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Uncharted Territory: Energy Attacks in the Battery-less Internet of Things

Cryptography and Security · Submitted 17 Apr 2023

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim Through an independent exploratory study and a follow-up systematic analysis, we demonstrate that by exerting limited control on ambient energy one can create situations of livelock, denial of service, and priority inversion, without physical device access.

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arXiv ID2304.08224 (version 2)
Pith IDTDUK7JVP, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationArslan Hameed, Luca Mottola, Thiemo Voigt. "Uncharted Territory: Energy Attacks in the Battery-less Internet of Things." arXiv:2304.08224 (2023). https://pith.science/paper/TDUK7JVP
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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 6,225 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.07 · states limitation 0.28 · human participants 0.10 · controlled comparison 0.86 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.98 · compares with prior results 0.97 · mentions code or data availability 0.03.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v2. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

We study how ambient energy harvesting may be used as an attack vector in the battery-less Internet of Things (IoT). Battery-less IoT devices rely on ambient energy harvesting and are employed in a multitude of applications, including safety-critical ones such as biomedical implants. Due to scarce energy intakes and limited energy buffers, their executions become intermittent, alternating periods of active operation with periods of recharging energy buffers. Through an independent exploratory study and a follow-up systematic analysis, we demonstrate that by exerting limited control on ambient energy one can create situations of livelock, denial of service, and priority inversion, without physical device access. We call these situations energy attacks. Using concepts of approximate intermittent computing and machine learning, we design a technique that can detect energy attacks with 92%+ accuracy, that is, up to 37% better than the baselines, and with up to one fifth of their energy overhead. Crucially, by design, our technique does not cause any additional energy failure compared to the regular intermittent processing. We conclude with directions to inspire defense techniques and a discussion on the feasibility of energy attacks.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 We study how ambient energy harvesting may be used as an attack vector in the battery-less Internet of Things (IoT). contribution 0.97 0.79 0.06 hedged possibility 0.94
s1 Battery-less IoT devices rely on ambient energy harvesting and are employed in a multitude of applications, including safety-critical ones such as biomedical implants. background 1.00 0.05 0.02 asserted 1.00
s2 Due to scarce energy intakes and limited energy buffers, their executions become intermittent, alternating periods of active operation with periods of recharging energy buffers. background 1.00 0.06 0.02 asserted 1.00
s3 Through an independent exploratory study and a follow-up systematic analysis, we demonstrate that by exerting limited control on ambient energy one can create situations of livelock, denial of service, and priority inversion, without physical device access. result 0.79 0.96 0.58 asserted 1.00
s4 We call these situations energy attacks. contribution 0.67 0.66 0.07 asserted 0.95
s5 Using concepts of approximate intermittent computing and machine learning, we design a technique that can detect energy attacks with 92%+ accuracy, that is, up to 37% better than the baselines, and with up to one fifth of their energy overhead. result 0.44 0.96 0.27 asserted 1.00
s6 Crucially, by design, our technique does not cause any additional energy failure compared to the regular intermittent processing. result 0.84 0.91 0.12 asserted 1.00
s7 We conclude with directions to inspire defense techniques and a discussion on the feasibility of energy attacks. future work 1.00 0.48 0.36 unclear 0.81

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: method or tool 0.88 · evidence from observation or experiment 0.99.

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Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

We study how ambient energy harvesting may be used as an attack vector in the battery-less Internet of Things (IoT). Battery-less IoT devices rely on ambient energy harvesting and are employed in a multitude of applications, including safety-critical ones such as biomedical implants. Due to scarce energy intakes and limited energy buffers, their executions become intermittent, alternating periods of active operation with periods of recharging energy buffers. Through an independent exploratory study and a follow-up systematic analysis, we demonstrate that by exerting limited control on ambient energy one can create situations of livelock, denial of service, and priority inversion, without physical device access. We call these situations energy attacks. Using concepts of approximate intermittent computing and machine learning, we design a technique that can detect energy attacks with 92%+ accuracy, that is, up to 37% better than the baselines, and with up to one fifth of their energy overhead. Crucially, by design, our technique does not cause any additional energy failure compared to the regular intermittent processing. We conclude with directions to inspire defense techniques and a discussion on the feasibility of energy attacks.

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  • We elect to use support vector machines in the first place because of their extreme accuracy for binary classification [ref] , which is precisely our case, and their optimal trade-off between accuracy of classification and resource consumption [ref] .

    Benchmarking TinyML Systems: Challenges and Direction · Design Space · 0.96

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