, we perform a systematic measurement study to understand the security of the state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. contribution 0.94 0.92 0.05 asserted 0.91
s6 We use two large-scale public deepfakes data sources including FaceForensics++ and Facebook Deepfake Detection Challenge, where the deepfakes are fake face images; and we train state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods. method 0.99 0.94 0.02 asserted 0.99
s7 These detection methods can achieve 0.94--0.99 accuracies in non-adversarial settings on these datasets. result 0.96 0.81 0.03 asserted 1.00
s8 However, our measurement results uncover multiple security limitations of the deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. result 0.99 0.95 0.35 asserted 1.00
s9 First, we find that an attacker can evade a face extractor, i.e., the face extractor fails to extract the correct face regions, via adding small Gaussian noise to its deepfake images. result 1.00 0.95 0.08 asserted 1.00
s10 Second, we find that a face classifier trained using deepfakes generated by one method cannot detect deepfakes generated by another method, i.e., an attacker can evade detection via generating deepfakes using a new method. result 0.99 0.92 0.10 asserted 1.00
s11 Third, we find that an attacker can leverage backdoor attacks developed by the adversarial machine learning community to evade a face classifier. result 1.00 0.90 0.07 asserted 1.00
s12 Our results highlight that deepfake detection should consider the adversarial nature of the problem. interpretation 0.97 0.46 0.88 asserted 0.68

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: empirical study 1.00 · evidence from observation or experiment 1.00.

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Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

Deepfakes pose growing challenges to the trust of information on the Internet. Thus, detecting deepfakes has attracted increasing attentions from both academia and industry. State-of-the-art deepfake detection methods consist of two key components, i.e., face extractor and face classifier, which extract the face region in an image and classify it to be real/fake, respectively. Existing studies mainly focused on improving the detection performance in non-adversarial settings, leaving security of deepfake detection in adversarial settings largely unexplored. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap. In particular, we perform a systematic measurement study to understand the security of the state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. We use two large-scale public deepfakes data sources including FaceForensics++ and Facebook Deepfake Detection Challenge, where the deepfakes are fake face images; and we train state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods. These detection methods can achieve 0.94--0.99 accuracies in non-adversarial settings on these datasets. However, our measurement results uncover multiple security limitations of the deepfake detection methods in adversarial settings. First, we find that an attacker can evade a face extractor, i.e., the face extractor fails to extract the correct face regions, via adding small Gaussian noise to its deepfake images. Second, we find that a face classifier trained using deepfakes generated by one method cannot detect deepfakes generated by another method, i.e., an attacker can evade detection via generating deepfakes using a new method. Third, we find that an attacker can leverage backdoor attacks developed by the adversarial machine learning community to evade a face classifier. Our results highlight that deepfake detection should consider the adversarial nature of the problem.

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