Pith. sign in

REVIEW

Shielding Federated Learning: Robust Aggregation with Adaptive Client Selection

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2204.13256 v4 pith:ZI6WPMSF submitted 2022-04-28 cs.CR cs.DC

Shielding Federated Learning: Robust Aggregation with Adaptive Client Selection

classification cs.CR cs.DC
keywords clientsclientmaliciousselectionaggregationattacksdefensesmab-rfl
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
0 comments
read the original abstract

Federated learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train an accurate global model while protecting clients' data privacy. However, FL is susceptible to Byzantine attacks from malicious participants. Although the problem has gained significant attention, existing defenses have several flaws: the server irrationally chooses malicious clients for aggregation even after they have been detected in previous rounds; the defenses perform ineffectively against sybil attacks or in the heterogeneous data setting. To overcome these issues, we propose MAB-RFL, a new method for robust aggregation in FL. By modelling the client selection as an extended multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, we propose an adaptive client selection strategy to choose honest clients that are more likely to contribute high-quality updates. We then propose two approaches to identify malicious updates from sybil and non-sybil attacks, based on which rewards for each client selection decision can be accurately evaluated to discourage malicious behaviors. MAB-RFL achieves a satisfying balance between exploration and exploitation on the potential benign clients. Extensive experimental results show that MAB-RFL outperforms existing defenses in three attack scenarios under different percentages of attackers.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.