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Self-Play PSRO: Toward Optimal Populations in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

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arxiv 2207.06541 v1 pith:7K5TNGVW submitted 2022-07-13 cs.GT cs.LGcs.MA

classification cs.GTcs.LGcs.MA
keywords populationemphoptimalpsropoliciespolicysp-psroadds
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best response policies to a population. Eventually, an optimal mixture of these population policies will approximate a Nash equilibrium. However, these methods might need to add all deterministic policies before converging. In this work, we introduce \emph{Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO)}, a method that adds an approximately optimal stochastic policy to the population in each iteration. Instead of adding only deterministic best responses to the opponent's least exploitable population mixture, SP-PSRO also learns an approximately optimal stochastic policy and adds it to the population as well. As a result, SP-PSRO empirically tends to converge much faster than APSRO and in many games converges in just a few iterations.

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