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DE-RSTC: A rational secure two-party computation protocol based on direction entropy

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arxiv 2110.09160 v2 pith:4BIE3HLY submitted 2021-10-18 cs.CR

DE-RSTC: A rational secure two-party computation protocol based on direction entropy

classification cs.CR
keywords directioninformationprotocolrationalutilitycomputationmutualparties
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Rational secure multi-party computation (RSMC) means two or more rational parties to complete a function on private inputs. In the process, the rational parties choose strategies to maximize utility, which will cause players to maliciously execute the protocol and undermine the fairness and correctness of the protocol. To solve this problem, we leverage game theory to propose the direction entropy-based solution. First, we utilize the direction vector of the direction entropy to examine the player's strategy uncertainty and quantify its strategy from different dimensions. Specifically, when parties choose a cooperation strategy, the direction vector is positive, and the information transmitted is positive, conversely, it is negative information. Then, we provide mutual information to construct new utility functions for the players. What's more, we measure the mutual information of players to appraise their strategies. Finally, we prove in detail the protocol we gave, and the result show that the fairness problem in rational secure two-party computation. We also prove that the proposed protocol reaches the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we conduct experiments using mutual information to construct utility, and the results show that the utility obtained when the player is honest will be higher.

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