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Rethinking Backdoor Data Poisoning Attacks in the Context of Semi-Supervised Learning
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Semi-supervised learning methods can train high-accuracy machine learning models with a fraction of the labeled training samples required for traditional supervised learning. Such methods do not typically involve close review of the unlabeled training samples, making them tempting targets for data poisoning attacks. In this paper we investigate the vulnerabilities of semi-supervised learning methods to backdoor data poisoning attacks on the unlabeled samples. We show that simple poisoning attacks that influence the distribution of the poisoned samples' predicted labels are highly effective - achieving an average attack success rate as high as 96.9%. We introduce a generalized attack framework targeting semi-supervised learning methods to better understand and exploit their limitations and to motivate future defense strategies.
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Filter, Obstruct and Dilute: Defending Against Backdoor Attacks on Semi-Supervised Learning
Backdoor Invalidator combines Gaussian filtering, complementary learning, and trigger mix-up to reduce backdoor attack success in semi-supervised image classifiers from 84.7% to 1.8% average while mostly preserving cl...
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