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Attacking by Aligning: Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks on Object Detection
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Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown unprecedented success in object detection tasks. However, it was also discovered that DNNs are vulnerable to multiple kinds of attacks, including Backdoor Attacks. Through the attack, the attacker manages to embed a hidden backdoor into the DNN such that the model behaves normally on benign data samples, but makes attacker-specified judgments given the occurrence of a predefined trigger. Although numerous backdoor attacks have been experimented on image classification, backdoor attacks on object detection tasks have not been properly investigated and explored. As object detection has been adopted as an important module in multiple security-sensitive applications such as autonomous driving, backdoor attacks on object detection could pose even more severe threats. Inspired by the inherent property of deep learning-based object detectors, we propose a simple yet effective backdoor attack method against object detection without modifying the ground truth annotations, specifically focusing on the object disappearance attack and object generation attack. Extensive experiments and ablation studies prove the effectiveness of our attack on the benchmark object detection dataset MSCOCO2017, on which we achieve an attack success rate of more than 92% with a poison rate of only 5%.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
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Twin Trigger Generative Networks for Backdoor Attacks against Object Detection
A twin trigger generative network scheme shows that object detectors can be backdoored with one invisible trigger during training and a different visible trigger during inference.
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AnywhereDoor: Multi-Target Backdoor Attacks on Object Detection
AnywhereDoor makes a single backdoored object detector controllable at inference time to remove, mislabel, or fabricate objects, across all classes or specific ones.
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Bounding-box Watermarking: Defense against Model Extraction Attacks on Object Detectors
A backdoor watermarking scheme for object detectors that poisons bounding-box coordinates in API responses, enabling near-perfect detection of extracted models in several settings.
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