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BadPre: Task-agnostic Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained NLP Foundation Models
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Pre-trained Natural Language Processing (NLP) models can be easily adapted to a variety of downstream language tasks. This significantly accelerates the development of language models. However, NLP models have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where a pre-defined trigger word in the input text causes model misprediction. Previous NLP backdoor attacks mainly focus on some specific tasks. This makes those attacks less general and applicable to other kinds of NLP models and tasks. In this work, we propose \Name, the first task-agnostic backdoor attack against the pre-trained NLP models. The key feature of our attack is that the adversary does not need prior information about the downstream tasks when implanting the backdoor to the pre-trained model. When this malicious model is released, any downstream models transferred from it will also inherit the backdoor, even after the extensive transfer learning process. We further design a simple yet effective strategy to bypass a state-of-the-art defense. Experimental results indicate that our approach can compromise a wide range of downstream NLP tasks in an effective and stealthy way.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
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Merge Hijacking: Backdoor Attacks to Model Merging of Large Language Models
Merge Hijacking is a backdoor attack that lets a malicious LLM checkpoint poison any model it is merged with while preserving normal behavior.
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MT4DP: Data Poisoning Attack Detection for DL-based Code Search Models via Metamorphic Testing
MT4DP flags a code search query as poisoned when rewriting it changes the ranking of code more than a threshold, but the main evaluation is weakened by synthetic trigger insertion and threshold tuning on the test set.
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Pruning Strategies for Backdoor Defense in LLMs
Attention-head pruning partially lowers backdoor attack effects in BERT without trigger knowledge, but the best strategy depends on trigger type and the attack is weakened, not removed.
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